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ABSTRACT

Mohamed, Azza. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2013. Welfare Impacts of False
Codling Moth Threatening California Oranges. Major Professor: Philip Paarlberg.

Welfare impacts of alternative pest management strategies of False Codling Moth
(FCM) threatening California’s oranges are examined. Different economic agents along
the supply chain of fresh oranges and orange products in the United States are
considered, including consumers, retailers, wholesalers, and growers. A partial
equilibrium dynamic framework that accounts for supply response from the other US
orange producing states is developed. Data for supply shocks (orange yield losses and
control costs) are obtained from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the
United States Department of Agriculture (APHIS).
FCM is not presently in the United States. If introduced to California and no action
is taken for its control, FCM can spread in all of California’s orange acreage within 10-12
years resulting in an annual crop loss of 11.25%. In addition to a No Mitigation Scenario,
three pest management scenarios are considered for control/eradication of the pest where
growers in infested areas are assumed to pay all the costs: The Pesticide Treatment and
Area-Wide Pest Management scenarios slow down the pest spread to reach 9.3% and
1.89% of California’s orange bearing acreage in 30 years respectively. The annual per
acre cost is $380.9 for the former scenario and $2310.5 for the later scenario. The
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Eradication Scenario eradicates the pest in seven years (the pest almost disappears in the
second year) at an annual cost of $3508.5 per acre besides stripping off the entire yield of
the infested orchard.
The results show that California orange growers’ ranking of the alternative
scenarios in terms of their total welfare impacts in 30 years is opposite to that of
consumers and retailers in all the US regions, California wholesalers and the US as a
whole. The No Mitigation Scenario which leads to the highest welfare losses for the US
as a whole (-$1240 million) is associated with the highest gains for California orange
growers ($1063 million). The Eradication Scenario which results in the lowest welfare
losses for the US as whole (-4 million) is associated with the lowest welfare gains for
California orange growers in non-infested areas and the highest individual grower
welfare losses for California orange growers in infested areas (a total loss of -$0.93
million for all California orange growers).

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1

Background and Problem Statement

The introduction of a plant pest outbreak to an environment can have significant
economic and ecological impacts. For example, the citrus canker infestation in Florida
consumed over $1.4 billion of federal and state expenditures in efforts to combat the
disease (Lowe 2009). Also, the total acreage of orange in Florida was reduced by 32% in
2008 from its level in 1996. Although it is not clear whether all such losses in acreage can
be attributed to citrus canker, 87,000 acres of orange trees representing 10% of the total
orange acreage in Florida were lost in eradication efforts (Lowe 2009). This is besides
yield losses, higher production costs, loss of some markets, and the environmental
impacts of pesticide use.
Management of plant pests and other invasive species may trigger government
regulation. The individual or company who introduces or spreads a potentially invasive
plant pest may not bear the full costs associated with their action so that private and
social costs diverge. Even if the source of incursion of the pest incurs some costs, the cost
to other agents and non-market costs may not be internalized in private decisions. In
addition, prevention and control of plant pest outbreaks can require extensive monitoring
and surveillance both by the regulatory authority and market agents. Although there may
be market incentives to control plant pests, market failures at the prevention, eradication

2
and control stages may entail a role for government at one or more of such stages (Alam
and Rofle 2006).
Identification of the appropriate management policy is a critical decision facing
regulators. Management policies may require huge government funds and may have
impacts on several stakeholders, including consumers, retailers, wholesalers, growers, as
well as export and import markets. Therefore, the choice of the pest risk management
regulation should be based on pest risk assessment that considers the relevant economic
welfare effects on the different agents. The welfare effects should be decomposed to
consider the disproportionate impacts the regulation might have on certain sub-groups
that are traditionally treated as homogeneous, like producers (Paarlberg, Lee, and
Seitzinger 2003). Also, the welfare analysis should consider the trade impacts, even if the
object of the regulation is not international trade. For example, applying an eradication
policy that entails tree removals and quarantines implies reduction in the product supply.
The extent to which the product price increases in the domestic market and the
subsequent impacts on producer and consumer surplus is affected by the possibility that
imports fill the gaps in demand. If the product is also exported, the export market
regulations following the pest outbreak are important to consider. A ban on exports may
imply more of the domestic production available to domestic consumers; thus offsetting
or more than offsetting the impact of the reduction in supply due to the pest.
In addition, depending on the pathway of the pest introduction and spread, the pest
management regulation should consider the country’s obligations under the relevant
international agreements. For example, the World Trade Organization Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) requires that such
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regulations be based on risk assessment, applied to the extent necessary to protect plant
life or health, and “should not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries
where identical or similar conditions prevail” (WTO 1994). Thus, even a domestic
regulation may affect the country’s compliance with its commitments under the SPS
Agreement. For instance, the United States had to review its restrictions on imports of
Unshu oranges from South Korea to be consistent with the regulations imposed on
Florida orange producers (USDA-APHIS 2010).
Moreover, the economic pest risk assessment studies should consider the dynamic
nature of pest spread and the lagged response of agricultural crops to changes in price,
especially perennial crops. Tree crops are characterized by (1) a long time lag between
initial input and first output, (2) output flows from the investment decision are extended
over a long period of time, and (3) a gradual reduction of the productive capacity of the
plants (French and Mathews 1971). In addition to the lagged response of tree crops to
price changes and high adjustment costs, the loss from a plant pest, if it results in tree
death or removal, is more perpetuated than for annual crops as it takes a long time for
new trees to enter into the production stage. Moreover, there is high uncertainty
associated with the growers’ decision with respect to price expectations, as well as the
pest risk. Therefore, it is important to note the uncertainty in probability of pest
introduction and assessment of economic consequences in the selection of a pest
management option (FAO 2004).
One of the pest risk assessment issues currently examined by US regulators is False
Codling Moth threatening California’s oranges. Fresh oranges constitute 22% of the US
per capita consumption of fresh fruit (USDA-ERS 2012). California’s orange production
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represents 25% of the US total orange production. However, it represents 74.3% of the
US orange production directed to the fresh market (USDA-ERS 2012). California directs
82% of its production of oranges to the fresh market (USDA-NASS 2012). The rest of its
production is directed to orange-based processed products (mainly juice) where
California constitutes less than 8% of the US orange production. Florida dominates the
United States market of orange-based processed products with a market share exceeding
90%. It directs more than 95% of its production to the orange for processing market.
California and Florida together represent 97% of the United States total orange
production. Arizona and Texas constituted the remaining share of the market in the last
30 years. However, no commercial production has been recorded for Arizona since
2008/2009 (USDA-ERS 2012).
False Codling Moth is not currently present in the United States. There have been
2622 border interceptions at 34 US ports between 1984 and 2013, and one domestic
interception of an adult male in Ventura County, California, in 2008. No adult females
have been detected yet. There is a risk that False Codling Moth becomes established in
California, given the similarity of weather conditions between California and the foreign
regions where the pest is established. If no action is taken to control the False Codling
Moth, it can spread in all California’s orange growing areas within 10 to 12 years,
causing an average loss of 11.25% of California’s orange production per year
(PERAL/NCSU 2013).
Therefore, several mitigation options are considered to control/eradicate the pest.
Growers in infested areas will incur all the control/eradication costs. In the first scenario,
growers in infested areas are required to apply pesticides which implies an annual
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additional cultural cost of $380.88 per acre. This scenario slows down the pest spread
such that 9% of California’s orange acreage is projected to be infested by the pest in 30
years. The expected crop loss reaches 1.05% of California’s orange production in the 30th
year of the projection period. The second scenario is an Area-Wide Pest Management
program, where growers in infested areas are required to apply pesticides in addition to
requirements of stripping off the infested fruits and perform some sanitization. This costs
them an additional $2310.5 per acre. The pest spreads gradually to cover 1.89% of
California’s orange acreage in the 30th year of the projection period, resulting in the loss
of 0.21% of California’s orange crop in that year. The third scenario is an eradication
scenario where growers in infested areas are required to destroy the entire orchard yield,
in addition to application of Sterile Insect and Mating Disruption Techniques. The total
cost incurred by growers in infested areas is $3508.8 per year. Under this scenario, the
pest spreads in the first year in 0.4% of California’s orange acreage until it is totally
eliminated in seven years. The alternative mitigation strategies can have varying impacts
on the different stakeholders to California’s orange industry. Those stakeholders include
orange growers, wholesalers, retailers, and consumers in California as well as the other
United States regions.
Thus, the problem is that in order for regulators to make an informed decision
about which pest management policy of False Codling Moth to select, they need to
understand the economic welfare trade-offs among the different stakeholders to
California’s orange industry. The objective of the current research is to identify the tradeoffs in economic welfare among the different agents in the United States orange market
under the alternative pest management strategies of False Codling Moth in California.
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In order to achieve that objective, the study develops a partial equilibrium model
for the analysis of economic impacts of pest management strategies of False Codling
Moth on California’s orange industry. The analysis contributes to the pest management
literature through examining the welfare impacts on consumers, retailers, wholesalers and
growers of fresh oranges and orange-based processed products in the different United
Stated regions. It also decomposes the welfare impacts of the different pest mitigation
programs on growers in infested and non-infested areas within California. This fills a gap
in the previous research on pest management which limited the analysis to the welfare
impacts on farmers and consumers, and did not consider the impacts on wholesalers and
retailers. Also, most of the previous research presented the aggregate welfare impacts of
alternate pest management policies on farmers in the affected region without distinction
between the impacts on growers in infested and non-infested areas.
Another contribution of the current research is that it accounts for the dynamic
nature of oranges as a tree crop while considering the supply response and welfare
impacts on the other United States orange producing regions. Also, the current study
integrates input from the output of a pest spread model developed by the United States
Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and North
Carolina State University (PERAL/NCSU 2013).
The economic model developed in the current study accounts for a wider scope of
supply and demand shocks than those relating to the specific case of False Codling Moth.
Therefore, it can be readily applied to a wide variety of pest management problems in any
of the three orange US producing regions. In addition, the framework of analysis can be
applied to similar pest management problems of other trees and perennial crops.
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1.2

Data and Methodology

In order to meet the objective of the research, a partial equilibrium model that
projects the economic impacts of phytosanitary measures for 30 years on the different
stakeholders (consumers, retailers, wholesalers, and orange growers) along the US supply
chain of fresh oranges and orange-based processed products in a dynamic framework is
developed. Consumer demand for oranges is determined using partial budgeting. Supply
and derived demand relationships between retailers-wholesalers, and wholesalers-orange
growers in the fresh orange and orange-based processed products are represented in a
Ricardo-Viner framework where labor is a mobile input, capital is an industry-specific
input, and orange is an intermediate input. Supply of oranges by growers is an investment
decision where growers respond to changes in expected relative returns to costs.
The model comprises five regions: (1) California, the region under risk and is the
US main producer of oranges directed to the fresh market; (2) Florida , the US main
producer of oranges directed to the processing market; (3) Arizona and Texas which
represent the other regions producing oranges in the US, and constitute a minor share of
the US orange production; (4) Rest of the US, domestic regions that do not produce
oranges; (5) Rest of the World, which is a net importer of fresh oranges from the United
States, and a net exporter of orange-based processed products to the United States.
International trade of the United States is modeled in an excess supply-excess demand
framework.
The inputs and outputs of the partial equilibrium model outlined above are
illustrated in Figure 1-1. The model equations are expressed in total logarithmic
differential form. Therefore, numerical solution of the model requires baseline data and
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elasticities which comprise the first two categories of inputs to the model. Baseline data
include US orange supply and use, orange prices at the different market levels, orange
grower costs and returns, and orange yield and acreage grouped by age in each state.
Since the economic impacts of the alternative pest management scenarios are projected
for a future thirty-year period, the values of the different baseline data variables are
forecast for the period (2014/15-2043/44). The forecasts are conducted through the
application of Vector Autoregression Model (VAR) and Ordinary Least Squares.
Elasticities are econometrically estimated in the current study, drawn from the literature,
or assumed based on judgment and model validation. Historical data for the period
(1980/81 to 2011/12) are employed for the data projection and econometric estimation of
elasticities. Such data are obtained from multiple internet sources including the US
Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, National Agriculture Statistics
and Foreign Agriculture Service, as well as Florida Department of Citrus, California
Department of Agriculture, University of Florida and University of California, Davis.
The third category of model inputs is supply shocks which comprise orange yield
losses and changes in grower costs. Projected per acre orange yield losses in each year of
the thirty-year study period, expressed as projected percentage reduction in orange yield,
under the alternative pest management scenarios are obtained from the US Department of
Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and North Carolina State
University (PERAL/NCSU 2013). PEARL/NCSU(2013) projects the crop damages
under the alternative pest management scenarios using a pest/disease spread model,
Exotic Pest Analysis Tool (EXPAT). Changes in grower costs, which include additional

9
pest mitigation costs and savings of costs dependent on yield per acre like harvest cost
and growth regulator costs, are also provided by (PEARL/NCSU 2013).
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Figure 1-1: Model Input and Output

1.3

Organization of Chapters

The dissertation consists of seven chapters. First, the current chapter provides an
introduction to the research topic, research problem and objectives, hypotheses, and
methodology. The second chapter presents a review of the literature on economic
assessment of pest management policies, as well as the literature on supply response of
perennial crops. The third chapter provides an overview of the United States orange
industry. The fourth chapter presents the conceptual framework of the analysis of orange
pest management alternative policies. It starts with presentation of the model structure
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along the fresh orange and orange-based processed products supply chains in each of the
US regions in light of the industry structure overviewed in the third chapter. Then, the
global market clearing conditions are presented. The fifth chapter presents the estimation
of the model parameters, data employed in the model, data projections for 30 years, and
model validation. The sixth chapter is an application of the model in the analysis of the
economic impacts of the alternative mitigation strategies of the False Codling Moth
threatening California’s oranges on consumers, producers, wholesalers, and retailers in
California as well as other regions. The seventh chapter highlights the conclusions and
suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides a review of the literature covering two areas. The first section
provides an overview of literature applying the main tools for economic pest risk
analysis, including budget sharing, partial equilibrium models, general equilibrium
models, and optimal control. The second section presents the literature on modeling
supply response of perennial crops.

2.1

Economic Pest Risk Analysis

The scope of research on pests and other invasive species is wide and it combines
several components into an inter-disciplinary framework (Cororaton et. al. 2009). This
framework can be outlined through the three stages of pest risk analysis in the
International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures-11 (FAO 2004) : Stage 1 (initiating
the process) is purely based on risk science as it focuses on identification of the pests
representing potential risk that should be subject to risk assessment ; Stage 2 (risk
assessment) starts with determining whether the pest in question satisfies the criteria for
being a quarantine pest, then evaluates the probability of pest entry, establishment, and
spread, and the associated economic impacts; Stage 3 (risk management) involves two
steps: The first is identifying pest management alternatives for alleviation of the risks
associated with the pest as identified in the risk management stage . The second is
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evaluating the management options for “efficacy, feasibility and impact in order to select
those that are appropriate”.
The thesis of this research relates to the second step of the risk management stage
which focuses on evaluating the economic impacts of already identified options for risk
management. In this regard, three techniques of economic pest risk analysis are
mentioned by the International Standard for Phytosanitary Measures on pest risk analysis
(FAO 2004): partial budgeting, partial equilibrium modeling, and general equilibrium
modeling. Those techniques are covered by the current literature review. Also, the
optimal control approach is briefly reviewed.

2.1.1

Partial Budgeting Models

Partial Budgeting is mainly suitable when the economic impacts associated with the
pest are limited to producers and are relatively small (FAO 2004). It employs fixed
budgets and fixed coefficients such that variables like prices and production are
exogenously defined. However, a pest infestation problem may have long term impacts
on prices and market dynamics which implies that partial budgeting is not adequate for a
comprehensive pest risk assessment study but it can be used for a preliminary assessment
(Soliman et. al. 2010).
For example, Cook et. al.(2011) used partial equilibrium analysis and partial
budgeting to analyze the consequences for Australia of allowing quarantine restricted
imports of apples from New Zealand, given that Australia banned apple imports from all
countries to prevent the risk of fire blight disease. A partial equilibrium model was used
to estimate the welfare gains of moving from an autarkic situation to the restricted trade
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situation. Variability of the parameters (elasticties of demand and supply, and prices) was
incorporated in the analysis assuming Pert Distribution. The net present value of the gains
from trade was calculated for 30 years.
Partial budgeting combined with a stratified dispersal model was used to simulate
the arrival, spread and impact of the disease in order to estimate the losses in production
under two scenarios: (1) pest eradication, and (2) pest control. The annualized welfare
gains due to moving from an autarkic situation to the restricted trade are added to the
losses from disease spread to estimate the net gains/losses from the quarantine-restricted
trade. The analysis showed that the gains from trade did not outweigh the production
losses.
The above analysis considered the evolution of the disease spread over time, as
well as the time it takes for the removal and replacement of apple trees. However, it did
not account for the response of producers and consumers to price changes resulting from
the possible decrease in production due to disease infestation in the case the disease is not
naturalized, or resulting from control costs incurred by the producers in the case the
disease is naturalized.

2.1.2

Partial Equilibrium Models

Partial equilibrium models rely on “microeconomic representations of supply and
demand and are used to assess the effects of a policy intervention or other shocks on
equilibrium, i.e. on the changes in price, quantity and welfare” (Beghin and Bureau
2001). This represents an advantage for partial equilibrium models over partial budgeting
models which do not consider price changes and welfare impacts, and gravity models
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which only account for the impacts of regulations on trade flows (Beghin and Bureau
2001). However, unlike general equilibrium models, partial equilibrium models do not
include linkages to all other sectors in the economy and treats national income and
expenditure as exogenous. Thus, partial equilibrium models are more suitable when the
sector under study is relatively small compared to the total economy, and when there are
specific complexities in the sector under study that need to be reflected in the analysis.
Roberts et. al. (1999) outlined the basic framework for the analysis of trade and
welfare effects of alternative technical regulations in agricultural markets using a partial
equilibrium model. The framework comprised three different components that can be
used separately or combined depending on the nature of the regulation. The first
component is the regulatory protection effect which reflects the fact that domestic
producers may gain some rents due to the regulation. In some cases, countries might
adopt a technical regulation for protecting production as its main goal without a real risk
associated with imports. Meanwhile, the second component is a supply shift element that
addresses the impacts of imports on domestic supply and the costs of imposing
phytosanitary measures on imports that will eliminate the threat of infestation. Finally,
the third is a demand shift element where the regulation impact on imports involves costs
to the consumer, but it may include information that can affect the consumers’ demand
for the product.
Several studies can be categorized under the framework outlined by Roberts et. al
(1999). For example, Peterson and Orden (2008) used a partial equilibrium model to
compare three scenarios for regulations of US imports of Hass avocados from Mexico
considering compliance costs in Mexico, subsequent pest risks, and US producers’
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control costs and production losses. The scenarios were: (a) the 2004 rule which provided
unlimited seasonal and geographical access with compliance measures (the baseline
scenario), (b) unlimited access without fruit fly compliance measures, and (c) unlimited
access without all compliance measures.
In all cases, there was a net welfare gain for the United States compared to the
restrictions preceding the 2004 rule, as the gains in consumers’ surplus due to lower
prices offset producers’ welfare losses. The results were robust to changes in the
compliance costs and the various estimates of US supply and demand elasticities. The
more risky scenarios (b and c) provided modest welfare improvements over the current
regulation. Therefore, the authors recommended that the current regulation is
maintained, given the limitations of the available information about the magnitudes of
pest risk probabilities that did not encourage taking risk decisions for modest gains.
However, the model did not consider the dynamics of supply response of avocado
producers as well as the spread of pest infestation.
Few studies considered the dynamics of supply response and the dynamic aspects
of infestation spread in the analysis of the impacts of phytosanitary measures. Those
aspects were considered by Acquaye et.al. (2008) when examining the economic impacts
of citrus canker on oranges in Florida, and evaluating the implications of a future
hurricane on the benefits from an eradication program. A simulation model for supply
and demand of Florida oranges was applied. On the supply side, annual production in
each county of Florida depended on age-specific yields and acreage. The age distribution
of trees was determined by previous years’ plantings and tree removals. Tree removals
were set exogenous to the model, while new plantings were determined based on profit-
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maximizing behavior with a rational expectations formulation. Meanwhile, the demand
side included demand equations for fresh oranges directed to consumption in the
domestic and export markets, as well as the demand for oranges for production of juice.
Supply of orange juice from other states was exogenously determined. Due to the large
number of equations, the model was solved numerically.
In the case of an initial outbreak affecting Florida’s central region without an
eradication policy in the absence of hurricanes, producers achieve a gain as lower
production combined with inelastic demand by domestic consumers (who lose) lead to
higher prices and higher domestic revenue which offsets the loss of export revenue, and
the result is an annual net loss for the United States of $2.7 million. The introduction of
an eradication program exacerbates the consumers’ losses due to further reduction in
supply caused by the eradication program as well as the restoration of foreign exports.
Meanwhile, producers achieve further gains due to higher revenue and compensation.
The result is an annual net national loss of $25 million. A hurricane is assumed to reestablish the disease in the central region in 2016 either (a) to two other regions in Florida
in the case of the introduction of an eradication program in 2011, or (b) to all six regions
in Florida in the case of no introduction of an eradication program in 2011. Comparing
the impacts of an eradication program in 2016 under scenarios (a) and (b), it is found that
scenario (b) results in higher producer surplus due to higher reduction in production and
higher prices leading to higher revenue. Meanwhile, consumers and tax payers incur
higher losses under scenario (a) due to the same reason, and the result is a net national
loss in both scenarios but there is a higher loss under scenario (a).
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However, the above results are derived from the assumption that the demand of
consumers for fresh oranges is inelastic. Sensitivity analysis for a range of demand and
supply elasticities is important to analyze the robustness of the results. Also, the analysis
did not identify the separate welfare impacts on growers who lose their trees are and
those who do not. In addition, the supply from producers in the other US states, and the
welfare impacts on them were not considered.
Meanwhile, in their analysis of the effects of the introduction and establishment of
citrus canker into California, Jetter et. al. (2003) decomposed the welfare impacts for
producers who lose trees under the eradication program and those who do not. They also
considered the impacts on orange producers in the other US states, but they did not show
the import impacts. Two scenarios were compared: eradication, and allowing the disease
to be established.
The study relied on an equilibrium displacement model to estimate the changes in
producer and consumer welfare from changes in market quantities and prices for fresh
orange. Also, the government outlays for the eradication program including
compensation to homeowners were estimated. Short run and long run impacts were
estimated. An elasticity of supply of 0.5 was used in the short run. In the eradication
scenario, the elasticity of supply was allowed to increase gradually to 20 after 8 years as
trees are replanted and re-enter production. Meanwhile, for the disease establishment
scenario, two values for long run elasticity of supply were compared: 1 and 4. After year
8, the costs and benefits from the eradication program are zero; yet, for the disease
establishment scenarios, the equilibrium reached in year 8 continues until perpetuity.
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Elasticities of demand of -0.85, -0.5, and -0.45 were used for oranges, lemons, and
grapefruit respectively for both the short and long run in both scenarios.
Under the eradication scenario, the losses to growers who lose trees offset the gains
that other producers achieve due to higher prices. Consumers also incur losses due to
higher prices. However, those losses decrease over time as growers replant, market
supply increases and prices fall. On the other hand, under the disease establishment
scenario, producer costs increase due to the need to apply pesticides four times a year. In
addition, new groves need special treatment to avoid the disease in the first four years,
the costs of which are added to investment costs and amortized for the life time of the
grove. Higher prices induce more production from the other states and lower demand
from consumers, which imposes a downward pressure on prices. The net price change,
which is still an increase, is not sufficiently high to offset the impact of higher costs
incurred by California producers. Thus, California growers will decrease production in
the long run, and other producers increase production.
Due to the large share of California in the US fresh orange market, the increase in
the other states’ production could not offset the reduction in California’s production, and
the net impact on the US market is a decrease in fresh orange supply. The losses to
producers are higher with a supply elasticity of 1 compared to 4. Consumer welfare runs
in an opposite direction to producer welfare. Comparing the net present value of costs of
the eradication program with those of losses due to the establishment of the disease, the
conclusion was that an eradication program should be adopted as the avoided losses are
high.
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However, the above analysis did not consider the impacts of imports and the
possibility of tree losses and quarantines under the disease establishment scenarios. Also,
it did not consider the welfare impacts on retailers and wholesalers. Although the study
used different short-run and long-run elasticities of supply by orange growers, it did not
represent the supply response of orange growers in a dynamic framework that considers
the age distribution of orange trees.
Alston et. al. (2012) applied a similar approach to Acquaye et. al.(2008) when
evaluating the aggregate impact on California’s wine grape producers of the current
control program of Pierce’s Disease which aims at preventing the spread of the insect
transmitting the disease from South California to the North where it is not yet established.
It was found that the current program leads to net benefits. Those results were maintained
with the different sensitivity analysis scenarios for disease incidence rate and prevalence.
Under the severe state-wide outbreak scenario, there is a loss in producer surplus of $161
million per year or 7.2% of the wine grape cash income per year. However, growers in
some regions achieve gains as the disease costs are relatively minor and are offset by the
benefits of higher prices resulting from the heavier losses in the primary production areas.
Similar results were obtained for the regional outbreak scenario.
Other studies pointed out the importance of taking into account pre-existing
commodity policies in the analysis of the impact of invasive species. Acquaye et. al.
(2005) presented a case study of the impact of citrus canker on orange production while
considering the specific tariff on imports of frozen orange juice concentrates, and federal
crop insurance. The analysis revealed that ignoring the tariff and insurance policy, there
was an underestimation of producer gains, overestimation of consumer loss, and
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underestimation of taxpayer benefit. However, the model was static, and did not consider
US producing areas outside Florida, as well as the impacts on fresh orange markets.
Also, Tu et. al. (2005) examined the implications of tariff escalation between
agricultural and processed food markets on invasive species risks. They apply a multimarket partial equilibrium model that connects the agricultural input and processed food
markets in a small open economy that applies a tariff escalation policy and introduce an
externality of invasive species to the agricultural input market. The results showed that
the tariff escalation through imposing higher tariffs on processed food than the
agricultural input results in increasing the risk of invasive species. This is due to the fact
that tariff escalation shifts trade away from the processed food market towards the
agricultural input which is the pathway for invasive species transmission.

2.1.3

General Equilibrium

Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are more suitable for addressing
large-scale problems that potentially have macroeconomic impacts, or that have vertical
inter-linkages with other sectors. However, such models are usually characterized by high
complexity, difficulty to interpret results, and higher development costs (Soliman et. al.
2010). One of their main applications in pest risk assessment is in the case of forest pests.
For example, McDermott and Finnoff (2010) employed static CGE to analyze the
welfare impacts of the Emerald Ash Borer (EAB) invasion in Ohio and Michigan.
Besides being widely used as landscaping trees around houses and in parks, ash trees are
used in several sectors like logging, furniture and paper. General Equilibrium modeling
allowed the analysis of the vertical relationships among the affected sectors, household’s
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removal impacts, and state removal impacts. Also, prices were allowed to adjust, and the
welfare estimates from the study were half of the projected losses from previous fixed
price models.
Welfare calculations depended on each industry’s elasticity in the production of ash
products. The later was represented through a coefficient ε which stands for the decrease
in productivity resulting from a 1% decrease in ash production where ε = 0 implies no
impact. The model is simplified by assuming ε = 1 for the logging sector, which is
directly affected by the loss, and a range of values from 0 to 1 were calculated for the
other sectors. The annual equivalent variation reduction was $1.8 million in Ohio under
the minimal impact scenario of ε=1 for the logging sector and 0 for others, and $3.9
million under the maximum scenario impact of ε = 1 for all sectors. “Back of the
envelope calculations” were made to estimate the total dynamic consequences of the
invasion using the annual estimates resulting from the model. However, dynamic CGE
modeling may lead to different results. In addition, the study did not consider any
mitigation scenarios which might reduce the total welfare loss, and may result in different
impacts for some sectors.
On the other hand, Chang et. al. (2012) examined the potential economic impacts
of future spruce budworm outbreaks on 2.8 million hectares of Crown Forest Land in
New Brunswick, Canada, over a 30-year horizon. The analysis combined (1) an advanced
spruce budworm decision support system model that integrates pest population and stand
dynamics to examine tree/yield and potential timber harvest volume changes over time,
and (2) a dynamic CGE model that tracks primary inputs, industry transactions, and
prices while accounting for economic growth over time.
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The model compared 16 alternative scenarios including two pest management
strategies, under two pest outbreak severity levels, and four pest control levels. The
results indicated that a moderate or severe pest outbreak results in losses ranging from
$3.3-4.7 billion in present value output terms. The losses centered on natural resourcerelated sectors (forestry and logging, support activities for agriculture and forestry, crop
and animal production, fishing, hunting and trapping, and mining & oil sectors),
manufacturing (due to lumber and wood products and pulp and paper sectors), utilities,
and transportation, and warehousing sectors. The flow of factors of production from the
affected sectors led to limited expansion in the other sectors that could not offset the
negatively impacted ones. The pest control program reduced the negative impacts on
output by 66%. If the program is combined with re-planning harvest scheduling and
salvage, the negative impacts will be further reduced by 1% to 18%.

2.2

Optimal Control

Optimal control models aim at identifying the optimal treatment path through
defining the management control as a minimization problem of the expected costs and
damages from the presence of control activities of the invasive species in question
(Cororaton et. al. 2009). An example is Brunett et. al. (2007) which employed optimal
control to find the optimal path for treatment of Miconia calvescens, a flowering plant
damaging the ecosystem in Hawaii through preventing other plants from growing. The
study results revealed that the optimal population of the invasive species ranged from 1 to
18% cover. The optimal path involves high expenditure in the first year of management
to slow the spread, but after that the expenditure will be lower than the present value of
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the net cost of management, and there will be increasing present value of the difference
between damages and costs over time. So, the optimal control policy did not entail
eradication of the invasive species or elimination of its damages. However, such studies
rely on an approach similar to partial budget sharing for the estimation of costs and
benefits of the invasive species eradication so they do not reflect the impact on prices and
quantities.

2.3

Modeling Supply Response

Modeling supply response of perennial crops like oranges should consider their
characteristics: (1) a long time between initial input and first output, (2) output flows
from the investment decision continue over a long period of time, and (3) a gradual
reduction of the productive capacity of the plants (French and Mathews 1971). Therefore,
models of perennial crops should account for the lags between initial input and output,
the age distribution of acreage of the perennial crop in question, and removals of
perennial crops (Askari and Cummings 1976).
French and Mathews (1971) provided the basic framework for analysis of perennial
crops. The framework comprises five components: (1) functions for desired production
and bearing acreage, (2) an equation representing new plantings, (3) an equation
representing removal of acreage (4) an equation depicting the relationship between
unobserved expectation variables and observable variables, and (5) an equation
explaining variations in yield as a function of age, trend variable representing technology,
and disturbances to account for weather and other biological factors. Total production is
represented by the product of acreage and yield.
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They applied the model to asparagus production in the United States through
estimating a single reduced form equation of the model due to data constraints. Acreage
was specified as a function of lagged prices and average harvested area in different
periods. The use of the reduced form did not allow the separate estimation of structural
parameters of the new planting, removal, and harvest decisions as intended by their basic
framework.
Another attempt to separately quantify harvest and investment decisions was made
by Wickens and Greenfield (1973) which is considered by Coleman (1983) as a
comprehensive investment approach. They suggested a three-equation model comprising
an investment function, a vintage production function, and a harvesting equation.
Investment was represented in terms of the expected difference between prices and
harvesting costs over the productive time of the tree, average yield, and the discount rate.
The vintage production function represented potential production in terms of average
yield, past plantings, and tree removals. Meanwhile, the harvesting equation related
actual production to maximum potential production and a weighted average of recent
prices. The yield cycle of the crop is also considered in the harvesting equation.
The model was used to estimate coffee supply response in Brazil. However, it was
criticized by Akiama and Trivedi (1987) because it was not possible to derive structural
parameters from the reduced form, and due to the use of a polynomial form to express
yield curve which does not necessarily apply. In addition, tree removals were
represented as error terms.
As explained in subsection (2.3.1.1), most of the subsequent studies followed
French and Mathews’ basic framework (Alston et. al. 1995; French, King, and Minami
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(1985); Kinney et. al. (1987); Lajimi et. al. 2008). Other studies extended the framework
by Wickens and Greenfield (1973) like Trivedi (1986), Akiama and Trivedi (1987),
Devadoss and Luckstead (2010); Alston et. al (1995) and Gray et. al. (2005).
Production is represented by the production identity below. In the following, an
overview of the literature on the two components of the production identity, yield and
bearing acreage, is presented.
𝑄𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 × 𝐵𝑡

(2.1)

where 𝑄𝑡 , 𝑌𝑡 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝑡 , refer to output, yield, and bearing acreage at time t,
respectively.

2.3.1

Bearing Acreage

Bearing acreage changes over time through plantings and removals, as follows:
𝐵𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝑁𝑡−𝑘 − 𝑅𝑡−1,

(2.2)

where B represents bearing acreage, the subscript t denotes the year, k is a lag of k
years required for a tree to reach bearing age, N represents new plantings, and R refers to
tree removals. Therefore, changes in bearing acreage depend on new planting and tree
removal behavior (Kinney et. al. 1987). The following discusses the literature on new
plantings and tree removals.

2.3.1.1 New Plantings
Modeling new plantings followed two approaches: the traditional approach and the
investment approach (Alston,1990). The traditional approach represented new plantings
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as a linear function of expected annual profitability, previous year’s acreage, current tree
removals, and other variables relevant to the crop under study. Examples of that approach
included French and Mathews (1971), French, King, and Mianmi (1985), French and
King (1988), Kinney (1987), and Lajimi et. al.(2008). Meanwhile, the investment
approach is based on the assumption that investment in new plantings is derived from the
maximization of net profit of an investment, assuming that cost of investment is a
quadratic function of new planting in most cases (e.g. Alston et. al. 1995 and 2012,
Acquaye et. al. (2008), Devadoss and Luckstead (2010), Gray et. al. (2005), Wickens and
Greenfield (1973):
Max 𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝑁𝑡 (𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑡 − 𝐴𝐶𝑡 )

(2.3)

The first order condition:
𝐸𝑃𝑉𝑡 = 𝑀𝐶𝑡

(2.4)

where AC𝑡 =c1+c2 𝑁𝑡 based on a quadratic cost function, ENPV : expected net
present value of an investment, 𝑁𝑡 : new planting, EPV𝑡 : expected present value of net
returns, AC𝑡 : average costs.
The first order condition implies that profit maximizing growers increase plantings
to the point where expected net present value of the marginal orchard equals the change
in total investment costs, which is with quadratic costs a linear function of new plantings.
Re-arrangement of the profit-maximization condition results in the following new
plantings equation:
𝑁𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡−1
Alston (1995) modified equation (2.5) to allow for partial adjustment:

(2.5)
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𝑁𝑡 = (𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑡−1 ) + (1 − )𝑁𝑡−1 ,

(2.6)

where  is the adjustment parameter. The partial adjustment function considers the
time required for investment decisions in the crop development, adjustment costs, and
possible short run constraints. It was suggested in the model structure of French and
Mathews (1971) and Nerlove (1958), but French and Mathews (1971) assumed that  =1
in the econometric estimation of asparagus supply response equation.
In applying the investment approach, some studies based the profitability
expectation on a rational expectation approach which assumes that growers “utilize all
past information to form expectations of the relevant variables for their production
decisions” Devadoss and Luckstead (2010). For example, Devadoss and Luckstead
(2010) used an autoregressive model for prediction of the expected price of apples
(E(P) = ∑6𝑖=1 𝜃𝑖 𝑃𝑡−𝑖 +∈𝑖 ). Several combinations of lags from 1 to 6 were compared
using AIC. The estimated expected price resulting from the autoregressive model is then
used as the expected price in the regression equation. They considered the approach
rational expectations because they utilized the past information in estimation of a model
for forecasting price, and costs. However, since the purpose is to model how farmers
have actually responded to changes in prices and farming costs, finding the number of
lagged annual profitability indicators that affect farmer’s planting decision through the
regression equation of new plantings is more appropriate.
The concept of rational expectations may be appealing in the sense that it assumes
that economic agents are optimizers and that they make use of all information available
about the economic conditions in their industry to predict the profitability of their
investment (Nerlove and Bessler, 2001). However, from an empirical point of view, it is
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hard to believe that farmers can utilize all information to predict the future supplydemand structure in the industry (French and King 1988). Other approaches for modeling
farmers’ expectations about future profitability of the crops include: (a) naïve
expectation, where the expected price equals the previous year’s price; (b) extrapolative
expectation, where the expected price is a weighted combination of the prices in several
previous years; and (c) adaptive expectation, where the current price differs from the past
year’s price by an amount proportional to the previous forecast error (Labys, 1973).

2.3.1.2 Tree Removals
Some studies modeled tree removals as functions of expected short-run profits
based on the fact that old trees may be retained a bit longer if high profits are expected in
the next year, and the existence of a government incentive program to remove trees. e.g.
French and King (1988). Other studies modeled removals in a similar way as the new
plantings decision (e.g. Alston et. al., 1995). However, they noted that the quality of data
about tree removals might be an obstacle to reliable estimation of tree removal equations.
Also, due to lack of data about new plantings and tree removals, many studies formulated
their model such that the dependent variable is the change in acreage or net investment
(new plantings minus tree removals) instead of separate equations for each. e.g. French
and Mathews (1971) and Kinney et. al. (1987). Several other studies modeled tree
removals as a constant proportion of acreage .e.g. Acquaye et. al. (2008), Alston et. al.
(2012) and Gray et. al. (2005).
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2.3.2

Yield

The yield of a perennial crop varies with the age of the bearing plants, technology,
weather and biological factors. Keeney and Hertel (2008) reviewed studies analyzing
yield response to price for annual crops. However, most studies do not assume yield
response to profit expectations and the response is limited to acreage. This is attributed to
the fact that yield is affected by many factors that are out of farmers’ control (Nerlove
1958). In addition, cultural practices tend to be standardized and exclude the possibility
of much variation in yield in response to price variations (French and Mathews 1971,
Alston 1980). In modeling lemon production in California, Kinney et. al. (1987) argued
that there is limited opportunity for lemon production to adjust input usage to either input
or product prices. Also, more recent studies like Acquaye et. al. (2008), Gray et. al.(2005)
and Alston et. al. (2012) did not assume yield response to price movements.

2.4

Conclusions

There are several approaches to the assessment of the economic impacts of
alternative pest management strategies. Partial equilibrium analysis is more suitable for
the purpose of the current research. A fruit tree crop is relatively too small to result in
significant macroeconomic effects, and its main interlinkage is with the fruit processing
sector which can be reflected in a partial equilibrium model. In addition, partial
equilibrium allows for more detailed examination of the sector under study.
The above literature review shows that only few studies considered the dynamics of
supply response of perennial crops and trees in economic analysis of the impacts of pest
spread e.g. Acquaye et. al. (2008) and Alston et. al. (2012). While Acquaye et. al.(2008)
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examined the economic impacts of a pest eradication policy on the fresh orange and
orange juice market in Florida in a dynamic framework, and presented the overall welfare
impact of the pest management policies on the US consumers, they treated supply from
the other US regions as exogenous. In addition, they did not consider the welfare impacts
at the different levels of the supply chain.
Also, Alston et. al. (2012), who examined the impacts of Pierce Disease
management policy in different production regions in California’s wine grape industry,
only showed the welfare impacts on wine grape growers and wine processers. They
treated wine grape processors as consumers, measuring the changes in their welfare as
changes in Marshallian consumer surplus. The impact of the change in the price of
input(wine grape) on the price and quantity of output was not considered. Moreover, they
did not consider international trade. In addition, both of the above studies showed the
aggregate impact on producers with no clarification of the losses for producers with
infested crops.
Jetter et. al.(2003) differentiated between the welfare effects on producers in
infested areas and non-infested areas in the analysis of the impacts of a citrus canker
eradication policy on California’s fresh citrus, but they did not show the welfare impacts
along the supply chain of the citrus industry or consider the impacts on the citrus juice
industry. Also, while they distinguished between the short-run and long-run impacts of a
pest eradication policy through different supply response parameters, they did not
develop a dynamic supply response framework that accounts for the age distribution of
orange acreage.
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The current study contributes to the literature through developing a framework for
the analysis of economic impacts of pest management strategies on California’s orange
industry that (1) accounts for the dynamic nature of supply response of oranges as a tree
crop, (2) considers the supply response and welfare impacts on the different stakeholders
in the other US orange-producing regions and accounts for net flows of international
trade, (3) decomposes the welfare impacts on the different stakeholders (orange growers,
wholesalers, retailers, and consumers) along the supply chain of fresh oranges and
orange-based processed products in the different US regions, (4) decomposes the welfare
impacts of the alternate pest management strategies to reflect the impacts on growers in
infested and non-infested areas, and (5) integrates input from the output of a pest spread
model developed by APHIS .The model can be readily applied to a wide variety of pest
management problems in any of the three orange US producing regions. In addition, the
framework of analysis can be applied to similar pest management problems of other
perennial crops.
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CHAPTER 3. INDUSTRY OVERVIEW

This chapter provides an overview of the orange industry in the United States. The
first section reviews the evolution of the United States orange production, consumption,
and utilization since 1980. This is in addition to providing a brief discussion of the United
States orange trade. Meanwhile, the second section outlines the market structure of the
orange industry in the United States.

3.1

US Orange Production, Consumption, and Trade

The United States is the second largest world producer of oranges (USDA-FAS
2013) with its 8 million metric ton production valued at around $2 billion per year during
the period 2006-2012 (USDA-ERS 2012). Florida contributed to around 70.1% of the US
total bearing acreage of oranges during the same period, followed by California which
represented around 28.4%, then Arizona and Texas (1.5%). However, no commercial
acreage has been recorded for Arizona in the USDA statistics since 2009/10.
California is the largest producer of fresh oranges in the United States representing
about 85% of the US total fresh orange production, followed by Florida which comprises
about 13%. California directs 82% of its production of oranges to the fresh market.
Meanwhile, Florida directs around 95% of its production to the processing channel
(USDA-ERS 2012). The difference between California and Florida in utilization of
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production is mainly attributed to weather. Florida’s warm and humid weather is
associated with oranges that have thinner skin and more yield of juice than that of
California. On the other hand, owing to California’s drier climate and cooler nights
during the winter, its oranges are characterized by thicker skin and more pulp. Thus,
California’s oranges are more qualified to meet the standards of the fresh market due to
lower incidence of blemishes and less susceptibility to damages during transportation
(Boland et. al.2008).
US production of oranges fluctuated between 1980 and 2012, with more variation
witnessed in Florida (Figure 3-1). Florida experienced a succession of freezes between
1977 and 1989 that resulted in severe damages to trees and yield. Total production and
bearing acreage in 1989/90 were 36% and 30% less than their levels in 1980 respectively.
With higher orange prices, new plantings increased and orange production reached a
historically high level in 1997/1998 (Morris 2009). The new plantings of oranges
migrated to south Florida to reduce the risk of vulnerability to freezes. However, the
more tropical climate of south Florida has been associated with increased plant disease
threats such as citrus canker and greening along with greater risk of hurricane damage
(Morris 2009) .
Between 1998 and 2008, the Florida orange crop was negatively affected by
hurricanes, citrus canker, and the emergence of citrus greening. Thus, during the period
(1997/8-2007/08), Florida’s orange production declined by 47%, from 9.96 million tons
to 5.1 million tons (USDA-ERS 2012). In addition, the number of orange trees decreased
by 23% during the same period (Morris 2009).
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While California’s orange acreage followed a similar trend to that of Florida, the
range of fluctuation was much lower. Total acreage in 1989/90 was 4% lower than its
182,000 acre level in 1980 (Figure 3-2). Similar to Florida, higher orange prices were
associated with higher plantings resulting in an increase in acreage in the 1990s. Yet,
acreage in 1999/2000, which is the highest acreage recorded for California (203, 000
acres) during the period 1980-2012, was only 11% higher than the 1980 level. While the
1998 freeze resulted in a reduction to California’s production by about half of its previous
year level, it did not result in damages to trees (Cook 2000).
On the other hand, the Texas orange industry has been severely affected by
successive freezes (Sauls 2008). The 1983 freeze resulted in loss of 70% of the orange
crop of that year and reduction of orange acreage by 60% from its 1980 level (calculated
from USDA 2012). No orange fruit was produced during the 1984-85 season and only a
modest amount was grown in the 1985-86 season. While the industry was recovering and
growers were in the process of replacing the damaged trees, another major freeze in 1989
reduced the acreage to around 3500 acres compared to 24,000 acres in 1980. Acreage
increased afterwards, but it remained at a flat level of 8800 acres since 2002/03.
Arizona’s acreage decreased gradually from 13,000 acres in 1980 to reach 10,000 acres
in 1989/90. Acreage maintained a level of 10,000 acres in the 1990s, then it decreased
gradually until it reached the point that no commercial acreage was recorded since
2009/10 (Figure 3-2).
While US per capita consumption of fresh oranges fluctuated during the period
(1980-2000), it witnessed a decreasing trend since 2000/2001. The per capita
consumption in 2010/11 was 24% less than its level in 1980. Total consumption
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fluctuated around an average of 1.4 million metric tons (MT) (USDA-ERS 2012). The
decrease in consumption is attributed to consumers’ increasing preference of easy peel
fruits like mandarin oranges and the increasing variety of fresh produce in the US market
(Baldwin and Jones 2012).
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Figure 3-1: Total Production of Oranges in the US by State
Source: USDA-ERS(2012)

Bearing Acreage of Oranges by State
700

500

Year

Figure 3-2: Bearing Acreage of Oranges in the US by State
Source: USDA-ERS(2012)

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

0

1994

Arizona
1992

100
1990

Texas

1988

200

1986

California

1984

Florida

300

1982

400

1980

1000 Acres

600

36
Per capita consumption of orange juice followed a similar trend of fluctuation
during the period (1980-2000). Yet, it experienced a higher decrease since 2000/2001, as
2011/12 level is 40% less than that of 2000/01. That decrease in consumption can be
attributed to a change in consumer diet towards lower calorie drinks including bottled
water (USITC 2006-a). Also, Morris (2010) and USITC (2012-a) believe that higher
retail prices have contributed to that decrease in consumption. In addition, USITC (2012a) cited the overall economic conditions and the pricing of alternative products as factors
contributing to the decrease in the US per capita orange juice consumption.
As for trade, the United States is a net exporter of fresh oranges, and a net importer
of orange products. California exported 32% and 42 % of its orange production to foreign
markets in 2009 and 2010 respectively (CDFA 2012), and Florida exported more than
40% of its fresh oranges in 2009 (Morris 2009). The main markets include Canada,
Japan, China/Hong Kong, South Korea and the European Union (USDA-FAS 2013).
While data about domestic shipments are not available, California is estimated to only
consume around 11 % of its fresh orange production1. Imports of fresh oranges
constitute 7.4% of total consumption to fill seasonal gaps in supply (USDA-ERS 2012
and Baldwin and Jones 2012). Most of the fresh orange imports enter the US duty-free
under free-trade agreements and non-reciprocal preferential arrangements for developing
countries (USITC 2012-b).
On the other hand, the United States imported 18% of its total orange juice supply
(production + imports +beginning stock) and exported 7 % of its orange juice supply in

1

Average per capita consumption of fresh oranges in California is assumed to be equal to that of the US
average.
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2011/12(USDA-ERS 2012). Most of orange juice imports are from Brazil and Mexico
mainly in frozen concentrated orange juice form (USITC 2012-a). Florida is estimated to
consume around 6% of its orange juice supply. Meanwhile, California’s orange juice
demand exceeds its supply. The US orange juice imports from Brazil are subject to
import tariffs of 4.5 cents per liter (USITC 2012-a). Anti-dumping duties imposed on
three Brazilian firms since 2006 were revoked in 2012 after a World Trade Organization
(WTO) ruling that the method of calculation of duties were not consistent with WTO
provisions (USITC-2013).

3.2

Market Structure

The structure of the market in the US orange industry is presented in Figure 3-3.
Consumers decide on their level of consumption of fresh oranges and orange juice. Then,
consumers’ demand for oranges is met through two supply chains: fresh and processed.
In each chain, there are three market levels: retail, wholesale, and farm. The following
presents a briefing about each of the economic agents in the US orange industry.
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Figure 3-3: Structure of the US Orange Industry

3.2.1

Consumers and Retailers

Consumers purchase fresh oranges and orange juice from retailers. Retailers
purchase fresh oranges directly from packinghouses or through some other marketing
agent. Meanwhile, they purchase orange juice from orange juice processors or branded
juice marketers. The US retail industry is witnessing increasing consolidation as the
market share of the top five US retailers increased from 34.7 in 1998 to 50.4% in 2008
(Morris 2010). However, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for the degree of
industry concentration of the orange industry is low since it is less than 1000 (US
Economic Census 2007). The HHI Index is calculated by “summing the squares of the
individual market shares of all participants” (US Department of Justice 2010).There are
views that the increasing consolidation of retailers in the recent years enhanced their
pricing power. e.g. Boland et. al.(2006). Those views are based on the increasing margin
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between retail price and both of farm prices and bulk orange juice prices, and on the
decreasing correlation between farm prices and retail prices (Morris 2010). However,
Morris (2010) argued that recently retail prices are following farm prices and bulk orange
juice prices but with a time lag.

3.2.1.1.1 Fresh Market Packinghouses
Packinghouses receive oranges in large 900-pound pallet boxes (Morris 2010).
They sort, grade, and pack fruit of similar quality and size into cartons or other
specialized containers (USITC 2006-b). Fruit that does not meet the standards of the
fresh market is sent to processing plants. Most packinghouses have sales staff that sells
its fruits directly to retailers or export markets. Most of the fresh sales are free on board
prices from the packinghouse (Morris 2010).
About one-half of all California and Arizona packinghouses (39) marketed their
fresh citrus production through Sunkist Growers, which is a non-profit marketing
cooperative owned by 6000 California and Arizona growers in 2005(USITC 2006-b).
Around 47% of California’s oranges were marketed through Sunkist in 2005. Another
25% of California’s oranges were marketed through California Citrus Orange Growers
Cooperative in the same year. However, California’s orange market is not vertically
integrated in a way that cooperatives can control the production of oranges or exercise
market power (Boland et. al. 2008). Before the suspension of the Arizona-California
citrus marketing order in 1994 (USDA-AMR 1994), cooperatives were able to influence
the fresh orange prices through controlling the quantity of oranges directed to the fresh
market (Jacobs 1994). Currently, cooperatives’ role is mainly marketing. The influence
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they have on growers’ production decision is educational through informing them about
the citrus varieties and cultural practices leading to profitable production. Membership is
voluntary and on an annual basis. Also, there is no requirement for members to market all
their production through the cooperative (Sunkist 2013).
Florida’s fresh citrus packing sector is more fragmented than that of California.
There are 40 certified fresh citrus packinghouses in Florida, which are either cooperatives
or large growers. However, it is trending towards more consolidation as the top 10
packinghouses account for 50% of the fresh citrus packing sector in Florida compared to
35% in 1996 (Morris 2010).

3.2.1.2 Orange Processors
Orange juice processors receive oranges from orange growers and process it into
single strength bulk orange juice with an average Brix value of 11.8 degrees, where the
Brix value is an indicator for the degree of concentration of orange juice measured as the
percentage by weight of sugar content in a solution at a particular temperature (USITC
2006 a). Afterwards, juice intended for the frozen orange juice concentrate market is
further processed to obtain a base concentrate of 65 degrees (the ratio of concentration
between single strength 11.8- degree brix value and 65-degree brix value is one to seven).
It is then reconstituted and packaged for retail sale near the point of retail sale for
transportation cost saving. Meanwhile, the Not from Concentrate Orange Juice is usually
packaged into single strength retail-size containers at the processing plant. However,
packaging for retail sale may also take place near distribution points in major markets.
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Many of the orange juice processors blend domestic orange juice with imported
concentrated bulk juice to ensure compatibility with product standards, and customer
preferences (USITC 2012).
There are about 25 orange juice extractor/processor firms in the United States.
Ninety percent of orange juice extraction is handled by 12 firms (USITC 2012). While
most of the Florida orange groves were relocated from the North and Central regions to
the Southern region with the 1970s and 1980s freezes in Florida, orange processing plants
remained in the Central region as hauling oranges is considered less expensive than
rebuilding the plants(Morris 2009). Branded juice marketers are gaining increasing
importance in the US market. They either own the orange processing facilities or
purchase orange juice form bulk processors. The market share of the three top brands
increased from 53% in 1997/98 to 65.7% in 2007/08 (Morris 2010). The top three orange
juice processors represented 55% of the US market share in 2010. The HerfindahlHirschman Index (HHI) for the degree of industry concentration of 1499 calculated by
(Yavapolkul 2011) indicated moderate concentration of the US orange juice industry in
2010.

3.2.2

Growers

There are 6,000-7,000 orange growers in the United States. The number of growers
has declined in the past few decades through continued consolidation and the development
of orchard lands for other uses (USITC 2006-b). California growers usually grow oranges
for the fresh market, and orange for processing is a residual market. The next chapter
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discusses the process of allocation of oranges between fresh and processing in the US
orange-producing regions.

3.3

Conclusions

The fresh orange industry is mainly concentrated in California, while the orange
processing industry is concentrated in Florida. The United States is a net exporter of fresh
oranges, and a net importer of orange products. There are three main levels of orange
marketing in the fresh orange and orange products channel: retail, wholesale, and farm.
The next chapter presents the economic model of the orange industry in the United States
which reflects the market structure outlined in the current chapter.
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CHAPTER 4. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter starts with presentation of how the model reflects the orange industry
market structure in a representative United States region. The supply-demand
relationships between the different agents in the US market outlined in the previous
chapter are represented. The basic framework is modified according to whether the
region is a net import, exporter, or non-producer of oranges/orange products. Meanwhile,
the second section presents the global market clearing conditions.

4.1

Market Structure in a Representative US Region

The model is structured to reflect the welfare impacts of phytosanitary measures
on the different stakeholders along the supply chain of oranges (consumers, retailers,
wholesalers, and orange growers) which was explained in the previous chapter. In the
first sub-section, consumers decide on their level of consumption of an aggregate of fresh
oranges and orange products. Then, they allocate their consumption between fresh
oranges and orange products based on relative prices, and elasticity of substitution
between fresh oranges and orange products. Thus, consumers’ demand for oranges is met
through two supply chains: fresh and processed. In each chain, there are three market
levels: retail, wholesale, and farm. The second sub-section outlines the supply-derived
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demand relationships at the retail and wholesale levels. The third sub-section presents the
supply decision by farmers.

4.1.1

Consumer Demand

Consumers are assumed to be price-taking agents who decide on the quantity
consumed of each product through maximization of their utility given their budget
constraint. The utility function satisfies the axioms of consumer choice: completeness,
transitivity, reflexivity, continuity, non-satiation and convexity. Completeness ensures
that a consumer can order their preferences for the full set of choices. Failure to meet this
axiom results in undefined preferences. Transitivity warrants consistency of consumer
choices. Given consumption bundles A, B, and C, a consumer who prefers A to B, and B
to C must prefer A to C. Reflexivity means that for a consumer each bundle is as good as
itself. This axiom is trivial for a properly defined choice set, but is necessary for
mathematical representation of utility. Continuity is important for obtaining differentiable
utility functions and well-behaved demand curves. It means that if A is preferred to B,
and C lies within ε of B, then A is preferred to C. The first four axioms allow
representation of consumer preferences by a utility function (Deaton and Mauellbauer
1980).
The axiom of non-satiation means that for a given consumption bundle X, a
consumer prefers another one, Y, that has more of one good, and at least the same
amount of the other goods in X. This axiom ensures that the budget constraint is binding,
assuming strictly positive prices. The axiom of convexity implies that if bundle X is
preferred to bundle Y, then any combination of the two bundles is preferred to bundle Y.
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The above axioms allow mathematical representation of the consumer choice problem
through the standard utility maximization problem given a budget constraint (Deaton and
Mauellbauer 1980).
The model relies on the utility function of a representative consumer assuming
that the response of aggregate demand to aggregate income and prices is the same as that
of individuals. This assumption is supported by adopting a homothetic and linearly
homogeneous utility function for all consumers where the indifference curves are rays
from the origin. This ensures path independence and uniqueness of consumer surplus
(Just, Hueth, and Schmitz 1982).
Consumer preferences are assumed to be weakly separable such that commodities
are partitioned into two groups (fresh oranges and orange products C o , and other
products C oth ) allowing preferences within a group to be described independently of
other groups; that is, the marginal rates of substitution between goods in a group are
independent of the quantities of products in another group (Armington 1969). Changes of
prices of goods outside the group only affect the group in question in a manner similar to
a change in income (Strotz 1957).
The assumption of weakly separable preferences allows the representation of
consumer’s decision for the quantities consumed of each of fresh oranges and orangebased processed products through two stages. In the first stage, a consumer maximizes a
weakly separable utility function U( C o , C oth ) subject to the expenditure constraint
E = P o C o + P oth C oth . The utility function is assumed to generate demand for oranges and
orange products of the form:
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C o = C( P o, , P oth, , E)

(4.1)

where P refers to price, E refers to expenditure, U represents utility, C represents
per capita consumption, and subscripts o and oth represent oranges and other products
respectively.
Then, in the second stage, a consumer selects fresh oranges and orange products to
minimize expenditure that meets his total orange demand, C o . C o is represented by

  Cof , Cop  which is assumed to follow a constant elasticity of substitution specification
(thus, meets the assumption of being homothetic and linearly homogeneous referred to
above). This stage gives per capita demand of fresh oranges, denoted by subscript of, and
per capita demand of orange-based processed products, represented by subscript op as
follows:

C of

 PofRC
 b  RC
P
 o
c





 c

C o , and

C op  C o  C fo .

(4.2)

(4.3)

RC
RC
where PoRC = wof Pof + wop Pop , b is a constant,  c is the elasticity of substitution

between fresh oranges and orange-based processed products, and wof and wop refer to
the shares of consumption of fresh and orange-based processed products in total
consumption of oranges respectively for a representative consumer (based on
homogeneity and linearity of the Constant Elasticity of Substitution function and using
Euler’s Theorem –Armington 1969).
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Given the above assumption of homothetic, linearly homogeneous utility function,
aggregate United States demand is represented by the product of per capita demand of the
respective good, population, and the percentage of consumers that do not have health risk
concerns about the product in question (Paarlberg et. al. 2008). As mentioned in the
introductory chapter, there is a limited chance that consumers have health risk concerns
relating to plant pests except for fears relating to pesticide use, and it is difficult to
estimate the number of those consumers. However, the model structure accounts for this
possibility in case health risks arise with other perennial crops to which the model is
applied. Therefore, total US consumption of all oranges, AC o fresh oranges, AC of , and
orange products, AC op , are represented as follows, given that pop refers to population,
and 0≤π≤1 refers to the proportion of the population who do not have health risk fears
about the product in question:
AC o   o  pop  C o ,

(4.4)

AC of   of  pop  C of , and

(4.5)

AC op   op  pop  C op .

(4.6)

4.1.2

Distribution of Fresh Oranges and Orange Products

This section focuses on the problem of retailers and wholesalers involved in the
distribution of fresh oranges and orange-based processed products. There are two
separate supply chains for fresh oranges and orange products but they have a similar
model structure. Retailers supply fresh oranges/orange-based processed products to
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consumers, and use fresh oranges/ orange-based processed products provided by
wholesalers as inputs to their production. Wholesalers supply fresh oranges/ orange
products to retailers and export markets, and demand fresh oranges/oranges for
processing from farmers and import markets.
The problem of producers in each of the four industries (retail fresh oranges, retail
orange products, wholesale fresh orange, wholesale orange products) is to maximize the
value of production under resource constraints. A Ricardo-Viner framework is applied
where each industry uses a composite mobile factor (termed labor), a factor specific to
the industry (capital which is fixed in supply), and an intermediate good (oranges). Labor
wage is exogenously set since this factor is shared with the rest of the economy and the
share of the orange industry in the economy is small. Producers operate under perfect
competition, so all returns accrue to factors of production such that the zero-profit
condition holds. Production in each industry is represented by a constant returns to scale
production (CRS) function which is linearly homogeneous of degree one in all inputs.
As a consequence of CRS, the cost function has the form C  w, q   q c  w ,
where c  w  is the unit cost of production, w is the input price vector, and q is the
quantity of production. CRS also implies that c  w  is both the average and marginal cost
of production, which is independent of output level (Woodland 1982).
The duality theory allows representation of the revenue maximization problem in
the form of a minimum factor payments problem such that the derived factor demand is
expressed as a function of input costs. Dixit and Norman (1980) proves the duality of the
revenue maximization and minimum factor payments problems. Based on Woodland
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(1982) and Dixit and Norman (1980), the minimum factor payments problem is
expressed as minimization of the objective function wv , where v is the vector of
production inputs including factors of production and the intermediate input, subject to
the constraint that the unit cost, c j ( w) , is at least equal to output price , c j ( w)  p . The
Lagrange of the problem is represented as follows (Woodland 1982):
m

L  w, q   wv   q j c j  w   p j 

(4.7)

j 1

The Kuhn- Tucker conditions of the problem are as follows (Woodland 1982):





L w0 , q 0
wi




j 1

L w0 , q 0
q j

m

q j cij  w   vi   0

  c  w  p
j

j

0

(4.8)

(4.9)

where q  (q1 , q2 ,...qm ) is the vector of Lagrange multipliers, m is the number of
output products, and i=1,…,n given that n is the number of factors of production and
intermediate inputs. Labeling the vector of Lagrange multipliers as q implies its
interpretation as the vector of outputs (since q is the vector of choice variables in the
revenue maximization problem, the dual of the minimum factor payments problem).
Meanwhile, cij  w is the demand for input i per unit of output of product j according to
Shephards’ Lemma (Woodland 1982). Thus, the unit cost of producing good j is the total
of demand for inputs i to n multiplied by their prices:
n

 

c j  w    cij w0 .wio .
i 1

(4.10)
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The complementary slackness conditions imply that because factors of production
and intermediate inputs that have positive shadow prices are fully employed and because
goods should break even to be produced, equations (4.8) and (4.9) hold with
equality(Dixit and Norman 1980). Therefore, the zero profit condition (equation (4.11)),
and the market equilibrium condition (equation (4.12)) for each of the factors of
production and intermediate inputs are represented as follows:
n

w

0
i

 

. cij w0  p j , and

i 1

q c w   v .

(4.11)

m

0

j

j 1

ij

i

(4.12)

It is more conventional in models that employ a similar structure to denote cij as

aij , like Jones (1965) and Sanyal and Jones (1982 ). Therefore, this notation will be
adopted and the above equations become:
n

w

0
i

i 1
m

q
j 1

j

 

. a ij w0  p j , and

 

a ij w0  vi .

Using the above structure, the zero-profit conditions and factor market clearing
conditions are shown below for retailers and wholesalers in the fresh orange and orange
products markets. Those conditions are similar for both orange markets. Therefore, for
subscript oj = of and op, where of refers to the fresh market, and op refers to the orange
products market, the factor market clearing conditions for retailers in each of the fresh
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orange and orange products markets (which have a similar structure) are represented as
follows:

QSojR aLR,oj (w, rojR , PojWR )  LRoj

(4.13)

QSojR akR,oj (w, rojR , PojWR )  KojR

(4.14)

QSojR aoR,oj (w, rojR , PojWR )  DDojRW

(4.15)

R
where QSoj represents retail supply of oranges in market oj (which refers to either

RW
the fresh orange or the orange products markets), DDoj refers to derived demand for

oranges, O, by retailers from wholesalers in market oj, LR ,oj is the demand for labor by
retailers in market oj, and K R ,oj is the demand for capital by retailers in market oj.
Required quantity of each input i = L, K, and O to produce a unit of oranges (fresh or
R
R
WR
processed) by retailers is represented by ai ,oj ( w, roj , Poj ) which is a function of the three

R
input prices: w (wage which is exogenously set), roj , returns to capital for retailers in

WR
market oj, and Poj , wholesale price of oranges at retailer’s door.

Similarly, the factor market clearing conditions for fresh oranges and orange
products at the wholesale level are:

QSojW aWL,oj (w, rojW , PojGW )  LWoj

(4.16)

QSojW akW,oj (w, rojW , PojGW )  KojW

(4.17)

QSojW aoW,oj (w, rojW , PojGW )  DDojWG

(4.18)
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W
where QSoj represents wholesale supply of oranges in market oj (which refers to

WG
either the fresh orange or the orange products markets), DDoj refers to derived demand

for oranges, O, by wholesalers from growers oj, LW ,oj is the demand for labor by w in
market oj, and KW ,oj is the demand for capital by wholesalers in market oj. Required
quantity of each input i = L, K, and O to produce a unit of oranges (fresh or processed) by
W
W
GW
wholesalers is represented by ai ,oj (w, roj , Poj ) which is a function of the three input

W
prices: w (wage which is exogenously set), roj , capital returns for wholesalers in market

GW
oj, and Poj , packinghouse door price of oranges in market oj.

The zero-profit condition for retailers is:

PojRC  aLR,oj w  aKR ,oj r R  aOR,oj PoWR
j ,

(4.19)

where PojWR  PojW 1  AVojWR   TRojWR  TojWR ,

(4.20)

PojW is the wholesale price of oranges of market oj (fresh or processed), AV refers to
WR
ad valorem charges imposed on the wholesale prices of oranges, TRoj is the transportation

WR
costs from the wholesaler’s to retailer’s door, and Toj represents other specific charges

which may include phytosanitary costs.
The zero-profit condition for wholesalers is:

PojW  aWL,oj w  aWK ,oj rW  aOW,oj PofGW

(4.21)

where PojGW  PojG 1  AVojGW   TRojGW  TojGW

(4.22)
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PojG is the equivalent on-tree price of oranges of market oj (fresh or processed), AV
GW
is the ad valorem charges imposed on the equivalent on-tree price of oranges, TRoj is the

GW
transportation costs from farm to packinghouse door, and Toj represents other per unit

non-ad valorem charges which may include phytosanitary costs.
On the other hand, the consumer-retailer market clearing conditions are represented
as follows:

QSofR  ACof

(4.23)

QSopR  ACop

(4.24)

As for the retailer-wholesaler market clearing conditions, the derived demand for
fresh oranges and orange products by retailers is fulfilled by domestic wholesalers in
orange producing regions. Interregional trade is handled by wholesalers rather than
retailers in those regions. Thus, the wholesale supply of fresh oranges and orange
products are represented according to the equations below in the orange producing
regions:

QSofW  DDofRW  ESof

(4.25)

W
QSop
 DDopRW  ESop  BI op  EI op

(4.26)

W
where QSof and

W
QSop
are the wholesale supply of fresh oranges and orange

RW
RW
products respectively, DDof and DDop refer to derived demand for fresh oranges and
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orange products by retailers from wholesalers, BI op represents beginning inventory of
orange products and EI op is the ending inventory of orange products.
Meanwhile, in the Rest of the US region, which is not an orange producer, retailers
handle imports. This is supported by the fact that packinghouses and orange processing
facilities are generally located near orange growing areas. While reconstitution of frozen
orange juice and packing for retail sale might take place in consumption regions for
transportation cost savings, there are no data available about the locations of such
activities or interregional trade patterns. Therefore, processing of bulk orange juice, and
packing for retail sale is assumed to be an integrated activity taking place in the
production regions.
Therefore, for regions not producing oranges, the derived demand by retailers is
met by imports or excess demand, EDoj , as follows:

DDofRW  EDof

(4.27)

DDopRW = EDop + BI op - EI op

(4.28)

4.1.3

Supply by Orange Growers

In the United States orange producing regions, derived demand for oranges by
WG
G
wholesalers, DDoj , is met by orange growers’ supply QSoj as follows:

DDofWG  QSofG
DDopWG  QSopG
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Due to the nature of oranges as a tree crop, the orange grower’s response to
changes in prices and other market conditions is mainly reflected in the long run through
changes in the decision of investment in new plantings of orange trees. In the short run,
orange growers’ response to changes in prices can be in the form of yield per acre
response and the allocation of production between the fresh orange and orange for
processing markets. As discussed in the literature review, the possibility of changing
yield per acre in response to changes in input and output prices is limited since cultural
practices tend to be standardized. Therefore, yield is treated as exogenous to the model.
Meanwhile, farmers’ decision to allocate production between the fresh and processed
markets differs among the production regions is explained below.

4.1.3.1 Total Orange Supply at the Farm Level
Orange supply at the farm level in each US orange-producing region is
determined by the product of yield and bearing acreage. Because orange yield varies by
age, the orange production identity takes account of age distribution of orange trees in
each region. The production identity also considers exogenous shocks to orange yield and
acreage due to pest infestation, pest management programs, or other events as follows:
n

QSGt   it Yit αit Bit

(4.29)

i 1

G

where QSt represents orange supply at the farm level in each region in year t,
subscript i refers to age category of orange trees,
age i in year t,

Yit is yield of orange trees per acre at

Bit is bearing acreage of oranges of age i in year t,  it denotes shock to
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yield of orange trees of age i in year t , and

α it represents shock to bearing acreage of

orange trees of age i in year t.

4.1.3.1.1 Yield
Yield of orange trees varies with age. Trees start bearing fruits at the age of 3, and
yield increases gradually to reach maturity at the age of 13. On average, orange trees in
California live until the age of 40 ( O’Connel 2009); meanwhile, Florida orange trees live
until the age of 30 (Spreen 2006). Arizona and Texas trees are assumed to live until the
age of 30. As mentioned above, yield is set exogenous to the model. Exogenous shocks
may occur to yield due to pest infestation, weather, technology, and other factors.

4.1.3.1.2 Bearing Acreage:
According to equation (2.2) in the literature review, bearing acreage is represented
as:

Bt  Bt 1  Nt 3  Rt 1
where B represents bearing acreage, R refers to tree removals, subscript t
designates the year, and subscript t-3 reflects the fact that orange trees start bearing fruits
at the age of three. However, similar to Acquaye et. al. (2008), since orange trees are
grouped by age:

Bit  Nt 3  Ri 1,t 1

for tree ages =3.

(4.30)

Bit  Bit 1  Ri 1,t 1

for tree ages >3.

(4.31)
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The new plantings decision is represented as a function of expected ratio of returns
to costs, 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡 , and new plantings of the previous year. A partial adjustment equation is
used to reflect the fact that a grower’s decision to invest in new plantings is not fulfilled
in the same year due to administrative delays and other constraints where  is the
adjustment coefficient reflecting the portion of the new plantings decision implemented
in year t as explained in chapter 2. Equation (4.32) below is estimated, with some
variation, for the three US orange producing regions in the next chapter.
𝑁𝑡 = (𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡 ) + (1 − )𝑁𝑡−1

(4.32)

On the other hand, orange tree removals are set exogenous to the model.
Exogenous shocks due to pest infestation or eradication policy are represented by the
parameter

α i in equation 4.29.

4.1.3.2 Allocation of Oranges between Fresh and Processing
California orange growers mainly target the fresh market, with few growers
producing for the processed market. Thus, the orange for processing market in California
is a residual market. Before 1994, the allocation of oranges between the fresh and
processed markets was determined by the Arizona-California Citrus Marketing Order
(Jacobs 1994, USDA-AMR 1994); though, the marketing order was partially suspended
after exceeding a certain threshold each season (Timothy et. al. 1996). Starting in 1994,
the allocation of oranges between fresh and processed utilization is determined by
demand and weather events. The percentage of California orange production directed to
the fresh market averaged 76%, during the period 1994-2011, and 74% during the period
1980-2011. The years witnessing major drops in the level of utilization of oranges as
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fresh were the years of freeze and low rainfall (Figure 4-1). Low rainfall levels are
associated with smaller oranges that do not meet the standards of fresh orange packing
houses (Fruit and Tree Nut Outlook 1999).
California oranges directed to processing are so low priced that negative equivalent
on tree-returns are recorded for oranges in many years during the period 1980-2011 (Fruit
and Tree Nut Yearbook 2012). Therefore, the relative price of fresh and processed
oranges in a given year may not be the main factor affecting the allocation of orange
production between fresh and processed. This was also confirmed by Ordinary Least
Squares estimation for an equation with the utilization rate of oranges as a dependent
variable, and the following as independent variables: relative price of fresh oranges and
orange for processing (current price and several lags), a dummy variable representing
years of severe weather events, and a dummy variable representing years when the
marketing order was applied. The estimated equation showed a very inelastic response of
the orange utilization rate to the current relative price (a coefficient of 0.01); meanwhile,
the lagged price variables were not statistically significant. The severe weather events
and marketing order dummy variables were statistically significant at the 1% level.
Therefore, the allocation decision of California oranges between the fresh market
and orange for processing market is set exogenous in the model. Exogenous changes to
the utilization rate of oranges, for example due to a higher percentage of fruits not
meeting the standards of fresh oranges and being allocated to processing, are denoted by
the shift parameter Ω in the following equation representing grower supply of fresh
oranges in California:
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QSofG , CA  U of ,CA .QSoG, CA Ω

(4.33)

G
G
where QSof , CA : Grower supply of fresh oranges, QSo , CA : total supply of oranges, and

U of : percentage of total orange production utilized fresh.

100

Percentage of California Oranges Utilized Fresh and Weather
Events

% of CA orange utlized fresh

90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10

Freeze
Drought
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

0

Year

Figure 4-1: Percentage of California Oranges Utilized Fresh and Weather Events
Source: Severe weather events data from NOAA (2012), and Orange Utilization data
from (USDA-ERS 2012).

On the other hand, in Florida, the relative equivalent on tree prices of fresh
oranges to oranges for processing fluctuated from 1:1 to 1:1.5 during the period 19802012 (Fruit and Tree Nut Yearbook 2012). According to Murraro (1997), Murraro et. al.
(1991), and Niles and Childfield (1976), Florida growers have two basic decision times
for allocation of oranges between the fresh and processed markets (Figure 4-2). The first
is prior to the production season, when the grower determines the cultural practices to
follow depending on whether he targets the fresh orange or orange for processing market.
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The grower’s decision depends on expectations relating to the following factors: expected
cultural costs, chances of harvesting fruits that meet the characteristics of the fresh orange
market, expected price differential, and expected yield of pounds solids per orange which
determines the price of oranges directed to the processing market.
The second decision time is at harvest when the grower decides whether to pursue
the fresh or processed marketing channels. The outcome of this decision is mainly
determined by the cultural practices followed and the environment during production that
influences fruit characteristics. The growers make their decision based on the realized
fruit characteristics, prices, yield and costs which become less uncertain at this stage.

Figure 4-2: Florida growers’ decision of allocation of oranges between fresh and
processing
Source: Murraro (1997)
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Thus, in Florida, the percentage of orange production routed to the fresh market,

U of , FL , becomes a function of the current year price, and the expected price. The expected
price is based on the lagged prices of the previous two years according to results of the
estimation of the regression equation of fresh orange utilization in Florida on the current
price, and the prices of the previous two years:

U of , FL  f ( PofW, t , PofW,t 1, PofW,t 2 )

(4.34)

QSofG , FL  U of , FL .QSoG, FL ΩFL

(4.35)

Finally, in each of the three orange producing regions, the quantity of oranges
G
routed into the processing channel is QSop :

G
G
G
QSop
= QSo - QSof

4.2

(4.36)

Model Closure and Global Price Linkages

The model allows regional trade within the United States as well as international
trade. In the fresh orange market, there are two exporting regions: California, and Florida;
and three importing regions: Arizona-Texas, Rest of the US, and Rest of the World.
Meanwhile, in the orange products market, there are two exporting regions: Florida and
Rest of the World; and three importing regions: Arizona-Texas, California, and Rest of
the US. Regional and international trade is represented in an excess supply-excess
demand framework where trade is an implicit function of price for US regions, and US
imports and exports.
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In order to provide a graphic illustration of the model (based on Alston, Norman
and Pardey 1995), we start by a two-region model where California is a net orange
exporter, and the other regions are net importers. In Figure 4-3, panel (a) represents
supply and demand in California, and panel (c) represents supply and demand in the Rest
of the Regions. The excess supply, ESo, is given by the horizontal difference between
California’s demand and supply curves. The excess demand, EDo, is given by the
horizontal difference between the Rest of the Regions’ demand and supply curves.
Market equilibrium between all regions occurs at the intersection of the excess supply
and demand curves at price Po.

Figure 4-3: Excess Supply-Excess Demand Framework – Two Region Model
Source: Alston, Norman and Pardey (1995) with some modification by the author.
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An upward shift in California’s supply curve due to a pest infestation results in an
increase in the equilibrium price Po to P1, as the excess supply curve shifts upwards.
There is a decrease in orange consumption in California, and a reduction in the quantity
traded of oranges. In the Rest of the Regions, the price increase induces an increase in
supply and a decrease in consumption.
Applying the above framework to the five-region case:
In the fresh orange market, given that California and Florida are net exporters, and
the other regions are net importers:

ESofCA + ESofFL = EDofAZTX + EDofROUS + EDofROW ,

(4.37)

where ESof refers to excess supply, and EDof represents excess demand as defined
before. CA is California, FL is Florida, AZTX is Arizona-Texas region, ROUS is the rest
of the US region, and ROW is the rest of the world region. Excess demand of the Rest
World is a function of the wholesale price of fresh oranges at the retailer’s door in the
Rest of the World (ROW).

EDofROW = EDofROW ( PofWR , ROW )

(4.38)

On the other hand, in the orange products market, Florida and Rest of the World
are net exporters, and the other regions are net importers:

ESopCA + ESopROW = EDopAZT + EDopCA  EDopROUS ,

(4.39)

where

ESopROW  ESopROW ( PopWR, ROW )

(4.40)

64

such that excess supply of world exporters is a function of wholesale price of
orange products at the retailer’s door.
As explained above, wholesalers handle inter-regional trade in the US orange
producing regions. Meanwhile, retailers handle imports in the Rest of the US region.
Therefore, the wholesale price of oranges at the retailers’ door was selected as the price
connecting all regions. The Rest of the US region price was selected as the price linking
all regions.
In the fresh orange market, the price linkages are as follows:

PofWR , ROUS = PofwR,CA 1  AVofCAROUS   TofCAROUS  TRofCAROUS

(4.41)

PofWR , ROUS = PofwR, FL 1  AVofCA ROUS   TofFL ROUS  TRofFL ROUS

(4.42)

PofWR , ROUS = PofwR, AZTX 1  AVofAZTX  ROUS   TofAZTX ROUS  TRofAZTX ROUS

(4.43)

PofWR , ROUS = PofwR, ROW 1  AVofROW  ROUS   TofROW ROUS  TRofROW ROUS

(4.44)

Similarly, in the orange products market, the price linkages are as follows:

PopWR , ROUS = PopwR,CA 1  AVopCAROUS   TopCAROUS  TRopCAROUS

(4.45)

PopWR , ROUS PopwR, FL 1  AVopCA ROUS   TopFL ROUS  TRopFL ROUS

(4.46)

PopWR , ROUS PopwR, AZTX 1  AVopAZTX  ROUS   TopAZTX ROUS  TRopAZTX ROUS

(4.47)

PopWR , ROUS PopwR, ROUS 1  AVopROW  ROUS   TopROW ROUS  TRopROW ROUS

(4.48)

=
=
=
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4.3

Differential Transformation of the Model

All the model equations are transformed into logarithmic differential form. The
logarithmic differential form has the advantage of being driven by elasticities which are
easier to estimate or obtain from literature. In addition, it allows the flexibility of either
using historical observed data or projected data (Paarlberg et. al. 2008). The differential
form of the model is presented in the Appendix.

4.4

Conclusions

The model structure reflects the relationships among the different stakeholders
(consumers, retailers, wholesalers, and orange growers) along the US supply chain of
fresh oranges and orange products in a dynamic framework. Consumer demand for
oranges is determined using partial budgeting. Supply and derived demand relationships
between retailers-wholesalers, and wholesalers-orange growers in the fresh orange and
orange products are represented in a Ricardo-Viner framework where labor is a mobile
input, capital is an industry-specific input, and orange is an intermediate input. Supply of
oranges by growers is an investment decision where growers respond to changes in
expected relative returns to costs. The differential form of the model is adopted, so the
model is driven by elasticities. The next chapter presents the econometric estimation of
the model parameters, and the data employed in the model.
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CHAPTER 5. PARAMETER ESTIMATION, DATA AND PROJECTIONS

This chapter presents the different sources of data used in the model. Because the
study employs a simulation model, it uses data and parameters from several sources. The
parameters are econometrically estimated in the current study, drawn from the literature,
or assumed based on judgment and model validation. Also, the model projects the
economic impacts of alternative pest management scenarios for the next 30 years, so
projections of the data that set the baseline for the model are required. Thus, the first
section presents the data employed for econometric estimation of the parameters and
projection of the baseline data. The second section provides econometric estimation of
supply response parameters of orange growers in the different United States regions, and
econometric estimation of orange consumer demand elasticities. It also presents the
values and sources of the other parameters. The third section focuses on the data
projections. Meanwhile, the fourth section discusses model validation. The fifth section
concludes the chapter.

5.1

Data Employed in the Model

5.1.1

Supply, Use, and Price Data

Data about US orange production and utilization at the national and state levels are
obtained from the US Fruit and Tree Nut Database (USDA-ERS 2012). Meanwhile, US
total fresh orange consumption, trade, and production are available from the USDA
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production, supply and distribution database (USDA-FAS 2012). There are some minor
discrepancies between the two databases with respect to fresh orange production.
Therefore, the total production data from the supply, and use database is employed, and
the production of each state is calculated based on shares of each state in fresh orange
production obtained from the Fruit, Tree Nut datasets. Orange juice production,
consumption, stocks, and imports data from 1980 to 2010 are obtained from USDA-ERS
(2013), while 2010 and 2011 data are obtained from the USDA production, supply and
distribution database (USDA-ERS 2012). Since time series data about other orange
products consumption, production, prices, and inventory are not available, all the
production of oranges directed to processing is assumed to go to orange juice production.
The estimated loss rate of fresh oranges at the retail level (by supermarkets) is obtained
from Buzby et. al.(2009).
Data about the consumption of fresh oranges and orange juice is not available at the
state level; therefore, the share of each state in total consumption is calculated based on
the state’s share in population. This assumes that orange consumption patterns are similar
among the US states which is not necessarily true. As for orange juice inventory, data is
available at the national level for the whole study period, and it is available for Florida
only starting 1985. The share of Florida in the total US orange juice inventory during the
period (1980-1984) is assumed to be equal to its average share during the period (19852011). Meanwhile, the rest of the inventory is prorated among the other states based on
their consumption shares.
Equivalent on-tree prices of oranges directed to fresh production and to processing
is available from the Fruit, Tree, and Nut dataset (USDA-ERS 2012) at the state level.
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Also, packinghouse door prices for both utilization forms are compiled from the USDA
Citrus Fruit Summary Reports (USDA-NASS various issues). Only aggregate price of
California’s oranges are published starting 2009/2010 for confidentiality reasons. The
fresh orange price was estimated based on regression of the fresh orange prices on
aggregate price of fresh oranges using available data from 1980/1981 to 2008/2009.
USDA Citrus Fruit Summary Reports provide FOB (Free on Board) prices of fresh
oranges for each state from 2000/2001 to 2011/2012. The data of the rest of the period is
estimated based on the average packing costs obtained from the available time period.
Data about prices of Florida’s bulk orange juice is available from 1990 to 2010
while data about prices of Brazil’s bulk orange juice is available from 1980 to 2011
(Florida Department of Citrus, Various Issues). Florida’s bulk orange juice data for the
period (1980-1990) and the year 2011 are estimated based on regression of Florida’s
prices on Brazil’s prices. The other states’ bulk orange juice prices are assumed to be
equal to those of Florida plus transportation. Data about the US Most Favored Nation
tariff on oranges since 1980 is obtained from the Citrus Reference report of 2012 issued
by Florida Department of Citrus. Average ad valorem equivalent of tariffs and quotas
imposed on the US fresh orange exports is extracted from the International Trade Center
Market Access Map website -MACMAP (International Trade Center 2013).
Retail prices of orange juice are obtained from Citrus Reference Reports issued by
Florida Department of Citrus (various issues). Retail prices of fresh Navel and Valencia
oranges are available on the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics website. Weighted
average orange retail price was calculated based on the share of each of the orange
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varieties in the total US production. All prices and costs data were converted to real
values using Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics website.
Data about temperature and rainfall are obtained from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration weather database (NOAA 2013). Severe weather events data
are available from NOAA (2012), as well as the 2012 Citrus Reference Report (Florida
Department of Citrus 2012). Data about orange acreage and yield at the state level are
obtained from Fruit and Tree Nut Report (USDA-ERS 2012).

5.1.2

New Plantings, Tree Removal, and Age Distribution of Orange Acreage Data

Data about total annual bearing acreage of oranges in all states during the period
(1980/1981-2011/2012) is obtained from the Fruit and Tree Nut Datasets (USDA-ERS
2012). However, that data is an aggregate of bearing acreage for all tree ages. For
California, data showing acreage of oranges by year planted is available from Florida
Department of Agriculture Citrus Summary Reports during the period (1980-1993) and
from California Citrus Acreage Reports for the years 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008,
2010, 2012 (California Department of Agriculture various issues) . However, there is
inconsistency between data in the various reports since acreage planted in a year might
appear higher in a subsequent report while it should be lower due to removals. Also, data
showing non-bearing acreage/trees of oranges are available from the USDA Census of
Agriculture Reports (1974-2007) which are released every five years. So, data about new
plantings and age distribution of orange bearing acreage are calculated based on
reconciling data from California Citrus Acreage Reports, and Census of Agriculture
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Reports, as well as an assumption of 2.8% orange acreage removal rate for the period
(1972-1997) using the average acreage removal rate of the period (1998-2012).
As for Florida, the Florida Orange Census is conducted biannually. Data about
Florida’s orange acreage by year set is available from Florida’s Commercial Citrus
Inventory reports (USDA-NASS various issues from 1970-2009). Florida Agricultural
Statistics Reports (Florida Agricultural Statistics Service, Various Issues) provide data
about orange non-bearing acreage from (2008/09-2011/12). Meanwhile, data about
orange acreage by age category is available for even years from 1970-2010 in Florida
Department of Citrus (2011). Total bearing acreage is available from the above
mentioned reports as well as Fruit and Tree Nut Dataset (USDA- ERS 2012). Similar to
the problem encountered with California’s data, there are some inconsistencies in the data
between the different years. Therefore, data about new plantings and distribution of
orange acreage by tree age in Florida are estimated based on reconciling data from the
above mentioned sources, as well as data about tree removals for even years during the
period 1994-2011 from Florida Department of Citrus (2011), and a guideline of average
tree removal rate of 2.8% for orange trees of age less than 24 years of age, and 5% for
oranges of 24 years of age or older from Acquaye et. al.(2008).
Concerning Arizona and Texas, data about orange acreage by age category is
available for Texas from 1969-1995 (Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer
Services, Various Issues). Meanwhile, data of non-bearing acreage for both Arizona and
Texas is available through the USDA Census of Agriculture Reports (1974-2007). Due to
lack of data about age distribution for the two states for many years, and given that their
contribution to the total US production does not exceed 3% during the study period, the
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supply response model for the Arizona-Texas region does not consider the age
distribution of orange acreage. New plantings data is estimated based on an assumption
of orange acreage removal rate of 5%. However, this rate is adjusted in many years based
on the available data about age distribution mentioned above, bearing acreage data, and
weather events.

5.1.3

Yield

Florida Department of Citrus (2011) provides average orange yield per tree by age
category from 1992/1993 to 2009/10. Also, Abrigo and Buani-Arouca (2010) estimate
the average ratio of yield of trees of each age to the yield of a mature tree using data from
37 years. The above data is used to define ranges for the ratio of yield of each age
category to the weighted average yield of oranges. Such ranges along with weighed
average yield of oranges (from USDA-ERS 2012), and acreage for each age are used to
solve for the yield of oranges per age category for each year using Excel Solver (Nonlinear Optimization). It is assumed that the ranges of ratio of yield of each age category to
average yield in California are similar to those of Florida.

5.1.4

Costs and Returns

The University of California Cooperative Extension Department issues costs and
returns studies for several agricultural products including oranges (University of
California, Various Issues). Studies for San Joaquin Valley, the region in which about
87% of the value of California’s orange production is located (California Citrus Quality
Council 2009), are available for the years 1980, 1985, 2002, 2005, 2007, and 2009.

72

Comparing the elements of cultural practices in the different studies, it is found out that
they are similar (except for Gypsum soluble use).While there are studies for other regions
in California in the years 1981/1982, 1988/89, and 1997, the data relating to the cultural
practices and costs are inconsistent with the data for San Joaquin valley. Thus, studies
about the other regions are excluded to avoid data inconsistencies. Therefore, using data
from the available studies about costs and returns of the San Joaquin Valley Region, cost
data for the period 1980-2011 are estimated as shown in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1: Cultural Costs and Cash Overhead Costs of California-Method of Estimation
and Data Sources
Item

Source

Fertilizers

Nitrogen-based fertilizers represent the majority of the total fertilizer
cost (96% of the total cost in 2007). Thus, fertilizer cost for the
whole data series is estimated using fertilizer cost from the 2007 cost
and return study and the Nitrogen Price Index at the national level
(ERS-USDA Fertilizer Use and Price dataset-table 7).

Insecticides

Insecticide costs for the period (1980-2011) were estimated through

(Including

applying the Insecticide Price Index to insecticide, herbicide, and

Herbicides,

fungicide costs from the 2007 cost and return study. The Insecticide

and

Price Index (at the national level) is obtained from the Agricultural

Fungicides)

Price Summary Survey (various issues) and the NASS Quick Stat
Database (from 1997-2011).

Irrigation

The quantity of irrigation water (30 acre-inches for mature trees)

(water costs)

reported in the 1980 cost and return study is the same as that reported
in the subsequent years. However, the water prices are not available.
Thus, considering that the consumer price index for utility water
follow a linear trend during the period 1980-2011, a linear increase is
applied based on data for the available years.
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Table 5-1: Continued
Item

Source

Frost

Frost protection variable costs comprise water costs, and wind

Protection

machine operation (propane costs). Water costs are estimated as
explained above. Meanwhile, propane costs are estimated based on
propane prices from the Agriculture Price Summary Survey (various
issues), and the USDA Quick Statistics database.

Labor costs

It is assumed that labor use for all years is the same as that reported
in the 2007 costs and returns study. The costs are changed based on
the change in labor wage. Wage data for California’s agricultural
labor (paid by the hour) are obtained from various issues of the
Farm Labor Survey and Quick Statistics database.

Pruning costs

A linear change in pruning costs is assumed. It is estimated based on
the available data from the California Cost and Return Studies.

Fuel, lube, and

Fuel, lube and repairs costs are assumed to change based on the

repairs costs

change in the historical yearly average gasoline prices of California
obtained from the California Energy Commission (2013) .

Cash Overhead

A linear change in cash overhead costs is assumed using the

costs

available data from O’Connell (various issues) and University of
California (various issues).

Land Value

The land rent data are available in the Quick Stat Database and
Agricultural Land Values and Cash Rents-Final Estimates only from
1994-2012. So, average land farm real estate values for California
from USDA-ERS: US and State Farm Income and Wealth Statistics
datasets (US and State-level data 1980-2011) is used. The land cost
is annualized following the methodology of capital recovery
employed in the Cost and Return studies.

Machinery

Machinery costs for the period (1980-2011) are estimated through
applying the machinery price index to machinery costs from the
2007 cost and return study. The index of prices paid for “other
machinery” from the Quick Stat Database, and Agricultural Prices
Reports is used.
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On the other hand, data representing costs of production of Florida oranges are
obtained from Florida orange costs and returns studies issued by the University of Florida
Institute of Agricultural Sciences (UF/IFAS various issues). The reports provide data for
cultural costs and debt payments. Debt payments include principal plus interest on grove
establishment and capital investment, management costs, and taxes and regulatory costs
for Central Ridge and Southwest Florida regions. The average of the two regions is used.
Meanwhile, data is not available about Texas orange production cost and returns.
However, according to Sauls (2008), Texas citrus production costs are close to those of
Florida or higher. The main difference is that Texas orange industry relies on irrigation
more than Florida. On the other hand, the few production cost studies that are available
for Arizona are mainly for a combined California-Arizona orange industry. Therefore, it
is assumed that Arizona’s production costs are similar to those of California, and that
Texas’ costs are similar to those of Florida. Accordingly, costs of production of oranges
for the Arizona-Texas industry are calculated as a weighted average of California and
Florida production costs based on the weights of acreage of Arizona and Texas
respectively. Returns are calculated based on a weighted average of the product of yield
and acreage of the Arizona and Texas region.

5.1.5

Revenue Shares

Unit revenue share of labor in the orange processing sector in Florida is obtained
from the United States International Trade Commission Anti-Dumping Investigation
Report of Certain Orange Juice from Brazil (USITC 2006-a). The labor share in
California and Arizona-Texas region is assumed to be the same as that of Florida.
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Revenue share of labor in the packinghouses is assumed to be similar to the revenue
share in the food sector available in the US Economic Census (United States Department
of Commerce 2007). For orange products, orange revenue share is calculated by dividing
the delivered-in price by the bulk orange juice in each state. Similarly, for fresh oranges,
orange revenue share is calculated by dividing the packinghouse door price by the FOB
price. Revenue share of capital and management is calculated as the difference between
the orange output price and the total of labor and packinghouse door price of oranges (or
delivered-in price of oranges in the case of orange products).

5.2

Model Parameters

5.2.1

Supply Response

As discussed in the literature review and model structure chapters, the orange
growers’ response to changes in prices of inputs and output is mainly reflected in changes
in their decision of investment in new plantings of oranges. The literature review
highlighted two approaches for modeling new plantings: the traditional approach and the
investment approach. Both approaches are applied.
In applying the traditional approach, features from Alston (1995), French, King,
and Minami (1985), Alston et. al. (1980), French and King (1988), and Kinney (1987) are
incorporated, as well as some other variables that relate to the orange industry as follows:
𝑁𝑡 = (𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 𝑅𝑅𝑡−2 +𝛽3 𝑅𝑅𝑡−3 + 𝛽4 𝑅𝑅𝑡−4 + 𝛽5 𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝑅𝐹𝑡−1
+ 𝛽8 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 𝑊𝑡−1 + 𝛽10 𝑀𝑂) + (1 − )𝑁𝑡−1

(5.1)
Several lags of annual returns to annual costs are tested. Annual returns are
calculated as yield times weighted average equivalent on-tree returns of fresh oranges and
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oranges for processing. Annual costs are calculated as cultural costs plus operating costs
plus annualized costs of orange grove establishment and capital. The annualized costs are
calculated using a capital recovery method. This method of calculation of annual returns
and costs is based on the annual returns and costs study and template provided by the
University of California Extension Department to orange growers (O’Connell et. al.
2005, 2007, and 2009). Therefore, it is likely that orange growers might calculate returns
and costs in a similar way. The model is estimated in a double-log form since the main
purpose is to estimate the elasticity of supply response. In order to avoid negative values
that result in undefined logarithmic values, the ratio of annual returns to annual costs is
used rather than net returns.
In the investment approach, equation (2.6) from the literature review section is
used but the ENPV (expected net present value) is replaced by expected benefit-cost
ratio:
𝑁𝑡 = (𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝐵𝐶𝑡−1 ) + (1 − )𝑁𝑡−1

(5.2)

where  is a fraction of the desired change in investment that is accomplished in
year t, EBC is expected benefit- cost ratio in year t which is calculated as the ratio of
present value of benefits to present value of costs.
The present value of costs included costs of establishment of orange orchards, land
and capital costs, operating costs (including cultural costs), and cash overhead costs.
Meanwhile, the stream of expected benefits in year t, EBt, were calculated as:
n

EBt  
i 0

1

1  r 

i

EPi  EYi  ESi

(5.3)
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where EP: expected price, EY: expected yield, and ES: Expected survival rate of
trees.

5.2.1.1 Estimation of Supply Response Parameters for California Growers
New plantings, benefit cost ratio, annual relative returns, rainfall, acreage, and
removals time series data are tested for the existence of unit roots using Dickey Fuller
test. The hypotheses are rejected at the conventional levels of significance (ranging from
1% to 10%).
Because the above time series are found to be stationary based on the Dickey
Fuller test results, the Ordinary Least Squares Method (OLS) is applied. A common
problem with the use of time series data is autocorrelation. While the OLS estimators in
the case of autocorrelation are still unbiased, consistent and asymptotically normally
distributed, they are no longer efficient such that the minimum variance property is no
longer satisfied. Consequently, a regression coefficient may be incorrectly declared
statistically insignificant (Gujarati 2003) .According to Keele and Kelly (2006), using the
lag of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable can in many cases address that
problem; however, it might lead to biased but consistent estimators if there is no residual
autocorrelation in the data-generating process or true underlying relationship. It might
also suppress the explanatory power of the other variables if it is added for the sole
purpose of addressing autocorrelation (Achen 2001). In the current case, the inclusion of
a lagged dependent variable is justified on the grounds that new plantings are an
investment decision that is partially fulfilled in a given year due to short-run constraints
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and adjustment costs. The issue of the influence on the explanatory power is addressed
through testing whether the significance of the other variables improves when one
removes the lagged dependent variable.
Although residual plots do not show signs of autocorrelation, the hypothesis of
no autocorrelation is rejected at the 5% level by the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange
Multiplier likelihood ratio test for the estimation of equations (5.1) and equation (5.2)
above. This test is more accurate than the Durbin-Watson test in the case of having the
lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable (Greene 2003).
One way of solving the problem of autocorrelation is the application of PraisWinsten regression, a Feasible Generalized Least Squares method, which yields more
efficient estimators than OLS in the case of autocorrelation (Wooldridge 2009). A
generalized least squares method transforms the variables through including the
autocorrelation parameter ρ in the formula for estimating the regression coefficient:
1
𝐺𝐿𝑆
̂
𝛽
  X’ 1X  X ' 1Y

(5.4)

1
𝐺𝐿𝑆 = 𝜎̂
2,𝐺𝐿𝑆
̂
Variance of 𝛽
 X’ 1X 

(5.5)

𝐺𝐿𝑆 is the estimated regression coefficient,  is the matrix containing the
̂
where 𝛽

autocorrelation parameter, X is matrix of independent variables, and Y is the vector of
dependent variable. Because the autocorrelation coefficient is usually unknown, a
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) method where the autocorrelation coefficient
method is estimated is more commonly used. Prais-Winsten is a Feasible Generalized
Least Squares Method which estimates ρ using an iterative method (Greene 2003).
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New plantings based on equations (5.1) and (5.2) above are estimated using both
Prais-Winsten and OLS. Several combinations of the variables in equation (5.1) are
examined. Such combinations include omitting the lagged dependent variable to account
for the concern raised by Achen (2001) that it might suppress the explanatory power of
the other independent variables. It is found that the only statistically significant variables
are the first-order lagged ratio of annual return to costs, and the first-order lagged new
planting variable (variables with a p-value higher than 10% are considered statistically
insignificant. Rainfall has a p-value of 11% but the coefficient has a negative sign while
it is expected to be positive). Table 5-2 compares the results of the estimation of equation
(5.2) and the re-estimation of equation (5.1) after omitting the variables that are not
statistically significant.
The estimated coefficients of regression resulting from applying OLS and PraisWinsten are similar in value. Also, the estimated ρ in all the equations that are examined
are between 0.4 and 0.47. According to Gujarati (2003), Griliches and Rao (1969) found
through a Monte Carlo study that OLS is at least as good as FGLS in terms of small
sample properties when ρ is less than 0.3. In our case, this may imply that the
autocorrelation associated with the OLS is low which matches with the findings from
residual plots which do not show signs of autocorrelation. The coefficient of the ratio of
annual returns to costs represents the short-run elasticity of supply. Meanwhile, the longrun elasticity of supply is obtained by dividing the short-run elasticity of supply by the
coefficient of adjustment (Labys 1973). Therefore, using the Prais-Winsten estimation
results for equation (5.1), the short-run elasticity of supply is 0.6 and long-run elasticity
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of supply is 3. Meanwhile, for equation (5.2), the short-run elasticity of supply is 0.54,
while the long-run elasticity of supply is 6.5.

Table 5-2: Comparison of the Results of Estimation of the New Plantings Equation of
California Oranges using the Annual Returns- Cost Ratio and the Benefit-Cost ratio
Equation (5.1)
Relative Returns
Prais-Winsten
OLS

Equation (5.2)
Benefit Cost Ratio
Prais-Winsten
OLS

Ln  RRt 1  Relative Returns

0.59 ***

0.69**

-

-

Ln  EBCt 1  Benefit/Cost

-

-

0.54**

0.61**

0.79 ***

0.74***

0.92 ***

0.88***

Constant

-1.5

-1.4

0.22

0.27

R-squared

82.77%

61.2%

83.99%

63.51%

F (p-value)

0

0

0

0

N

31

31

31

31

Ratio of the previous year
Ln  NPt 1  Lagged New
Plantings

***: siginifcant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, and *: significant at 10%.

In conclusion, equations (5.1) and (5.2) converge to similar results except for the
difference in the higher long run elasticity. The ratio of annual returns to annual cost is
selected as a measure of profitability in the new plantings equation of California. The
templates for orange production cost and returns issued by the University of California
Extension and Cooperation for use by orange growers apply the annual returns to costs
ratio. Also, the annual cost includes the annualized costs of orchard establishment and
capital, so it includes the investment costs. Growers are likely to fund the initial
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investments through loans, so they pay the annualized cost in each year. This is in
contrast to paying the whole investment costs in the first year which might imply bigger
differences between the two measures of profitability. In addition, as explained below,
the estimated new plantings equation of Florida which uses annual returns to costs ratio is
better in terms of statistical properties than the equation using the benefit cost ratio.
Applying the same measures of profitability in the two regions ensures consistency.
Figure (5-1) plots the data of observed new plantings of California oranges versus the
predicted data based on equation (5.1).

Predicted New Plantings of California
(1000 Acres)

Observed Versus Predicted New Plantings of Orange Trees in
Califonria
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0

2

4
6
8
Observed New Plantings of California (1000 Acres)

10

12

Figure 5-1: Plot of Observed Versus Predicted New Plantings of California Oranges
(1980-2011)

5.2.1.2 Estimation of Supply Response Parameters for Florida Growers
New plantings, benefit cost ratio, annual relative return, rainfall, acreage, and tree
removals time series data are tested for the existence of unit roots using Dickey Fuller

82

test. The hypotheses are rejected at the conventional levels of significance (ranging from
0% to 10%).
OLS is used to estimate equation (5.1). However, first-order autocorrelation is
detected through the Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange Multiplier likelihood ratio. Also,
residual plots indicate some signs of autocorrelation. The equation is re-estimated using
the Prais-Winsten regression. The four lagged variables of the annual profitability ratio
and the lagged new plantings variable are found to be significant at the conventional
levels ranging from 1% to 10%. Figure 5-2 plots the data of observed new plantings of
Florida oranges versus the predicted data based on equation (5.1). Meanwhile, estimation
of equation (5.2) shows low R-squared (20%), and the benefit-cost ratio is not significant
at any of the conventional levels of significance (p-value 0.45). However, the whole
model is significant at the 1% level (Table 5-3).
Traboulsi (2013) estimates the supply response of Florida’s orange growers using
total acreage as the dependent variable, and temperature, one-year lagged price of
oranges, rainfall, time trend and lagged acreage as explanatory variables. The estimated
elasticity of supply with respect to the one year lagged price is 0.17. The estimated
lagged dependent variable coefficient is 0.988. Also, temperature is found to be
statistically significant at the 5% level. The difference in the results with respect to
temperature may be attributed to the fact that the current model uses annual returns to
cost ratio rather than price. Annual returns include yield which may already incorporate
the effect of temperature. This is besides that the current model uses new plantings rather
than total acreage as the dependent variable.

83

Predicted New Plantings (1000
Acres)

Observed Versus Predicted New Plantings of Orange Trees in Florida
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Figure 5-2: Observed Versus Predicted New Plantings of Oranges in Florida

Table 5-3: Comparison of the Results of Estimation of the New Plantings Equation of
Florida Oranges using the Annual Returns/Cost Ratio and the Benefit/Cost ratio (PraisWinsten Regression)
Equation (5.1)
Relative Returns
-

Equation (5.2)
Benefit/Cost Ratio
0.157

Ln  RR t 1  , Lagged Relative Returns

0.162*

-

Ln ( RR t  2 ), Lagged Relative Returns

0.215*

-

Ln ( RR t 3 ), Lagged Relative Returns

0.212*

-

Ln ( RR t  4 ), Lagged Relative Returns

0.299**

-

Ln  NPt 1  , Lagged New Plantings

0.732***

0.88***

0.68

0.36

R-Squared

90.3%

20.3%

F(p-value)

0

0

N

28

31

Ln  EBCt 1  , Lagged Benefit Cost Ratio

Constant

***: siginifcant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, and *: significant at 10%
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5.2.1.3 Estimation of Supply Response Parameters for Arizona-Texas Growers
As mentioned earlier, orange acreage in Arizona has been declining such that no
acreage is recorded for Arizona in the USDA statistical reports since 2009. Meanwhile,
Texas orange acreage has highly fluctuated during the period (1980-2012) due to severe
weather. In addition, Texas orange cultivation relies on irrigation more than Florida,
since Texas rainfall levels are less than half those of Florida (Sauls 2008). Therefore,
rainfall, which is not a significant variable in the estimation of either Florida’s or
California’s supply response equations, is not considered as an independent variable.
Also, equation (5.2) is not tested since it is decided that it will not be used for either
California or Florida.
Marketing order and weather dummy variables, tree removals of the previous year,
and a time variable representing structural changes are included as independent variables
in the supply response equation besides four lags of annual return to cost ratio, and a
lagged new planting variable (based on equation 5.1). Several combinations of the
variables are tried. The equations are estimated using OLS regression. The two
combinations of variables shown in table 5-4 exhibit the best performance among all
combinations in terms of the significance of variables and higher R-square. In both cases,
the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for no first order autocorrelation is not rejected at any of
the conventional levels of significance (p-values are 0.8 and 0.82). Re-estimation using
Prais-Winsten show results that are close to OLS which is another sign that no
autocorrelation exists.
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Table 5-4: Results of Estimation of New Plantings Equation for Arizona-Texas Region
OLS Regression

Prais-Winsten Regression

Ln ( RR t  2 ), Lagged Relative Returns

0.68**

0.49**

Ln  NPt 1  , Lagged New Plantings

0.43***

0.65***

Weather

-.52 *

Constant

0.17

-.12

R-squared

61.2%

71.1%

F (p-value)

0

0

N

31

31

***: siginifcant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, and *: significant at 10%.

5.2.2

Orange Consumption

5.2.2.1 Elasticity of Substitution between Fresh Oranges and Orange Juice
Elasticity of substitution is estimated from the logarithmic transformation of the
market share form of equation (4.1), based on Armington (1969):
C of P𝑅𝐶
𝑜𝑓
C of P𝑅𝐶
𝑜

=𝑏

𝜎𝑐

P𝑅𝐶
𝑜𝑓

1−𝜎𝑐

(P𝑅𝐶 )
𝑜

Co

The estimated equation is:

Ln (

C of PofRC
RC
o o

CP

 PofRC
 P RC
 o

) = -1.37-0.5 ln 





Since (1 − 𝜎𝑐 )= -0.5, then 𝜎𝑐 = 1.5.

(5.6)
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5.2.2.2 Own Price Elasticity of Demand for Oranges
To estimate the own price elasticity of oranges, the real index of nitrogen fertilizer
is used as an instrument for retail price of oranges. This is in order to avoid the possible
problem of endogeneity due to the correlation between retail price of oranges and the
error terms of the regression equation of orange consumption on orange prices. The two
main conditions that a variable should meet to be used as an instrumental variable are
being (1) correlated with the independent variable it is used as an instrument for; and (2)
uncorrelated with the error terms (Wooldridge 2009). Regression of real price of oranges
on the nitrogen index shows that nitrogen index is a statistically significant variable at the
5% level. The overall model is significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the nitrogen index
satisfies the first condition of an instrumental variable. While the second condition
cannot be tested, one can argue that nitrogen index does not result in shifts in demand for
oranges. A two-stage least squares method is applied. The estimated equation is:
ln

(AC o ) = -10.5 -0.76 ln ( PoRC )

(5.7)
RC

where ACo is aggregate orange consumption, and Po is value share weighted
average price of fresh orange and orange juice.
Based on the estimated own price elasticity of oranges (aggregate of fresh oranges
and orange products), the estimated elasticity of substitution between fresh oranges and
orange products, and average consumption shares of fresh oranges and orange products,
the resulting partial price elasticity of fresh oranges and orange products are -1.3 and
-0.9 respectively. Comparing those numbers with the estimated own price elasticity for
fresh oranges and orange juice from the literature, it is found that the estimated own price
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of elasticity of fresh oranges ranged between -0.27 to -1.14 with an average of -0.79 from
10 papers published between 1992 to 2002 reviewed in Durham and Eales (2010).
Durham and Eales (2010) estimated the own-price of elasticity of fresh oranges to be
-1.37, but they used data from retail stores rather than aggregate national level data.
Weatherspoon et. al. (2012) estimated the Cournot price elasticity and Slutsky price
elasticity to be -0.72 and -0.542 using data from a retail store in Detroit, which is a low
income area. As for orange juice, Brown et. al. (1994) estimated the own price elasticity
to range from -0.82 to -0.89 using several methods of estimation. USITC (2012) expert
opinion estimates the own price elasticity of orange juice to range from -0.4 to -0.8.

5.2.3

Other Parameters

Data for the price elasticity of total demand of world imports for fresh oranges
from the US is obtained from the literature. Sparks (1991) estimates the Cournot price
elasticity of demand for the US fresh oranges in four of the top US markets. The
estimated elasticities were -1.16, -3.3, -1.28, and -1.07 for Canada, European Union,
Hong Kong, and Singapore respectively. The estimated elasticities are close in the four
markets except for the European Union. Given that Canada is the largest fresh orange
market for the US, the estimated elasticity for Canada (-1.16) was initially selected to
represent the elasticity of demand of importers of US fresh oranges. Yet, model
validation led to the choice of -1.5. Elasticity of supply response of orange products
exporters to the United States is defined as 1.5 based on Spreen (1996) estimation of the
supply response of Mexico orange juice exporters. No studies for the supply response by
Brazil, the major orange juice exporter to the US, is available for the author. As for the
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elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, and between capital and orange input
at the retail and wholesale levels, they are assumed to be 0.2. Table 5-5 shows all the
elasticities employed in the model.

Table 5-5: Elasticities Used in the Model
Item
Elasticity of Supply Response of California
Orange Growers
Elasticity of Supply Response of Florida
Growers

Elasticity
Lagged Relative Returns (RRt-1): 0.6
Lagged New Plantings (NPt-1): 0.8
RRt-1 :0.16, RRt-2 : 0.22, RRt-3:0.21, and RRt-4 :0.3

NPt 1 :0.73

Elasticity of Supply Response of ArizonaTexas Orange Growers

RRt-1:0.68
NPt-1:0.43

Demand Elasticity of Substitution between
fresh oranges and orange juice

1.5

Own Price elasticity of Demand for Oranges

-0.76

Elasticity of Demand for US Exports of
Fresh Oranges

-1.5

Elasticity of Export Supply of Orange Juice
to the US

1.5

Elasticity of Substitution between Capital
and Labor at the Retail and Wholesale Levels

0.2

Elasticity of Substitution between Capital
and Labor at the Retail and Wholesale Levels

0.2
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5.3

Data Projections

As discussed in the conceptual framework, the model relies on differential
equations to solve for deviations from a baseline in response to shocks to exogenous
variables. The empirical analysis projects the impacts of pest spread under different
mitigation policies from 2014/15 to 2043/44. Therefore, projections of all the supply, use,
price, and cost data for that period are required to set the baseline for solving the model.
Since the model variables are interrelated, a tool that allows for modeling the
interaction of several endogenous time series variables is useful for data projection
(Becketti 2013). Use of Vector Autoregression (VAR) or Vector Error Correction Models
(VECM) is considered. Stationarity tests of the data variables determine the selection of
the model. According to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests, hypothesis of the
existence of unit roots is rejected at the conventional levels of significance (between 1%
to 10%) for all variables.
Stationarity of the data variables implies the selection of VAR model. The main
purpose of VAR is to determine the interrelationships among variables rather than to
estimate structural parameters. Each variable is represented as a function of p lags of all
the variables included in the model as shown in the following equation:

xt  A0  A1xt-1  A1xt-2  Ap xt-p  et
where

(5.8)

x t is an (n.1) vector of the n variables of the model, A 0 represents an (n×1)

vector of intercept terms,

A i refers to (n×n) matrices of coefficients, and e t denotes an

(n×1) vector of error terms. The explanatory variables are lagged variables which implies
that they are predetermined. This supports the assumption that the error terms are not
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correlated with the independent variables. Also, the error terms are assumed to follow the
assumptions of no autocorrelation and constant variance. The above allows the estimation
of each of the equations included in the VAR model using OLS. While the VAR model is
likely to be overparameterized, imposing zero restrictions may result in losing important
information about the interrelationships among variables (Enders 2010).
Each of the fresh and processed orange markets is modeled separately. The
endogenous variables considered in the model are orange prices, consumption, and new
plantings. Yield is included as an exogenous variable since its behavior affects the other
variables. A higher yield results in higher production which implies higher consumption
and lower prices. Although lower yield is associated with lower prices for growers, the
impact on grower returns, which is determined by the product of price and yield, depends
on the interaction between yield and price. Expected grower returns affect the farmer’s
decision of new plantings. National level data of consumption and retail prices are used.
Meanwhile, state level data of grower price and acreage are employed. Given that
California is the main player in the fresh orange market, California’s data are included in
the supply side of the fresh orange market. On the other hand, Florida’s data are included
in the supply side of the orange for processing market.
The first step is to project California’s yield. The Dickey Fuller’s test, PhilipsPerron test, and GLS-DF tests reject the existence of a unit root. So, the time series is
stationary. The autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation correlograms indicated a
possibility of applying an ARMA (0, 0, 1) model to yield data. The moving average
coefficient and the overall model are statistically significant at the 1% level. That process
predicts an annual average yield of 10.5 tons per acre. However, Lobell et. al. (2006)
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projects a decrease in yield in California’s oranges due to climate change. Fitting a PraisWinsten regression to the yield data with time as an independent variable resulted in
projection of yield data that decreased by 0.019 tons/acre so that yield is predicted to
decrease from 10.5 in 2013/14 to 9.7 in 2050/51. Accordingly, a Vector Autoregression
Model is estimated using yield projections as an exogenous variable. Pre-diagnostic lag
order selection statistics are used to test for the appropriate lag for the model. Four of the
tests (AIC, HQIX, SBIC, LR) recommend a five-lag model. Meanwhile the FPE test
recommends a four-lag model. The five-lag model fails to meet the stability condition.
Therefore, the five-lag model is discarded.
A four-lag model scenario is estimated (Table 5-6). The endogenous variables are
California’s fresh orange real equivalent on-tree price, California’s new planting, national
level real retail price of fresh oranges, and national consumption of fresh oranges. Postdiagnostic tests indicate that the stability condition is satisfied. Also, the Lagrange
Multiplier test of the hypothesis of no-autocorrelation is not rejected at all lag orders and
all conventional levels of significance (p-values are not less than 0.477). The null
hypothesis of normality of disturbances is not rejected by the Jarque-Bera test at any of
the conventional levels of significance (1-10%). The post estimation test of the
significance of the lags is statistically significant at the 1% level in most cases except for
the third lag in the real fresh equivalent on-tree price of California oranges equation and
the fourth lag of consumption which are only significant at the 15% level. Meanwhile, all
lags are statistically significant at the 1% level when the VAR is considered as a whole.
All pairwise Granger Causality Tests are significant at the 1% level except for the test
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that consumption causes new plantings. However, the joint tests for each variable are
significant at the 1% level.

Table 5-6: Results of VAR Estimation for Fresh Oranges
Explanatory Variables

Dependent Variable
California Real
Equivalent on
Tree-Price of
Fresh Oranges

Real Retail Price
of Fresh Oranges

US
Consumption of
Fresh Oranges

New
Planting

Lag1

1.235***

1.703**

-0.300

0.008

Equivalent on

Lag2

-0.376

-0.914

0.313

0.010**

Tree-Price of

Lag3

-0.292

-1.768***

0.806***

0.011

Lag4

-1.047***

-2.025***

0.431*

0.007

Lag1

-0.195

0.142

-0.291*

0.002

Real Retail Price

Lag2

0.407**

0.783 **

-0.187

-0.002**

of Fresh Oranges

Lag3

0.098

0.425

-0.151

-0.005

Lag4

0.095

-0.499 **

0.009

-0.002

Lag1

0.648***

0.989***

-0.300**

0.000

US Consumption

Lag2

0.235

0.685*

0.313**

-0.001

of Fresh Oranges

Lag3

0.235

-0.143

0.806*

-0.002

Lag4

-0.471**

-1.717**

0.431*

-0.004

Lag1

14.927**

-44.190**

-44.190

-0.051

Lag2

36.044**

-8.922**

-8.922

0.188

Lag3

-7.809

30.423

30.423***

-0.127

Lag4

-33.740*

16.182***

16.182**

0.314*

-54.66

-88.2

91.3

0.27

California Real

Fresh Oranges

New Planting
of Oranges in
California

California Yield

***: siginifcant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, and *: significant at 10%.

Vector Autoregression model of oranges for processing is developed in a similar
way to that of fresh oranges. The endogenous variables considered are Florida’s real
equivalent on-tree prices of oranges for processing, consumption of orange products,
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imports of orange products and Florida new plantings. It is worthy to note that the real
retail price of orange products is excluded since the estimated model does not satisfy the
condition of stability.
On the other hand, Florida’s orange yield is included in the model as an
exogenous variable. The existence of a unit root in that variable is rejected at the 10%
and 1% levels of significance by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Philips-Perron tests
respectively. Meanwhile, the Dickey Fuller- GLS test shows that the optimal lag is 1
indicating the existence of a unit root. ARIMA models (0,2,1) and (0,1,1) are examined.
Both specifications are significant at the 1% level. The projections resulting from the
ARIMA (0,2,1) were selected since they imply decreasing projected Florida yield.
Florida’s future yield is expected to decrease due to orange diseases.
A four-lag order VAR model is estimated. The stability conditions are satisfied.
Also, the Lagrange Multiplier test of the hypothesis of no-autocorrelation is not rejected
at all lag orders (p-values were not less than 18%). The null hypothesis of normality of
disturbances is not rejected by the Jarque-Bera test. The post estimation test of the
significance of the lags was statistically significant at the 1% in most cases except for the
first, second and fourth lags in the real grower price of orange for processing.
Meanwhile, all lags are significant at the 1% level when the VAR is considered as a
whole. All pairwise Granger Causality Tests were significant at between 1% to 10% level
except for the consumption impacts on new plantings, and the impact of real grower price
on net imports of oranges. However, the joint tests for each variable are significant at the
1% level. The results of the estimation are shown in Table 5-7.
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Table 5-7: Results of VAR Estimation for Oranges for Processing
Dependent Variables
Florida Real
Explanatory
Variables

Equivalent on
Lag

Tree-Price of
Oranges for

New
US Consumption of

US Net Imports of

Planting of

Orange products

Orange Products

Oranges in
Florida

Processing
Lag1

0.33**

-0.5**

0.27

0.03*

Lag2

-0.09

-0.3

-.09

0.05

Oranges for

Lag3

0.007

-0.08

0.18

0.007**

Processing

Lag4

0.23*

0.48**

-0.35

0.06**

Lag1

0.15*

0.33***

-0.3*

0.03***

Lag2

0.09

0.59***

-0.01

-0.02***

Lag3

0.16

-0.5***

0.18*

0.01

Lag4

0.12

0.22**

0.15

0.04***

Lag1

0.01

0.33**

0.39

-.001

Lag2

0.32

0.28

0.37

0.0001

Lag3

0.19

-0.7***

-0.35

0.06

Lag4

-0.11**

0.08**

-0.38

0.033***

Lag1

-1.09

10.5***

5.2*

0.46**

Lag2

0.2

-16.9***

-2.8

-0.08

Lag3

1.3

10.9

-3.5

0.57**

Lag4

-0.65

5.9**

0.35

-.31

-18.42

18.29

18.9

0.9

Florida Real
Equivalent on
Tree-Price of

US Consumption
of Orange
Products

US Net Imports
of Orange
Products

New Planting of
Oranges in
Florida

Florida yield

***: siginifcant at 1%, **: significant at 5%, and *: significant at 10%.

95

The other variables in the model are projected based on their relationship with the
variables projected in the VAR models mentioned above. Florida’s real equivalent ontree prices of fresh oranges are estimated based on Prais-Winsten Regression with
California’s real equivalent on-tree price, Florida’s yield, and severe weather events as
the explanatory variables. The same regression variables are tried for estimation of
Arizona’s and Texas price, but only the coefficient of California’s price is significant.
Meanwhile, California and Arizona-Texas real equivalent on-tree prices of orange for
processing do not exhibit a relationship with Florida’s real prices. Therefore, it is
assumed that such price represents 10% of the equivalent on-tree real price of fresh
orange price in each region. Real transportation costs at the different levels, packinghouse
costs, and all grower costs are assumed to remain constant at the average level of (20092011) in the 30-year projection period.
Total acreage of oranges is calculated based on new plantings and average annual
removal rate of 2.6% for orange trees below the age of 14, and 5% for older orange trees.
Allocation of oranges between fresh and processing is based on average historical levels.
It is assumed that 80%, 5%, and 85% of the future production of oranges is allocated to
fresh utilization in California, Florida, and Arizona-Texas respectively. Allocation of
consumption of fresh oranges and orange products between the different regions assumes
that the geographical distribution of population between the different states follows that
of 2012. Exports of fresh oranges are calculated as the difference between production and
consumption.
Figure 5-3 shows a scatter diagram of the projected fresh orange retail price and
consumption. They display a negative relationship as expected. Consumption levels are
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projected to follow a flat to decreasing trend as shown in Figure 5-4. Given the projected
increase in population, a decreasing or even flat total consumption implies a decreasing
per capita fresh orange intake. This is consistent with the projections about decreasing
fresh per capita orange consumption due to the consumers’ preference of easy-peel citrus
like tangerines, and the increasing availability of other types of fresh fruits. The US retail
price and California’s equivalent-on-tree price of fresh oranges are projected to witness
an increase in the beginning of the forecast period, followed by a period of fluctuations
until 2030 when they become almost flat (Figure 5-5). The equivalent on tree prices of
Florida and Arizona-Texas follow similar trends (Figure 5-6).
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Figure 5-3: Fresh Orange Retail Price vs. Consumption from
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Figure 5-4: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) Total US
Consumption of Fresh Oranges

Figure 5-5: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) US Retail
Price of Fresh Oranges
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Figure 5-6: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) Equivalent
On–Tree-Price of Fresh Oranges in the three US orange-producing Regions

On the other hand, new planting in California increases in the beginning of the
forecast period, then it follows a flat to decreasing trend. Figure (5-7) compares new
plantings resulting from the projections of a VAR model with projections resulting from
the new plantings regression equation estimated in the previous chapter (equation 4.2).
Projections from both models follow similar trends although the VAR model is
associated with higher levels of new plantings. Beginning 2032, projections from the new
planting regression equation tends to demonstrate a more decreasing trend. Although the
projections resulting from both methods result in high levels of new plantings compared
to the period (2003/04 to 2011/12), projections that maintain the low levels of the 2000s
(for example, univariate time series projections) are excluded since they would result in
severe reductions in California’s total orange acreage. Forecasts resulting from the new
planting regression equation are selected.
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Figure 5-7: Comparison of New Plantings Projections from the VAR Model and the New
Planting Regression Equation

Total bearing acreage of California’s oranges is shown in Figure (5-8).
Meanwhile, total US production, consumption and exports of fresh oranges are shown in
Figure (5-9). With the low levels of new plantings in the late 2000’s, bearing acreage of
California is forecast to follow a decreasing trend through 2018. Then, the projected
increase in new plantings is associated with increasing bearing acreage of California until
the mid-2030’s when the acreage level becomes almost flat and close to the 1980’s level.
Lower bearing acreage and yield of oranges in California and Florida are associated with
lower US fresh orange production compared to historical levels.
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Figure 5-8: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) Bearing
Acreage of Oranges in California

Figure 5-9: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) Total US
Production, Exports, and Consumption of Fresh Oranges

On the other hand, Florida witnessed a decreasing trend of new planting of oranges
since 2000. New plantings are projected to continue decreasing until 2019 when it starts to
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increase with higher orange prices. Consequently, Florida’s bearing acreage of oranges
follows a decreasing trend until 2024 when it starts to increase to be close to the early 1990s
level (Figure 5-10). Decreasing bearing acreage and yield in Florida results in lower
oranges for processing production levels. Production of oranges for processing are
predicted to follow the trend of Florida’s bearing acreage. Net imports of orange products
are forecast to have an opposite trend to that of production (Figure 5-12). Projected
Equivalent on-Tree Prices of oranges for processing in Florida are shown in Figure 5-11.

Figure 5-10: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) Florida’s
Bearing Acreage of Oranges
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Figure 5-11: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) Florida’s
Equivalent-on-Tree Price of Oranges for Processing
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Figure 5-12: Historical (1980/81-2010/11) and Projected (2011/12-2043/44) US Orange
Products Production, Consumption, and Net Imports
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5.4

Model Validation

The purpose of this section is to evaluate the validity of the model through
comparing the response of the model variables to exogenous shocks with the actual
behavior of such variables using historical data. This process involves calibration of the
model through sensitivity analysis of the parameters and revenue shares.
One of the key shocks to the model is yield shock because plant pests are usually
associated with yield reduction. The model response to fresh orange yield shocks is
compared with historical responses to similar shocks. However, the focus will be on
tracking the response of the model variables in the same year rather than the full dynamic
response of the model because it is difficult to track the separate impact of a given shock
over a period of historical data. The estimated elasticity of the response of new plantings
of oranges to changes in relative returns was validated in section 5-2 through comparing
the observed data with predicted values. The new plantings response is the key variable
in the dynamic behavior of the model. A main endogenous variable that affects new
plantings behavior and links the different parts of the model is the packinghouse door
price of California fresh oranges. Therefore, the validation process focuses on the impacts
on this particular price.
The focus on the period of validation is between the years 2000 to 2008. Different
market conditions prevailed until 1994, since the California Citrus Marketing allowed
California orange producers to restrict the quantity of oranges directed to the fresh market
in order to maintain high prices. On the other hand, for the years following 2008/2009,
the prices of fresh oranges were not reported in the USDA Citrus Summary Reports for
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confidentiality reasons (USDA-ERS 2012). Only the average price of fresh oranges and
oranges for processing is publicly available starting 2009/2010.
Table 5-8 compares the packinghouse door price changes predicted by the model in
response to fresh orange yield shock with the observed responses to such shocks. When
the observed change in fresh orange production is different from the total change in
orange yield, the difference is included in the model as a shock that diverts fresh orange
production to processing assuming that the allocation of oranges between fresh and
processing depends on weather and other exogenous events in California, as explained in
section 4-3. The figures in the “Shock to Fresh Orange Yield” column in Table 5-8 refers
to the total shock to fresh oranges resulting from total yield reduction and the diversion
shock. For example, the comparison assumes that the price of California fresh oranges in
2000, a year of lower orange yield, would have been equal to that of 2002, if the
production level was the same. Thus, introducing an increase of 8.1% to California’s
fresh orange yield in 2000 would have resulted in a 20.4% reduction in California’s fresh
orange price. The model predicts that the price would have been reduced by 18.8%. The
predicted prices are close to the observed prices for most of the years included in the
table. The highest difference is encountered in the comparison of the years 2005 and
2007.
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Table 5-8: Comparison of Predicted Response of California Packinghouse Door Prices of
Fresh Oranges to Observed Price Changes

Comparison
Year

Shock to
Fresh Orange
Yield

Observed
Packinghouse
Door Price
Change

Predicted
Packinghouse
Door Price
Change

2000

2001

3.9%

-9.9%

-9.1%

Derived
Demand
Elasticity
with Respect
to Packing
House Price
-0.43

2000

2002

8.1%

-20.4%

-18.8%

-0.43

2001

2002

15.7%

-38.0%

-37.1%

-0.42

2003

2002

11.9%

-24.3%

-26.5%

-0.45

2005

2004

5.3%

-9.0%

-12.3%

-0.43

2005

2007

8.7%

-15.4%

-20.2%

-0.43

Year to which the
Model Shock is
Applied

The changes in packinghouse door price in the model are determined by the
elasticity of response of California’s wholesale derived demand of oranges to changes in
California’s packinghouse door price. Such elasticity is a function of revenue shares, and
elasticities of substitution at the wholesale and retail level, the share of the importing US
regions in fresh orange imports and the different transportation costs, as well as share of
world imports and world import demand elasticity of fresh oranges as shown in the
following formula:
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the fresh orange retail elasticities of substitution between capital and oranges and
between capital and labor respectively, subscript r denotes domestic regions consuming
California’s oranges (California, Rest of the US, and Arizona-Texas), and

OWj ,  KWj ,

 kRj,r , and  kRj,r refer to the revenue shares of oranges, and capital at the wholesale and
T
retail levels respectively. Also, O ,r represents the share of domestic region r in total
T
fresh orange imports, O ,World is the share of imports from the rest of the world in total

fresh orange imports, and



is the elasticity of foreign demand for fresh orange imports

from the United States.
Table 5-9 presents sensitivity analysis of the elasticity of supply response of
wholesale derived demand of California’s oranges to packinghouse door price with
respect to the model parameters. The sensitivity analysis is also performed to the
predicted packinghouse door price of California fresh oranges in 2003 if the fresh orange
yield was the same as that of 2002. A lower revenue share of oranges at the wholesale is
associated with less elastic derived demand and a higher change in price. Also, increasing
the elasticity of the Rest of the World demand of US fresh oranges increases the derived
demand elasticity and is associated with a lower price change; yet, the impact varies with
export share in the US orange production. In addition, higher level elasticity of
substitution between capital and oranges is associated with higher derived demand
elasticity. The resulting predicted price from increasing the elasticity of substitution from
0.2 to 0.3 is closer to the actual price. Decreasing the elasticity of substitution from 0.2 to
0.1 is a decrease in derived demand elasticity from 0.43 to 0.31 and the price decrease
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rises from 26.5 % to 37.3%, despite the assumed increase in elasticity of import demand
by the rest of the World which has some offsetting effect in the opposite direction.
While increasing the elasticity of substitution between capital and oranges results
in price changes that are closer to predicted prices for the years to 2003 and 2005, it is
also associated with higher gaps between actual and predicted prices in other years. In
addition, there is limited scope for wholesalers and retailers to reduce orange waste in the
case of higher orange prices. In conclusion, the current model structure and parameter
results in predictions of packinghouse price change that are close to historical changes.
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Table 5-9: Sensitivity Analysis of the Wholesale Derived Demand Elasticity of Fresh Oranges to Packinghouse Door Price with
respect to the Model Parameters and Revenue Shares (Shock Applied to 2003 data in comparison to 2002 data)
Elasticities and Revenue Shares

Change

Elasticity
of
Elasticity
Elasticity
Response
of
of
of orange
Substitution Substitution
import
between
between
demand by
Oranges
Labor and
Rest of the
and Capital
Capital
World to
Price

Wholesale
Revenue
Share of
oranges

Retail
Revenue
Share of
Oranges

Yield Shock

Actual
Change In
Price

Predicted
Change in
Price

Wholesale
Derived
Demand
Elasticity of
Fresh
Oranges to
Packinghouse
Door Prices

0.20

0.20

1.50

0.73 CA,
0.63 FL

0.36 CA,
0.43 ROUS

11.9%

-24.3%

-26.5%

-0.45

Lower Wholesale
Revenue Share of
Orange

0.20

0.20

1.50

0.63 CA,
0.5 FL

0.36 CA,
0.43 ROUS

11.9%

-24.3%

-32.3%

-0.37

Higher Retail Revenue
Share of Orange

0.20

0.20

1.50

0.73 CA,0.
0.43 CA,
63 FL
0.55 ROUS

11.9%

-24.3%

-25.4%

-0.47

Lower Elasticity of
Import Demand for
Oranges by Rest of the
World

0.20

0.20

1.20

0.73 CA,
63 FL

0.36 CA,
0.43 ROUS

11.9%

-24.3%

-27.7%

-0.43

Higher Elasticity of
Demand for Oranges by
Rest of the World

0.20

0.20

1.80

0.73 CA,
63 FL

0.36 CA,
0.43 ROUS

11.9%

-24.3%

-24.9%

-0.48

Higher Elasticities of
Substitution between
Capital and Labor, and
Capital and Oranges

0.25

0.25

1.50

0.73 CA,
63 FL

0.36 CA,
0.43 ROUS

11.9%

-24.3%

-23.1%

-0.52
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Table 5-9: Continued
Elasticities and Revenue Shares

Change

Elasticity
of
Elasticity
Elasticity Response
of
of
of orange Wholesale
Substitution Substitution import
Revenue
between
between
demand
Share of
Oranges
Labor and
by Rest
oranges
and Capital
Capital
of the
World to
Price

Retail
Revenue
Share of
Oranges

Yield Shock

Actual
Change In
Price

Wholesale
Derived
Demand
Predicted
Elasticity of
Change in Price
Fresh
Oranges to
Packinghouse
Door Prices

Lower Elasticity of
Import Demand for
Oranges by Rest of the
World, Higher
Elasticities of
Substitution

0.30

0.30

1.20

0.73 CA,
63 FL

0.36 CA,
0.43
ROUS

11.9%

-24.3%

-22.2%

-0.54

Lower Elasticity of
Import Demand for
Oranges by Rest of the
World, Higher
Elasticity of
Substitution

0.10

0.10

2.00

0.73 CA,
63 FL

0.36 CA,
0.43
ROUS

11.9%

-24.3%

-37.3%

-0.32

Higher Elasticity of
Substitution between
Capital and Labor

0.20

0.25

1.50

0.73 CA,
63 FL

0.36 CA,
0.43
ROUS

11.9%

-24.3%

-26.8%

-0.44
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5.5

Conclusions

This chapter presents the different sources of data used in the model. Because the
study employs a simulation model, several parameters are estimated in the current study,
drawn from the literature, or assumed based on judgment and model validation.
Econometric estimation of the supply response parameters of orange growers in the
different United States regions is conducted in the current chapter, besides econometric
estimation of orange consumer demand elasticities. On the other hand, import demand
elasticity for the United States exports of fresh oranges by the Rest of the World and
elasticity of export supply by orange products in the Rest of the World to the United
States are drawn from the literature. Meanwhile, the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor, and capital and oranges are assumed based on judgment and model
validation. The model projects the impacts of the alternative mitigation scenarios for 30
years. Thus, the current chapter presents those projections which are based on time series
analysis and econometric estimation. Based on the conceptual framework presented in
chapter 4, and the data and parameters presented in this chapter, the alternative impacts of
the pest management strategies of False Codling Moth affecting California’s oranges is
presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO THE FALSE
CODLING MOTH PEST INFESTATION

Although False Codling Moth (FCM), Thaumatotibia (Cryptophlebia) leucotreta,
(Lepidoptera: Tortricidae), is not currently present in the United States, it was recognized
by the USDA Plant Pest Quarantine (PPQ) as a potential threat since 1960. Native to
Africa, FCM has been intercepted 2622 times at 34 US ports in cargo and passenger
luggage during the period 1984-2013 (PERAL/NCSU (2013). However, the first instance
of domestic detection of FCM was of a single male in Ventura County, California, in
2008; yet, no adult females were discovered (USDA 2010). Regulatory action is invoked
under the following conditions: “(1) more than one moth is found in an area less than 6
square miles within one estimated life cycle; (2) one mated female, or a larva, or a pupa
are detected; and (3) a single moth is detected that is determined to be associated with a
current eradication project” (USDA 2010).
While False Codling Moth prefers navel oranges as the main host, it feeds on
other varieties of citrus and crops causing fruit yield reduction. Due to similarity between
the weather conditions of the Southern and Southwestern United States and the foreign
regions where the pest is established, there is a risk that it becomes established in the
United States (USDA 2010). According to the False Codling Moth risk map developed
by NAPFFAST (2013), the risk areas for establishment of False Codling Moth in the
United States include California, Florida, Arizona, and Texas. The risk areas for pest

112

establishment are identified based on relative density of potential pest hosts, conducive
climate conditions, and pathway introduction points (Magarey et. al. 2011). However, the
focus of the current research is only on California orange growing areas.
False Codling Moth results in orange crop losses that range between 2.5 to 19.4%
in unsprayed orange orchards in Citrusdal region in South Africa which has similar
weather conditions to those of California’s major orange producing areas (PEARL/NCSU
2013). The orange fruit affected by the pest is totally damaged such that it is no longer
possible to sell the fruit in either the fresh or processed orange markets.
Therefore, several mitigation options are considered for addressing the threat of
the False Codling Moth to California oranges including quarantines, pesticide treatment,
sterile insect technique, and mating disruption. PERAL/NCSU (2013) compares the
expected pest spread and expected damages to orange yield in California under
alternative pest management strategies that include combinations of the above mitigation
options as well as a No Mitigation Scenario where no action is taken to control the pest.
The comparison relies on output from the Exotic Pest Assessment Tool (EXPAT)
developed by (Waage 2005) and modified by the Plant Epidemiology and Risk Analysis
Laboratory of the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and North Carolina
State University. Based on expected damages to California’s yield and expected costs to
be incurred by orange growers in California provided by PERAL/NCSU (2013), the
economic impacts of the different pest management scenarios are compared using the
economic model outlined in Chapter (4) and the data and parameters described in
Chapter (5).
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The following section presents the various mitigation options available for
controlling the False Codling Moth affecting oranges. Then, section (6.2) presents the
scenarios considered for the analysis of the impacts of False Codling Moth introduction
to California oranges as well as a brief description of the EXPAT model. The first
scenario is a No Mitigation Scenario where no action is taken to control the pest. Each of
the other scenarios includes one or more of the mitigation options outlined in section
(6.1). Section (6.3) presents the model results for the analysis of the economic impacts of
the different scenarios. Section (6.4) presents the conclusions.

6.1

Mitigation Options

Four mitigation options are considered in PERAL/NCSU (2013). Each of the pest
management scenarios outlined in section 6.2 (except the No Mitigation scenario) include
one or more of the pest mitigation options discussed in this section. All mitigation costs
are assumed to be incurred by growers in infested areas.

6.1.1 Quarantine/Fruit Removal
Quarantines involve various restrictions on fruit movement. Two quarantine
options are considered. The first option is to use orchard sanitation where the host
materials and larvae are removed before they emerge. This involves weekly stripping of
fruits that requires four labor hours per week costing a total of $1826 per acre for the
forty weeks of the orange growing season. Under this option, 80% of the fruit can be sold
(PERAL/NCSU 2013).
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The second quarantine option is stripping 100% of the orchard crop such that all
the fruits are removed from the trees and destroyed. This implies a 100% fruit loss in the
infested orchards. Under this option, participating growers incur an annual cost of $1462
per acre besides yield loss (PERAL/NCSU 2013).

6.1.2 Sterile Insect Technique
The Sterile Insect Technique (SIT) is a biological control method defined by the
International Standard for Phytosanitary Measure No. 5 (FAO 2005) as “a method of pest
control using area-wide inundative releases of sterile insects to reduce reproduction in a
field population of the same species”. This method is considered by the International
Standard for Phytosanitary Measures No. 3 (FAO 2005) as an introduction of beneficial
organisms because it is an environment-friendly pest control method that avoids the
introduction of exotic species to the environment. Also, sterile insects are not selfreplicating so they cannot be established in an environment (NAFA n.d.). The annual
total cost of application of the program is $1156.2 per acre in infested areas
(PERAL/NCSU 2013).

6.1.3

Mating Disruption

Under mating disruption, the orchard is saturated with synthetic pheromones -that
are naturally released by female moths to attract males for mating- in order to inhibit the
ability of males to find females (Murray and Alston 2010). Application of this program
costs $509 per acre per year (PERAL/NCSU 2013).
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6.1.4

Pesticides

The effectiveness of pesticide application in reducing the infestation rate of False
Codling Moth varied among studies within a range of 50-75%. With two pesticide
applications per year, a pesticide program costs $380.88 per acre annually
(PERAL/NCSU 2013).

6.2

Pest Management Scenarios

Four pest management scenarios covering 30 years are considered. The first
scenario assumes that no mitigation action is taken to control the pest. Each of the other
pest spread scenarios includes one or more of the mitigation options outlined in the
previous subsection. The potential damages to orange yield as well as the potential costs
to be incurred by growers under each scenario are provided by PERAL/NCSU (2013)
using the Exotic Pest Assessment Tool described below. Given that the False Codling
Moth has multiple hosts other than oranges, the scenarios assume that all mitigation
requirements are applied by growers of other plants that are hosts to the False Codling
Moth. Yet, the costs considered in the current analysis only pertain to orange growers
(PERAL/NCSU 2013).
The Exotic Pest Assessment Tool (EXPAT) allows the comparison of the spread of
an invasive pest in the United States under various pest management options. The spread
of a plant pest or a disease “is determined by several biological factors including the size
of the area of the original incursion; the intrinsic rate of natural increase; the dispersal
distance; the host density of the area of interest; and satellite outbreaks from the original
site” (PERAL/NCSU 2013). The likelihood of a random satellite outbreak is assumed to
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be directly related to the area of the initial outbreak and population density in that area.
The parameter values required for simulation of plant pest or disease spread are obtained
from literature relating to the spread and physical impacts of the plant pest/disease under
study. Each parameter is represented in the model as a probability distribution rather than
a point estimate to consider the uncertainty associated with available empirical data
(PERAL/NCSU 2013).
The estimated potential yield loss due to the pest in the region under study is
calculated as the mathematical product of the area of spread of the pest (obtained from
the EXPAT Model) and the potential damage due to the pest obtained from the literature
(PERAL/NCSU 2013). The output provided by the EXPAT model is in the form of
percentage reduction in orange yield in each year of the thirty-year projection period. The
percentage reductions in orange yield are introduced to the partial equilibrium economic
model developed in this dissertation as exogenous supply shocks.
The following presents the alternative pest management scenarios of False Codling
Moth. As mentioned earlier, the minimum yield loss associated with False Codling Moth
is 2.5% and the maximum is 19.4%. Applying a uniform distribution with a minimum of
2.5% and a maximum of 20%, the average estimated potential yield loss is 11.25%. Table
6-1 illustrates the minimum, average, and maximum pest infestation spread under each of
the four scenarios where the pest infestation spread refers to the percentage of
California’s bearing acreage infested by False Codling Moth. Table 6-2 shows the
minimum, average, and maximum estimated potential yield loss in each year due to the
False Codling Moth for each of the pest management scenarios. In the following, the pest
management scenarios assuming the minimum estimated potential yield loss are labelled

117

minimum outbreak scenarios, the pest management scenarios assuming the average
potential yield loss are labelled average outbreak scenarios, and the scenarios assuming
maximum estimated potential yield loss are labelled maximum outbreak scenarios.

6.2.1

Scenario 1: No Mitigation

This scenario assumes that no mitigation is attempted to control the pest spread.
The crop damage due to the pest spread is assumed to be similar to that of unsprayed
orchards in Citrusdal, South Africa, which has similar weather conditions to most of
California’s citrus producing areas. No control costs are incurred.
The EXPAT model results show that under this scenario, the False Codling Moth is
predicted to infest 100% of the area over an average of 10.09 years, with a minimum of 9
years, and a maximum of 12 years (Table 6-1). Starting year 12, an average loss of
11.25% of California’s orange crop is expected annually assuming a uniform probability
distribution, at a minimum of 2.5% and a maximum of 19.4% (Table 6-2).

6.2.2

Scenario 2: Grower Mitigation with Pesticide

Under this scenario, growers apply the pesticide mitigation option. The pesticide
application is assumed to reduce the pest growth rate by a range of 50% to 70%. Orange
growers in infested areas incur an annual cost of $380.88 per acre.
The pest spread model results show that the pest infestation rate is reduced
compared to the No Mitigation Scenario. The average infestation rate increases gradually
over the 30 year-period to reach an infestation rate of 9.3% as an average for the model
iterations with a minimum of 1.7% and a maximum of 27% in year 30 (Table 6-1). Crop
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losses increase gradually to reach an average of 1.03% in year 30 with a minimum of
0.06% and a maximum of 4.36% (Table 6-2).

6.2.3

Scenario 3: Area Wide Management Program

This scenario involves both orchard sanitation and pesticide sprays. Orchard
sanitation requires growers to remove infested fruits from the orchard on a weekly basis.
Growers in infested areas can sell the non-infested fruits. This program requires an
annual mitigation cost of $2310.5 per acre to be incurred by growers in infested areas
(PERAL/NCSU 2013). Crop losses under this scenario range between a maximum of
1.4% at the highest infestation level and a minimum of 0% at the minimum infestation
(Table 6-2). Actually, at the minimum infestation level, this scenario has a similar impact
to the eradication scenario as the pest is eradicated after five years (Table 6-1).

6.2.4

Scenario 4: Eradication

This scenario is a federally-coordinated eradication program that combines
several of the above mentioned mitigation options. It includes pesticide spraying, fruit
stripping, sterile insect technique and mating disruption. That combination of mitigation
options is expected to be effective in pest eradication. Besides, the mitigation costs of
$3508.51 per acre, the growers in infested areas lose all their yield due to the fruit
stripping requirement. Yet, they save the costs of applying the growth regulator ($148.4
per acre), as well as harvesting costs (PERAL/NCSU 2013).
The longest the pest survives before eradication is 7 years which occurs at the
maximum infestation level of 1.3%. At the average infestation level of 0.43%, the pest
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survives for four years (Table 6-1). The crop losses are the same as the infestation levels
since the program requires stripping of the entire crop of the infested orchard (Table 6-2).

Year

Table 6-1: Comparison of the False Codling Moth Infestation Spread as Percentage of
Total Acreage under the Different Pest Management Scenarios

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

No Mitigation Scenario
Min Average
(%)
(%)
0.07
0.44
0.09
0.49
0.19
1.04
0.42
2.16
0.87
4.43
1.66
8.55
4.16
17.72
9.03
35.63
16.92 68.61
34.21 95.20
69.25 99.98
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Max
(%)
1.23
1.28
2.61
5.39
11.30
21.71
43.99
88.48
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Pesticide Only Scenario
Min
(%)
0.07
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.05
0.08
0.12
0.11
0.13
0.18
0.23
0.30
0.35
0.28
0.44
0.54
0.53
0.68
0.66
0.90
0.95
1.05
0.97
0.72
1.00
0.93
1.51
1.68

Source: PERAL/NCSU (2013)

Average
(%)
0.43
0.18
0.17
0.19
0.23
0.30
0.40
0.52
0.66
0.83
1.02
1.24
1.48
1.75
2.04
2.36
2.70
3.06
3.44
3.83
4.27
4.73
5.22
5.72
6.25
6.80
7.42
8.02
8.66
9.31

Max
(%)
1.23
0.63
0.62
0.64
0.75
0.98
1.29
1.75
1.99
2.60
2.94
4.05
4.17
5.45
5.78
6.77
8.75
8.38
11.68
11.04
13.68
15.07
16.30
16.75
19.05
22.12
23.55
24.54
28.99
26.59

Area-Wide Pest
Management Scenario
Min Average Max
(%)
(%)
(%)
0.07
0.43
1.23
0.01
0.07
0.29
0.00
0.03
0.13
0.00
0.04
0.15
0.00
0.05
0.22
0.00
0.01
0.05
0.00
0.09
0.43
0.00
0.13
0.63
0.00
0.16
0.69
0.00
0.20
0.88
0.00
0.25
1.09
0.00
0.30
1.25
0.00
0.35
1.49
0.00
0.40
1.83
0.00
0.47
2.23
0.00
0.53
2.34
0.00
0.60
2.51
0.00
0.67
2.96
0.00
0.75
3.95
0.00
0.83
3.52
0.00
0.92
4.04
0.00
1.01
4.42
0.00
1.11
4.86
0.00
1.21
4.76
0.00
1.31
5.96
0.00
1.42
5.64
0.00
1.54
7.01
0.00
1.65
6.92
0.00
1.77
7.29
0.00
1.89
8.83

Eradication Scenario
Min
(%)
0.07
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Average
(%)
0.43
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Max
(%)
1.23
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
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Table 6-2: Comparison of the Estimated Potential Yield Loss for California Oranges
under the Different Pest Management Scenarios

1

Min Average
(%)
(%)
0.00
0.05

Max
(%)
0.24

Min
(%)
0.00

Average
(%)
0.05

Max
(%)
0.24

Area-Wide Pest
Management Scenario
Min Average Max
(%)
(%)
(%)
0.00
0.05
0.24

2

0.00

0.05

0.23

0.00

0.02

0.10

0.00

0.01

0.04

0.00

0.00

0.01

3

0.01

0.12

0.46

0.00

0.02

0.09

0.00

0.00

0.02

0.00

0.00

0.00

4

0.01

0.24

1.03

0.00

0.02

0.09

0.00

0.00

0.03

0.00

0.00

0.00

5

0.02

0.50

2.11

0.00

0.03

0.13

0.00

0.01

0.04

0.00

0.00

0.00

6

0.07

0.96

3.92

0.00

0.03

0.18

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.00

7

0.15

1.99

7.64

0.00

0.04

0.23

0.00

0.01

0.08

0.00

0.00

0.00

8

0.32

4.00

16.97

0.00

0.06

0.25

0.00

0.01

0.11

0.00

0.00

0.00

9

0.71

7.70

20.00

0.00

0.07

0.35

0.00

0.02

0.12

0.00

0.00

0.00

10 1.26
11 2.48

10.72

20.00

0.00

0.09

0.42

0.00

0.02

0.15

0.00

0.00

0.00

11.25

20.00

0.00

0.11

0.53

0.00

0.03

0.18

0.00

0.00

0.00

12 2.50
13 2.50

11.25

20.00

0.01

0.14

0.65

0.00

0.03

0.20

0.00

0.00

0.00

11.25

20.00

0.01

0.17

0.72

0.00

0.04

0.27

0.00

0.00

0.00

14 2.50
15 2.50

11.25

20.00

0.01

0.20

1.00

0.00

0.05

0.27

0.00

0.00

0.00

11.25

20.00

0.01

0.23

1.03

0.00

0.05

0.37

0.00

0.00

0.00

16 2.50
17 2.50

11.25

20.00

0.02

0.26

1.12

0.00

0.06

0.35

0.00

0.00

0.00

11.25

20.00

0.01

0.30

1.48

0.00

0.07

0.40

0.00

0.00

0.00

18 2.50
19 2.50

11.25

20.00

0.02

0.34

1.56

0.00

0.08

0.53

0.00

0.00

0.00

11.25

20.00

0.02

0.39

1.81

0.00

0.08

0.55

0.00

0.00

0.00

20 2.50
21 2.50

11.25

20.00

0.03

0.43

1.99

0.00

0.09

0.58

0.00

0.00

0.00

11.25

20.00

0.03

0.48

2.01

0.00

0.10

0.73

0.00

0.00

0.00

22 2.50
23 2.50

11.25

20.00

0.03

0.53

2.16

0.00

0.11

0.78

0.00

0.00

0.00

11.25

20.00

0.03

0.59

2.65

0.00

0.12

0.97

0.00

0.00

0.00

24 2.50
25 2.50

11.25

20.00

0.04

0.64

2.97

0.00

0.14

0.83

0.00

0.00

0.00

11.25

20.00

0.04

0.70

2.99

0.00

0.15

0.91

0.00

0.00

0.00

26 2.50
27 2.50

11.25

20.00

0.05

0.77

3.78

0.00

0.16

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

11.25

20.00

0.04

0.84

3.57

0.00

0.17

1.40

0.00

0.00

0.00

28 2.50
29 2.50

11.25

20.00

0.06

0.90

4.19

0.00

0.19

1.25

0.00

0.00

0.00

11.25

20.00

0.06

0.97

4.32

0.00

0.20

1.24

0.00

0.00

0.00

30 2.50

11.25

20.00

0.06

1.05

4.35

0.00

0.21

1.37

0.00

0.00

0.00

Year

No Mitigation Scenario Pesticide Only Scenario

Source: PERAL/NCSU (2013)

Eradication Scenario
Min
(%)
0.07

Average
(%)
0.43

Max
(%)
1.23
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6.3

Model Application

The economic impacts of the above scenarios are analyzed using the model
outlined in chapter (4), with the parameters and data described in chapter (5). Shocks to
the model in terms of percentage reduction in yield and changes in control costs are
obtained from PEARL/NCSU (2013) as explained in the previous sections. All mitigation
costs are assumed to be incurred by growers in infested areas. The reduction in yield in
year t is introduced to the model as a shock to the current year’s supply, and a shock to
the expected returns of orange growers. Thus, the pest infestation and mitigation
scenarios affect California orange growers’ new planting decision in two ways. First,
growers update expected returns based on changes in the previous year’s average yield
and price. Second, given that additional costs under the different mitigation scenarios are
only incurred by growers in infested areas, growers calculate expected cost, E (Cost ) , as
follows:

E (Cost )  P( Inf )  CostInf  P( NoInf )  CostNoInf

(6-1)

where P( Inf ) is the probability of pest infestation based on the previous year’s pest
spread, CostInf is the cost in case of pest infestation under the mitigation scenario in
question, P( NoInf ) is the probability of no pest infestation, and Cost NoInf is the cost when
there is no pest infestation.
In subsection (6.4.1), the impacts of the different scenarios on orange production,
consumption, and production are presented. The impacts presented in this subsection
assume average outbreak level (percentage reduction in orange crop denoted average in
Table 6-2). Section (6.4.2) compares the welfare impacts of the different scenarios under

122

the average pest outbreak level assumption. Then, the welfare impacts under the
minimum, average, and maximum pest outbreak levels (with potential yield losses
denoted minimum, average, and maximum respectively in Table 6-2) for the four pest
management scenarios are compared.

6.3.1

Impacts on Orange Production, Consumption, and Prices

This subsection starts with presentation of the impacts of pest infestation under the
No Mitigation Scenario in order to illustrate the relationship between the different
variables in the model. Then, the impacts under the different scenarios are compared. All
the analysis in this subsection assume average outbreak level.

6.3.1.1 No Mitigation Scenario
In the No Mitigation Scenario, no action is taken to control the pest spread. The
pest infestation rate increases gradually such that all California’s orange growing acreage
is subject to pest infestation within 11 years of the initial infestation (Table 6-1). An
average crop loss of 11.25% of infested areas is projected (Table 6-2). In the following,
the impacts of the No Mitigation Scenario on California’s prices, grower returns to cost
ratio, acreage, and production are first discussed in subsection (6.3.1.1.1). Then, the
transmission of those impacts to the other orange-producing regions is discussed in
section (6.3.1.1.2).
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6.3.1.1.1 California
The decrease in average orange yield in California due to pest infestation induces
an increase in average orange price received by growers. Therefore, new plantings
increase which results in an increase of orange bearing acreage over time. The increase in
bearing acreage partially offsets the impact of the orange yield reduction on orange
output, such that the orange output decrease is lower than the yield shock. As orange
bearing acreage witnesses more increases and as more of the new plantings reach
maturity, the yield shock impact on orange output is more than offset and orange output
becomes higher than the base level starting the year 2039. Starting the same year, the
increase in orange output to levels higher than the base level induces a decrease in orange
grower price to levels below the base level (Figure 6-1).

35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
-5%
-10%
-15%

CA Orange Grower Price
CA Yield Shock
CA Orange Output

2042

2040

2038

2036

2034

2032

2030

2028

2026

2024

2022

2020

2018

2016

Acreage Change
2014

% Change from Basline

Change in California's Orange Output, ACreage, Yield, And Grower
Price- No Mitigation Scenario

Year

Figure 6-1: Changes in California's Orange Output, Acreage, Yield and Grower Price- No
Mitigation Scenario
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Expected grower returns to costs ratio is the main factor affecting changes in new
plantings in this model. Changes in expected grower returns to cost ratio is a function of
the changes in grower prices, yield, and cost of the previous year. Yet, there are no
changes in costs associated with this scenario except for harvest cost savings since
harvest cost depends on yield. Therefore, the yield reduction has two opposite impacts on
grower returns: a downward pressure on the quantity sold but an upward impact on price.
Consequently, as seen in figure 6-2, the increase in grower returns to costs ratio is lower
than the increase in grower price in all years. Also, grower returns to costs ratio starts to
decrease before the grower price falls (grower price falls starting 2039 because of the
output increase resulting from higher new plantings as explained above). Starting 2037,
the increase in grower price is not high enough to offset the impact of lower yield on
average grower returns to cost ratio, and grower returns to cost ratio falls. Grower relative
returns to costs per acre become 11.7% lower than the base level in 2043 (A yield
decrease of 11.25%, plus a price decrease of 4.7%, so the total decrease in returns of 16%
is partially offset by a decrease in harvest and transportation costs such that the net
change in relative returns to costs is -11.7%).
New plantings follow the changes in grower returns to cost ratio with some lag.
The impact of changes in grower returns to cost ratio on new plantings in a given year is
extended for several years and new plantings increase at a higher rate than relative returns
of the previous year due to the time taken for adjustment following an investment
̂ t =0.6 𝑅𝑅
̂ t-1 + 0.8 𝑁𝑃
̂ t-1, where 𝑁𝑃
̂ t refers to changes in new plantings in
decision ( 𝑁𝑃
̂ t- refers to changes in returns to cost ratio in year t-1 such that only 20% of
year t, and 𝑅𝑅
an investment decision is implemented in year t and the rest is implemented in the

125

following years). The percentage increase of new plantings compared to base level
reaches a maximum of around 44% during the period (2028-2030), then the rate of
increase in new plantings declines with the decrease in grower returns. New plantings
start to follow a decreasing trend in 2041 which is f years after the decline in grower
relative returns. In 2043, new plantings become 14% lower than their base level (Figure
6-2).
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Figure 6-2: Changes in California’s New Plantings, Grower Returns, and Orange PriceNo Mitigation Scenario

6.3.1.1.2 Transmission of the Changes in California’s Prices and Interaction with the
Other Regions:
Given that 80% of California’s production is utilized as fresh and that California
contributes to more than 75% of the US fresh orange production but less than 8% of the
US orange for processing production (USDA-ERS 2012), the impacts of changes in
California grower prices of oranges on the wholesale prices at retailer’s door (the border
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price linking the different regions) differs between the fresh and processed market. The
changes in wholesale prices of oranges in California and all the other regions follow the
trend of the changes in California’s grower price, although the percentage changes of
wholesale prices are around 50% lower than that of California’s growers. Figure (6-3)
shows the price of grower, wholesaler, and retailer prices of California’s. Meanwhile,
Figure (6-4) shows that the wholesale prices of Arizona and Texas follow the changes in
the wholesale price of California, where the latter is determined by the grower price of
California as shown in Figure (6-3).
On the other hand, Florida dominates the orange products market and California
imports more than 55% of its orange products consumption. Therefore, the wholesale
prices of orange-based products in the United States mainly follow the changes in
Florida’s market. As illustrated in Figure (6-5), the percentage changes in the wholesale
price of orange products of California are low compared to the percentage changes in its
grower price. Figure (6-6) shows that the changes in California’s wholesale price of
orange products follows the trend of the grower price (Packinghouse Door Price) of
Florida, rather than grower prices of California. For example, when California’s
packinghouse door price of orange products increases by 40%, its wholesale level price
increases by less than 1%. In contrast, the wholesale price of Florida’s fresh oranges
follows the grower price of California.
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Changes in Fresh Orange Prices at the Wholesale, Retail, and
Packinghouse Door Levels in California-No Mitigation Scenario
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Figure 6-3: Changes in Fresh Orange Prices at the Wholesale, Retail, and Packinghouse
Door Levels in California-No Mitigation Scenario

Changes in Florida's Wholesale Price and Packinghouse Door Price
Compared to California's Wholesale Price of Fresh Oranges-No
Mitigation Scenario
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Figure 6-4: Changes in California’s Packinghouse Door and Wholesale Prices of Fresh
Oranges compared to the Wholesale Price of Arizona-Texas and Florida-No Mitigation
Scenario
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Changes in Florida's Wholesale Price and Packinghouse Door Price
Compared to California's Wholesale Price of Fresh Oranges-No
Mitigation Scenario
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6.3.1.1.2.1 Florida
With the increase in price of fresh oranges relative to the price of orange for
processing, Florida orange growers divert some of their production from the orange for
processing market to the fresh market. Thus, the production of oranges for processing in
Florida slightly decreases until the year 2032. Yet all the changes are minimal, as the
maximum increase in fresh orange production is 2.3%, and the maximum decrease in
orange for processing production is -0.13%.
The decreases in the production of oranges for processing induce a minor increase
in its grower price (a maximum of 0.4%). The increase in the prices of oranges for
processing combined with the increase in fresh orange prices explained above results in
an increase in Florida’s grower returns. Grower returns in Florida depend to a greater
extent on the price of orange for processing since it represents 95% of their production.
Thus, even in the years when fresh orange grower price reaches an increase of 22%, the
increase in grower returns is only 1.5%. As a result, the changes in Florida’s grower’s
returns are much lower than those of California’s growers.
The grower returns of Florida, which are illustrated in Figure 6-7, are largely
determined by its packinghouse door price of oranges for processing. Consequently,
grower returns continue to increase until the year 2034 when it starts to slightly decline
until it becomes 2.2% lower than the base level in 2043. The reason for that decline in
grower returns is the decrease in the orange for processing price starting 2031 (the impact
of the decrease in orange for processing price on grower returns between 2031 and 2034
is offset by the increase in fresh orange grower price), as well as the decline in the rate of
the decrease in fresh orange grower price. That decrease in orange for processing price is
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due to the increase in Florida’s orange production following the new plantings increase
resulting from higher returns starting 2031.
Changes in new plantings follow the changes in new returns, but with some lag.
Therefore, new plantings of Florida witness an increase by a maximum of 3.82% in 2031,
then they start to decline in 2038 to become 4.6% lower than the base level in 2043. The
increase in new plantings results in an increase in Florida’s orange production. Although
the rate of increase of Florida’s production allocated to the fresh market starts to decline
following the rate of change of price, it remains higher than the average increase in the
total orange output of Florida until the year 2040 when fresh orange prices decrease
(Figure 6-8). Overall, Florida’s total orange output increase does not exceed 1.5%.
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Figure 6-7: Changes in Florida's Average Grower Returns, and Packinghouse Door Prices
of Fresh Oranges and Oranges for Processing-No Mitigation Scenario
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Figure 6-8: Change in Florida’s Orange New Plantings, Farm Production, and Grower
Returns -No Mitigation Scenario

6.3.1.1.2.2 Arizona-Texas Region
The Arizona-Texas region, which directs most of its production to the fresh market,
witnesses higher increases in new plantings than those of Florida, but lower than
California (Figure 6-9). New plantings adjust to the changes in returns in Arizona-Texas
with a shorter lag than California and Florida due to the higher adjustment coefficient of
the estimated new plantings coefficient in Arizona-Texas. The adjustment coefficient for
Arizona-Texas is 0.65 compared to 0.73 in Florida, and 0.8 in California. Also, in
Florida, the estimated new plantings equation included four lagged variables of previous
years’ relative returns, while the estimated equations for California and Arizona-Texas
regions included one lagged variable of previous year’s returns only (Tables 5-2, 5-3 and
5-4 in the previous chapter). New plantings increase of Arizona-Texas region reaches a
maximum of 24% in the year 2027. Then, with lower increase in fresh orange price in
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California and higher orange output in Arizona-Texas region, new plantings increases at
a decrease rate until 2034. Starting 2035, new plantings of Arizona-Texas follow a
decreasing trend to reach a 15% decline from the base level in 2043. Orange output in
that region remains higher than the base level with a maximum increase of 9.1% in 2035,
then the rate of output increase declines with lower new plantings.
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Figure 6-9: Change in Arizona-Texas Orange New Plantings, Farm Production, and
Grower Returns- No Mitigation Scenario

6.3.1.2 Impacts of the Different Mitigation Scenarios
Under the Pesticide Treatment Scenario, the yield shock increases gradually from
0.05% in the first year to 1.05% in year 30, and growers in infested areas (infested areas
increase gradually to 9% of total California orange acreage in 2043) incur an annual cost
of $380 per acre. The yield shock is very low such that it results in a minimal increase in
orange grower price reaching a maximum of 2% in 2043. The increase in relative returns
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is lower than orange grower price due to higher expected costs and lower expected yield.
Thus, new plantings increase by a minimal rate to reach a maximum increase of 2% in
2043. Thus, a minor increase in orange acreage in California occurs which marginally
offsets the yield shock impact on orange output. In 2043, the yield shock is 1.05% and
the orange output decrease is 0.85% (Figure 6-10).
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Figure 6-10: Impacts on California's New Plantings, Grower Price, Returns, and
Production- Pesticide Treatment Scenario

On the other hand, while the Area-Wide Pest Management scenario is associated
with higher treatment costs for the infested acres compared to the Pesticide Treatment
Scenario, the grower expected costs are no more than 40% higher (except for the first
year) because the probability of pest infestation is lower under the Area-Wide Pest
Management Scenario. Under the Area-Wide Pest Management scenario, the pest spreads
to 1.89 % of California’s orange acreage in 2043 leading to the loss of 0.21% of
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California’s orange crop. Meanwhile, under the Pesticide Treatment Scenario, the pest
spreads to 9.3% of California’s orange acreage resulting in the loss of 1.05% of
California’s orange crop in the same year. With a lower yield shock than the previous
scenario, the price change resulting from the yield reduction is too small to offset the
increase in expected costs and yield loss; consequently, there is a slight decrease in new
plantings (not exceeding 0.85%) during the whole forecast period( figure 6-11). As a
result, there is a minor decrease in California’s orange output which exceeds the
reduction resulting from the yield shock (0.4% decrease in orange output in 2043 while
the yield reduction is 0.21% in the same year). It is worthy to note that this scenario starts
with a yield shock of -0.05% in the first year which decreases gradually, and then
increases again in 2027. That is why the rate of increase in grower price is higher in the
first two years.
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Figure 6-11: Impacts on California's New Plantings, Grower Price, Returns, and
Production- Area Wide Pest Management Scenario
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The eradication scenario involves stripping of the entire crop from the infested
acre as well as a combination of mating disruption and sterile insect technique applied in
infested areas only. At an average infestation rate, this scenario results in eradication of
the False Codling Moth in seven years and there is a yield loss of -0.43% in the first year.
Starting the second year, the yield loss under this scenario is negligible. Therefore, all the
changes to output, prices, and production are minimal (Figure 6-12). There is a slight
decrease in new plantings (0.2%) in the second year due to the initial yield shock and
higher expected costs due to the eradication treatment requirement. Then, in the second
year, a slight increase in new plantings occurs (0.25%) due to the higher price resulting
from the initial yield loss. This results in a minimal increase in output which is associated
with a minimal price decrease. A minor decrease in output follows which induces a small
price increase. Yet, all of the changes in output and price are negligible and do not exceed
0.13% except for the first year.
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Figure 6-12: Impacts on California's New Plantings, Grower Price, Returns, and
Production- Eradication Scenario
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Comparing the acreage used for orange production in California under the
different scenarios, the No Mitigation Scenario increases the total acreage of orange by
12% in year 30 to increase from 189,000 to 211, 000 acres. However, output is only
1.68% higher than the base acreage level before the pest infestation. Meanwhile, the
Pesticide Treatment scenario results in a small decrease to Califonria’s output that
reaches 1% at the end of the forecast period, and an icrease in acreage not exceeding
0.1%. The Area-Wide Pest Management and Eradication scenarios are associated with
minimial changes to acreage and production in California.
As for the impacts of the alternative scenarios on the total United States
production, consumption, and trade of fresh oranges and orange products, there are very
minor changes under the Pesticide Treatment, Area-Wide Pest Management, and
Eradication Scenarios. On the other hand, the No Mitigation Scenario is associated with
decreasing US output of fresh oranges to reach a decline of 9% from the base output.
Then, it remains lower than the base production levels until the year 2038, when it
follows an increasing trend such that it exceeds base production by 1.6% in 2043. Fresh
orange consumption exhibits similar trend, but the maximum decrease witnessed is 2.5%.
Also, exports follow the trend of production and consumption but the rate of decrease is
higher than production and consumption. Also, production of orange products decreases
by no more than 1% from the base level. Consumption follows a similar trend, while
imports follow an opposite direction.
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6.3.2

Welfare Impacts

This subsection starts with comparing the annual welfare impacts for the different
US regions and stakeholders under the No Mitigation Scenario with an assumption of
average pest outbreak level. Then, the total welfare impacts for the different stakeholders
and regions for the whole study period under the alternative mitigation scenarios and the
No Mitigation Scenario are compared. Finally, the welfare impacts of the alternative
scenarios under the assumptions of minimum, average, and maximum pest outbreak
levels are compared.
Changes in consumer welfare are defined as changes in consumer surplus.
Changes in wholesalers’ and retailers’ welfare are measured by changes in returns to
capital and management. Orange growers’ welfare is measured as changes in grower’s
net profits including investment costs. Due to the possibility that the asset value of an
infested orange orchard may be reduced, the analysis assumes that orange growers do not
sell the orange orchards such that they do not incur losses relating to the decline in the
value of their assets. Welfare losses for wholesalers, retailers, and growers refer to
reduction from the baseline welfare level, and should not be interpreted as negative
returns/profits.

6.3.2.1 Welfare Impacts under the No Mitigation Scenario
Changes in average California orange growers’ welfare is affected by changes in
grower returns per acre, and production costs (Figure 6-13). California growers achieve
welfare gains until 2035 due to the high grower returns resulting from higher prices.
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However, California growers start to incur welfare losses two years before average
grower returns start to decrease. This is attributed to the higher costs of investment they
incur due to new plantings which continue to increase after the changes in grower returns
because of the lags in implementation of prior investment decisions. Welfare changes of
Florida and Arizona-Texas growers follow a similar trend to that of California but with a
smaller magnitude of welfare changes.
Changes to the welfare of California fresh orange wholesalers follow an opposite
trend to those of Arizona-Texas and Florida fresh orange wholesalers and California
growers. California wholesalers of fresh oranges incur increasing welfare losses as input
prices increase at much higher rates than output prices, in addition to lower derived
demand by retailers and foreign importers because of higher prices (Figure 6-14).
Welfare losses of California fresh orange wholesalers decrease with higher California
orange output and lower input price. Meanwhile, Florida and Arizona-Texas fresh orange
wholesalers benefit from the increase in wholesale price of California since the level
change in output price is higher than the level change in input price, in addition to higher
demand for their output with the decrease in California’s supply.
The change in welfare of California’s orange products wholesalers follows an
opposite direction to that of Florida until 2024 (Figure 6-15). In the beginning of the
forecast period, Florida wholesalers achieve minor gains due to the increase of output
prices relative to input prices. However, such gains are partially offset by lower volume
of sales due to less availability of Florida oranges for processing which have been
diverted to the fresh market. As Florida’s total output increases with new plantings,
Florida’ orange for processing availability increases and the wholesale price decreases.
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This reduces the negative impacts of lower California production of orange for
processing on California’s orange products wholesalers since they are net importers,

Changes in Florida's Average Grower Returns, and Packinghouse
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Figure 6-13: Annual Changes in Growers’ Profits in the Different US Orange-Producing
Regions- No Mitigation Scenario

Meanwhile, the trend of changes of welfare impacts for fresh orange consumers
and retailers are similar in all regions (Figure 6-16). The difference between the level of
impacts on the different regions is proportional to their consumption levels. The results
show that, welfare losses to fresh orange retailers are much higher than those incurred by
consumers. This is attributed to the fact that the reduction in the retail price of fresh
oranges is much lower than that of the wholesale price. This implies that fresh orange
retailers absorb a large part of the price change which can be explained by the high
margin between the base retail price and wholesale price of fresh oranges and the higher
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elasticity of demand for oranges by consumers than the derived demand elasticity for
oranges by retailers.
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Figure 6-14: Changes in the Returns to Capital and Management for Fresh Orange
Wholesalers in the US Orange-Producing Regions- No Mitigation Scenario
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Figure 6-16: Changes to Total Welfare of Consumers and Retailers of Fresh Oranges in
all US Regions-No Mitigation Scenario

6.3.2.2 Comparison of the Welfare Impacts of the No Mitigation Scenario and the
Alternative Mitigation Scenarios
The welfare impacts of the No Mitigation Scenario and the alternative mitigation
scenarios at the average pest outbreak level are presented in the first subsection. Then, in
the second subsection, the impacts of the alternative mitigation scenarios at the minimum
average and maximum pest outbreak levels are compared.

6.3.2.2.1 Comparison of the No Mitigation Scenario and the Alternative Mitigation
Strategies at an Average Infestation Rate
The welfare impacts of the alternative scenarios in the different US regions at all
market levels without discounting and at a discount rate of 5% under the assumption of
average infestation rate, are compared in Table 6-3. The aggregate welfare impacts on the
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United States of all scenarios under 0%, 3%, 5%, 7%, and 10% discount rates are
compared in Table 6-4.
Under the No Mitigation Scenario, no action is taken to control the pest and 100%
of California’s orange acreage is expected to be infested within 10-12 years resulting in
an average loss of 11.25% of California’s orange production per year. This scenario
results in the highest aggregate welfare losses for the United States with a total of
-$1,240 million in 30 years. The highest welfare losses are incurred by fresh orange
retailers, as a total of all regions, followed by consumers of fresh oranges, California’s
fresh orange wholesalers, then California’s orange products (juice) wholesalers. The
welfare losses by fresh orange retailers are triple the welfare losses by consumers since
retailers absorb a large part of the price increase as illustrated in the previous section.
This is attributed to the high margin that retailers maintain between wholesale and retail
price, as well as the high elasticity of demand for fresh oranges by consumers compared
to the derived demand elasticity for fresh oranges by retailers from wholesalers.
Consumers’ welfare losses are attributed to the higher orange prices and lower
consumption.
California orange wholesalers also incur welfare losses because the level increase
in their input price, California’s grower price, is much higher than the increase in their
output price. Also, there is a reduction in the quantity they sell in most of the years due to
lower orange production by California. Meanwhile, Florida and Arizona-Texas
wholesalers benefit from the increase in the wholesale price of fresh oranges in California
since the grower prices in those regions increases at a lower rate than that of California.
In addition, the grower prices in Florida and Arizona-Texas decrease before the decline in

143
California’s grower price (that decline in price is witnessed due to higher output).
Although the increase in California’s acreage is much higher than that of the other two
regions, acreage impact on output is offset by the yield shock in most of the years such
that California’s orange output remain lower than the base level until the year 2041. By
contrast, the increase of acreage in Arizona-Texas and Florida, though lower, is
associated with a positive increase in fresh orange output.
The decline in Florida and Arizona-Texas regions grower prices starting the mid
2030’s offsets the gains they achieve in the beginning of the period, and the net impact on
growers in those two regions for the 30 years is a welfare loss of -$17 million and
-$3 million respectively. On the other hand, when a 5% discount rate is applied, the net
gains for those two regions is a gain of $51 million for Florida, and $10 million for
Arizona-Texas. However, all the welfare losses and gains for Florida growers are
minimal compared to their production revenues.
The growers in California achieve the highest gains under the No Mitigation
Scenario in the 30-year period. The aggregate gains they achieve represent a total of
$1063 million at zero discount rate and $766 million at a 5% discount rate. Most of the
gains achieved by California’s growers are concentrated in the first 20 years of the
projection period. Their gains in those 20 years are 1.65 times the total gains achieved in
the 30-year period.
Meanwhile, the eradication scenario results in the lowest welfare losses for the
United States among all scenarios at all discount rates ($-4.02 million at 0% discount rate
falling to $-3.36 million at 10% discount rate). In addition, the Eradication scenario is
associated with the lowest welfare losses and gains for all groups of stakeholders.
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Consumers’, retailers’, and wholesalers’ welfare losses are $-0.36 million, $-0.61 million,
and $-2.34 million respectively which are minimal welfare losses compared to the other
scenarios. Also, the overall welfare loss to California orange growers is only $-0.93
million.
The Pesticide Treatment Scenario and Area-wide Pest Management Scenario
result in higher welfare losses than the Eradiation scenario, but lower than the No
Mitigation Scenario. As an aggregate impact on the United States, the Pesticide
Treatment Scenario and the Area-Wide Pest Management Scenario result in similar levels
of welfare losses that amount to -$75 million and -$77 million respectively at a zerodiscount rate. However, the distribution of welfare gains and losses among the different
agents differs between both scenarios. The Area-Wide Pest Management Scenario is
associated with welfare losses to fresh orange consumers and retailers in all regions and
California fresh orange wholesalers that are about one-third of those incurred under the
Pesticide Treatment scenario. Meanwhile, the aggregate impact on fresh orange growers
in California is a gain of $75 million under the Pesticide Treatment Scenario, and a
welfare loss of $-23 million under the Area-Wide Pest Management Scenario.
Decomposing the welfare impacts on California orange growers to distinguish
between growers in infested and non-infested areas, we find that under the Pesticide
Treatment scenario, orange growers in infested areas achieve total welfare losses of $116 million while growers in non-infested areas achieve total gains of $192 million
during the thirty-year forecast period. Meanwhile, under the Area-Wide Pest management
scenario, there are welfare gains for growers in non-infested areas of $70 million and
welfare losses of -$93 million for growers in infested areas compared to base grower
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profits during the thirty-year forecast period. The Eradication Scenario is associated with
welfare losses of -$5.6 million for orange growers in infested areas, and welfare gains of
$4.7 million for growers in non-infested areas. Under the No Mitigation Scenario, all of
California’s orange acreage is infested with the pest starting year 12. Growers in infested
areas achieve total gains of $859 million dollars in the 30-year projection period, and
growers in non-infested areas achieve total gains of $204 million.
In the following, the per grower welfare gains and losses under the four pest
management scenarios are compared. An average orchard size of 60 acres is assumed,
based on O’Connell (2009). The No Mitigation scenario is associated with average gains
of $7800 per grower in non-infested areas and average gains of $29,190 per grower in
infested areas. Grower gains are calculated based on the assumption that the average crop
loss rate of 11.25% uniformly applies to all growers. However, the orange crop damages
due to the pest infestation range between 2.5% and 19.4%. Thus, if the crop losses do not
uniformly apply to growers, California growers whose orchard is affected by the
maximum crop damage of 19.4% under this scenario achieve average annual welfare
losses of -$14,058 which are still lower than the average losses under Pesticide Treatment
scenario as seen below.
Under the Pesticide Treatment Scenario, growers in infested areas, which
represent 9% of total California’s orange acreage in 2043, incur losses due to pesticide
spraying costs in addition to losing 11.25% of their yield, but there are savings in harvest
costs. For example, in 2043, 272 orange growers in infested areas are forecast to incur an
average reduction in profit of -$40,880.2 each. Meanwhile, each of the 2645 growers in
non-infested areas is forecast to achieve an average increase of $6291.4 in profit.
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Under the Area-Wide Pest Management Scenario, growers in infested areas reach
0.21% of total orange acreage in California in 2043. Assuming an orchard size of 60
acres, 55 orange growers incur a profit reduction of -$160,113 each in 2043 in infested
areas, and 2848 growers in non-infested areas achieve a profit increase of $2450.8 each in
non-infested areas in the same year. The welfare losses to California orange growers are
concentrated at the end of the forecast period when the infestation rate ranges between
1% and 1.85%. Thus, 80% of the welfare losses incurred by growers are during the
period (2036-2043). Consequently, the discounted welfare losses of California orange
growers in infested areas are -$33.1 million and -$14 million at 5% and 10% discount
rates respectively.
Under the eradication scenario, the infestation of the False Codling Moth is
concentrated in the first year (0.43% of the total orange acreage), after which the
infestation rate decreases to 0.000485% in the second year, and then it decreases
gradually to reach total eradication in the seventh year. Therefore, the main impact of the
eradication program is witnessed in the first year. Assuming an average orange orchard
size of 60 acres, 12 orange growers incur a welfare loss of -$459,696 each in the first
year of the forecast period. Those welfare losses comprise revenue losses due to stripping
of the entire orchard yield which is a requirement of the program, in addition to the costs
of applying the mitigation programs of Sterile Insect Technique and Mating Disruption
besides the costs of fruit stripping. The calculation of profit losses of growers takes into
account the saving of harvest and growth regulator costs. In the same year, gains of
growers in non-infested areas are negligible ($3.7 per grower). Following that year, gains
and losses of all growers (there is no need to classify growers between infested and non-
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infested areas anymore since the pest is eradicated) alternate within a minimal range due
to the minor changes in new plantings following the initial price increase in the first year
as explained in the previous subsection.

6.3.2.2.2 Comparison of the Impacts of the Alternative Pest Management Scenarios
under the Three Pest Outbreak Levels
The welfare impacts of the four alternative mitigation scenarios under the
minimum, average, and maximum pest outbreak levels (with estimated potential yield
losses denoted minimum, average, and maximum respectively in Table 6-2) are
compared in Tables 6-4 and 6-5. The ranking of the No Mitigation Scenario with respect
to the aggregate welfare impacts on the United States and the welfare impacts on the
different economic agents does not change under the three pest outbreak levels. It is
associated with the highest welfare aggregate losses for the United States and the highest
welfare gains for California orange growers. It also results in the highest welfare losses
for fresh orange consumers, retailers, and California wholesalers.
Under the average and maximum pest outbreak levels, the eradication scenario is
associated with the lowest welfare losses. While there are small differences between the
values of the aggregate welfare losses that the United States incurs under the Pesticide
Treatment and Area-Wide Pest Management scenarios at the average outbreak
assumption (-$75 million and -$77 million respectively), the difference in the values of
aggregate welfare losses increases under the maximum outbreak scenario such that the
former is associated with welfare losses -$311.69 and the latter is associated with losses
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of -$327.29 million .The distribution of gains among the different agents for both
scenarios does not change with the different outbreak assumptions.
For the minimum pest outbreak assumption, the Area-Wide Pest Management
scenario has a similar impact on pest spread as that of the eradication scenario under an
average outbreak assumption such that the pest is eradicated after the fifth year.
However, this scenario is associated with lower welfare losses to orange growers in the
infested area than the Eradication scenario because the treatment costs are lower, and the
growers can still sell the non-infested crop. Therefore, it is associated with a smaller
overall welfare loss to the United States than that resulting from the Eradication Scenario.
The Pesticide Treatment Scenario results in an overall welfare loss of $-9.81 million
under the minimum outbreak assumption.

6.3.2.2.3 Sensitivity of the Results to Different Discount Rates
Under the Pesticide Treatment and Area-Wide Pest Management scenarios, a
higher discount rate results in lower overall welfare losses to the United States because
the infestation rate increases gradually over the forecast period. As explained in the AreaWide Pest Management case, most of the welfare losses to growers in infested areas
occur during the last eight years of the forecast period. Also, consumer welfare losses are
higher near the end of the forecast period when the price increase is higher under both
scenarios. That is why consumer welfare losses at a 5% discount rate are about one-third
their levels at a 0% discount rate under both scenarios. Meanwhile, under the eradication
scenario, the total consumer welfare losses actually increase with discount rates since
they are concentrated at the beginning of the forecast period. Overall, under the
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eradication scenario, the total welfare impacts are less sensitive to changes to discount
rate since most of the pest impact is concentrated in the beginning of the forecast period.
In the No Mitigation Scenario, the pest spreads to 100% of California’s acreage in
year 11 with a yield reduction of 11.25% in all orange growing areas. Consumer welfare
and fresh orange retailers’ and wholesalers’ welfare losses are reduced by about 50%
using a 5% discount rate. However, orange growers’ gains are only reduced by 25%. This
is because as an overall impact growers achieve higher gains in the beginning of the
forecast period. In fact, California growers achieve gains in the first 20 years of the
forecast period that are 1.65 times the total gain they achieve in the thirty-year period.
They start to achieve welfare losses with lower price increase and higher investment costs
starting the year 2035 as explained above.

6.4

Conclusions

This chapter compares the economic impacts of four alternate pest management
programs to address the threat of False Codling Moth to California oranges. The
projected pest spread and crop damages resulting from the alternative pest management
alternatives are provided by PEARL/NCSU (2013). The first alternative is a No
Mitigation Scenario where no action is taken to control the pest. All California’s orange
producing areas are infested with the pest in 11 years at the average pest outbreak
assumption, and the pest is associated with an 11.25% loss of orange crop.
The other three scenarios include alternative pest control programs where the
orange growers in infested areas incur all the costs. The Pesticide Treatment Scenario
involves pesticide spraying at an additional cost of $380.9 per acre in infested areas. The
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pest spreads to 9.3% of California’s orange acreage in 30 year under this scenario.
Meanwhile, the Area-Wide Pest Management Scenario requires orange growers in
infested areas to apply pesticides and strip the infested fruits but they can still sell 80% of
the orchard yield. This program reduces the pest spread to 1.89% of total California’s
acreage in 30 years at an average infestation rate and can lead to total eradication of the
pest at a minimum pest outbreak assumption. On the other hand, the eradication scenario
requires orange growers in infested areas to totally destroy their orange crop and apply
several pest control techniques that cost them $3540 per acre. The maximum spread of
the pest is in 0.43% of California’s orange acreage in the first year of infestation, after
which the pest almost disappears until it is fully eradicated in the seventh year.
The No Mitigation Scenario is associated with the highest aggregate welfare losses
for the United States under discount rates ranging between 0% and 10%. The Eradication
scenario is associated with the lowest total aggregate welfare loss for the United States at
all discount rates. At the minimum pest outbreak assumption, the Area-Wide Pest
Management scenario has similar welfare impacts to the Eradication scenario since they
have similar pest spread impacts. However, at the average and maximum pest outbreak
assumptions, the Area-Wide Pest Management and Pesticide treatment scenarios result in
similar values of aggregate welfare losses to the United States, though the Area-Wide
Pest Management Scenario results in slightly higher overall welfare losses than those
resulting from the Pesticide Treatment Scenario under a maximum outbreak assumption
(-$311.69 million versus -$327.29 million). Yet, in terms of the distribution of the
welfare impacts among the different agents, the two scenarios differ as explained below.
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Considering the separate welfare impacts of the alternative scenarios on the
different groups of stakeholders, the Eradication Scenario is associated with the lowest
welfare losses for fresh orange consumers, retailers, and wholesalers who incur the
highest welfare losses under the other scenarios especially the No Mitigation Scenario.
On the other hand, the No Mitigation and Pesticide Treatment scenarios result in the
highest gains for California orange growers. Meanwhile, the Area-Wide Pest
Management Scenario leads to negative welfare gains for California orange growers
except under the minimum pest outbreak assumption.
Decomposing the impacts on California orange growers at the average infestation
rate, the Pesticide Treatment Scenario, Area-Wide Pest Management, and Eradication
scenarios result in welfare losses of -$116 million, -$93 million, and -$6 million for
growers in infested areas respectively, and gains of $190 million, $60 million, and $5
million for growers in non-infested areas respectively. Yet, the per grower welfare losses
vary among the three scenarios due to their different impacts on pest spread and the
varying program costs. Assuming an orchard size of 60 acres, 12 growers in infested
areas incur -$459,696 under the Eradication Scenario in 2014 (the year of highest pest
spread), 272 growers incur welfare losses of -$40,880 under the Pesticide Treatment
Scenario in 2043, and 55 growers incur welfare losses of -$160,113 under the Area-Wide
Pest Management Scenario in 2043.
Also, the findings show that the welfare impacts of orange growers and fresh
orange wholesalers exhibit a negative relationship. However, a large percentage of
California growers are members of cooperatives that perform the packing operations for
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them and most of the revenues/losses accrue to growers. Therefore, some of the welfare
gains/losses of growers are partially offset by impacts on wholesalers.
Although, in the No Mitigation Scenario, there are high welfare losses to
consumers due to higher prices of fresh oranges, the change in the retail price level is
about 30% of the change in the wholesale price at retailers’ door. This is attributed to the
high margin between the two prices which allows retailers to absorb a large part of the
price change. This is besides the higher elasticity of demand of consumers for fresh
oranges relative to the derived demand elasticity of retailers for fresh oranges.
The welfare impacts on Florida growers due to changes in California’s market are
small relative to the size of orange production in Florida even in the No Mitigation
Scenario when there are large changes to price of fresh oranges in the US market. The
reason is the small contribution (around 5%) of fresh oranges to Florida’s orange
production which is mainly allocated to the processing market. On the other hand, the
welfare impacts on Arizona-Texas markets are larger relative to the size of its orange
industry since most of its production is directed to the fresh orange channel.
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Table 6-3: Comparison of Welfare Impacts of the Alternative Scenarios on the US Regions (Value $Million)
Total with zero discount rate

Pesticide Only

No Mitigation Scenario

Scenario

Element

Total with 5% discount rate

CA

FL

AZ-TX

ROUS

Total US

CA

FL

AZ-TX

ROUS

Total
US

Consumer Welfare Fresh

-59.86

-29.44

-66.84

-351.26

-507.4

-29.93

-14.66

-33.34

-175.78

-253.71

Consumer Welfare Juice

4.77

0.48

4.44

40.78

50.47

0.71

-0.42

0.73

4.54

5.56

Retail Fresh
Retail Juice

-179.05
5.70

-95.73
3.77

-187.47
4.94

-1090.69
20.96

-1552.94
35.37

-88.69
0.09

-47.63
0.69

-92.89
-0.01

-539.95
1.05

-769.16
1.82

Wholesale Fresh

-519.90

135.92

84.57

-299.41

-255.61

62.40

32.78

-160.43

Wholesale Juice

-184.94

169.74

5.87

-9.34

-89.32

47.08

1.97

-40.26

766.21

Growers Infested Areas

859.2

556.5

Growers non-Infested Areas

204.1

140.8

Total Grower

1,063.3

-16.84

-3.33

1,043.13

704.54

51.60

10.07

Total

130.02

167.9

-157.82

-1380.2

-1,240.11

241.79

99.06

-80.69

-710.14

-449.98

Consumer Welfare Fresh

-3.72

-1.79

-4.23

-22.14

-31.88

-1.31

-0.64

-1.49

-7.81

-11.25

Consumer Welfare Juice

-0.21

-0.18

-0.20

-1.42

-2.01

-0.07

-0.06

-0.06

-0.47

-0.66

Retail Fresh

-11.14

-5.81

-11.74

-67.8

-96.5

-3.93

-2.06

-4.14

-23.91

-34.04

Retail Juice

-0.25

-0.01

-0.21

-0.65

-1.12

-0.10

-0.01

-0.09

-0.27

-0.47

1.31

0.00

-9.47

Wholesale Fresh

-37.68

8.08

3.94

-25.66

-13.71

2.93

Wholesale Juice

-12.92

3.13

0.20

-9.59

-4.26

0.86

Growers Infested Areas

-116.43

-40.09

Growers non-Infested Areas

192.01

66.31

74.38

14.17

2.91

Total

5.80

18.18

-9.12

-92.01

91.46

26.22

4.95

1.09

-75.3

2.84

5.97

-3.38

32.26
-32.46

-27.03
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Total Growers

-3.4
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Table 6-4: Continued
Total with zero discount rate

Eradication Scenario

Area-Wide Pest Management

Scenario

Element

Total with 5% discount rate

CA

FL

AZ-TX

ROUS

Total US

CA

FL

AZ-TX

ROUS

Total
US

Consumer Welfare Fresh

-1.28

-0.62

-1.46

-7.64

-11.01

-0.45

-0.22

-0.51

-2.69

-3.87

Consumer Welfare Juice

-0.08

-0.07

-0.08

-0.55

-0.78

-0.03

-0.02

-0.03

-0.18

-0.26

Retail Fresh

-3.85

-2.00

-4.05

-23.4

-33.3

-1.35

-0.71

-1.42

-8.23

-11.71

Retail Juice

-0.10

-0.01

-0.09

-1.42

-1.62

-0.04

-0.01

-0.04

-0.59

-0.68

Wholesale Fresh

-14.27

2.94

0.63

-10.70

-5.01

1.02

0.16

-3.83

Wholesale Juice

-4.80

1.08

-0.02

-3.74

-1.66

0.33

-0.01

-1.34

Growers- Infested Areas

-93.47

-33.06

Growers- non-Infested Areas

70.05

24.56
-16.24

-8.50

1.84

0.75

0.00

-5.91

-12.27

-77.37

-17.04

2.23

-1.1

-11.69

-27.6

-0.05

-0.28

-0.41

-0.08

-0.05

-0.09

-0.50

-0.72

0.00

0.01

0.04

0.06

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.01

0.02

-0.15

-0.10

-0.17

-0.9

-1.32

-0.26

-0.15

-0.28

-1.57

-2.26

Retail Juice

-0.02

-0.01

-0.02

-0.16

-0.21

-0.03

-0.01

-0.03

-0.19

-0.26

Wholesale Fresh

-1.65

0.11

-0.62

-2.16

-1.76

0.18

-0.19

-1.77

Wholesale Juice

-0.33

0.29

-0.02

-0.06

-0.40

0.16

-0.03

-0.27

Total Growers

-23.42

5.14

2.04

Total

-47.80

6.46

-3.02

Consumer Welfare Fresh

-0.05

-0.03

Consumer Welfare Juice

0.01

Retail Fresh

Growers- Infested Areas

-5.6

-5.34

Growers -non-Infested Areas

4.67

6.22

-0.93

0.12

0.87

0

0.06

0.88

0.44

0.36

0.00

1.68

Total

-3.1

0.40

-0.04

-1.3

-4.02

-1.65

0.57

-0.25

-2.25

-3.58
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Table 6-4: Welfare Impacts under the Alternative Mitigation Scenarios, and Pest Outbreak Assumptions- No Discounting
(Value $Million)
No Mitigation

Pesticide Treatment

Area-Wide Pest Management

Eradication

Economic
Region Maximum Average Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum Average Minimum
Agent
Outbreak Outbreak Outbreak Outbreak Outbreak Outbreak Outbreak Outbreak Outbreak Outbreak Outbreak Outbreak

Total

-985.4

-507.4

-107.7

-134.21

-31.88

-2.28

-62.73

-11.01

-0.12

0.93

-0.4

-0.14

Consumer
Welfare
Juice

Total

95.6

50.47

5.08

-7.81

-2.01

-0.15

-4.13

-0.78

0

0

0.06

0.02

Retail
Fresh

Total

-2815.1

-1552.94

-324.63

-405.69

-96.5

-6.9

-189.57

-33.3

-0.37

2.49

-1.32

-0.45

Retail
Juice

Total

47.3

35.37

8.5

-7.59

-1.12

-0.15

-4.17

-1.62

0

-1.36

-0.21

-0.01

Total

-608

-299.4

-61.8

-108.49

-25.66

-1.5

-51.71

-10.7

-0.02

-5.34

-2.16

0.1

-1060.4

-519.9

-109.9

-158.28

-37.68

-2.64

-74.88

-14.27

-0.15

-5.11

-1.65

-0.24

173.03

84.57

18.4

15.73

3.94

0.56

7.27

0.63

0.1

-0.37

-0.62

0.04

FL

279.4

135.9

29.9

34.05

8.08

0.58

15.9

2.94

0.03

0.14

0.11

0.3

Total

-22.3

-9.34

-7.08

-39.37

-9.59

-0.9

-13.67

-3.74

-0.21

-0.65

-0.06

0

Total

1265.2

1043.13

295.6

391.47

91.46

2.06

-1.32

-16.24

0.63

0.43

0.06

0.32

CA

1329.04

1063.33

289.5

324.88

74.38

1.23

-34.39

-23.42

0.71

-1.26

-0.93

0.65

AZ-TX

-2.4

-3.33

1.29

15.25

2.9

-0.14

7.34

2.04

-0.12

-0.15

0.87

-0.39

FL

-124.5

-16.84

4.82

51.35

14.17

0.97

25.73

5.14

0.04

1.84

0.12

0.07

Total

-3022.7

-1240.1

-192.03

-311.69

-75.3

-9.82

-327.29

-77.37

-0.09

-3.5

-4.02

-0.16

Wholesale CA
Fresh
AZ-TX

Wholesale
Juice

Grower
Profit

Total

155

Consumer
Welfare
Fresh

156

Table 6-5: Total Welfare Impacts for the United States under the ِAlternative Scenarios at Different Infestation and Discount
Rates
(Value $Million)
No Mitigation
Discount
Rate
Maximum Average Minimum
Outbreak Outbreak Outbreak

Pesticide Treatment

Area-Wide Pest Management

Eradication

Maximum
Outbreak

Average
Outbreak

Minimum
Outbreak

Maximum
Outbreak

Average
Outbreak

Minimum
Outbreak

Maximum
Outbreak

Average
Outbreak

Minimum
Outbreak

0%

-3022.72

-1204.16

-192.03

-311.69

-75.3

-9.82

-327.29

-77.37

-0.09

-3.5

-4.02

-0.161

3%

-1721.96

-658.95

-94.81

-161.75

-41.55

-4.84

-174.48

-40.79

0.05

-2.89

-3.84

-0.159

5%

-1354.71

-438.78

-64.21

-107.53

-27.16

3.21

-118.09

-27.59

0.074

-2.34

-3.67

-0.158

7%

-1075.91

-321.31

-43.49

-73.18

-18.88

-2.18

-81.82

-19.23

0.071

-1.81

-3.53

-0.155

10%

-774.65

-191.53

-25.28

-43.01

-11.13

-1.28

-49.31

-11.87

0.05

-1.12

-3.36

-0.148
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH

7.1

Conclusions

This dissertation provides decision support to the United States regulators in the
identification of the trade-offs in economic welfare among the different stakeholders to
the United States orange industry under the alternative pest management strategies of
False Codling Moth affecting California’s oranges. This is achieved through the
integration of an economic model developed in this research with the output from a pest
spread model developed by the United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service and North Carolina State University (PEARL/NCSU
2013).
False Codling Moth, a pest that prefers oranges as its main host, is not presently in
the United States. Yet, it has the potential to be established in California. If introduced to
California and no action is taken for its control, False Codling Moth can spread in all of
California’s orange growing areas within 10 to 12 years, causing an average loss of
11.25% of California’s orange production per year. California’s orange production
represents 25% of the US total orange production. However, California dominates the
United States fresh orange market with a market share of more than 75%. By contrast,
Florida is the main US producer of oranges directed to processing. California and Florida
constitute 97% of the US orange production, and Texas and Arizona produce the rest.
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Several mitigation options are currently considered for the control/eradication of
False Codling Moth where California orange growers in infested areas are assumed to
pay the mitigation costs. The Pesticide Treatment Scenario involves pesticide spraying at
an additional cost of $380.9 per acre in infested areas. The pest spreads to 9.3% of
California’s orange acreage in 30 years under this scenario. Meanwhile, the Area-Wide
Pest Management Scenario requires orange growers in infested areas to apply pesticides
and strip the infested fruits but they can still sell the non-infested fruits. The mitigation
practices under this scenario imply an additional cost of $2310.5 per acre for growers in
infested areas. This program reduces the pest spread to 1.89% of total California’s
acreage in 30 years at an average infestation rate and can lead to total eradication of the
pest at a minimum infestation rate. On the other hand, the eradication scenario requires
orange growers in infested areas to totally destroy their orange crop and biological
control techniques that cost them $3508.5 per acre. The maximum spread of the pest is
0.43% of California’s orange acreage in the first year of infestation, after which the pest
almost disappears until it is fully eradicated in the seventh year.
Therefore, the main objective of the current research has been to identify the tradeoffs in economic welfare among the different agents in the United States orange market
under the alternative pest management strategies of False Codling Moth in California.
This objective is achieved through developing a model that projects the economic
impacts of phytosanitary measures for 30 years on the different stakeholders (consumers,
retailers, wholesalers, and orange growers) along the US supply chain of fresh oranges
and orange products in a dynamic partial-equilibrium framework.
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Comparison of the impacts of the alternative pest management scenarios shows
that the No Mitigation Scenario results in the highest aggregate welfare losses to the
United States(-$1240 million), while the eradication scenario is associated with the
lowest aggregate welfare losses(-$4 million). Alternatively, both the Pesticide Treatment
and Area-Wide Pest Management Scenarios result in similar aggregate welfare losses
(-$75 million and -$77 million respectively).
California orange growers’ ranking of the alternative pest management scenarios
in terms of welfare impacts is opposite to that of the United States as a whole as well as
most of the other economic agents. The No Mitigation Scenario is associated with the
highest welfare gains for California orange growers in infested and non-infested areas,
and the highest welfare losses for fresh orange consumers, retailers, California
wholesalers, and the United States as a whole. This scenario has a similar impact to
volume control policies. Prior to 1994, California orange growers participated in volume
control policies when the California-Arizona Citrus Marketing Order permitted them to
restrict the quantity of oranges sold in the fresh market. The organization of California
growers through a cooperative system allowed them to apply a mechanism for
compensation of growers who incur losses due to volume control (Jacobs 1994). Such
cooperatives still exist but they currently operate in a market where volume control is
outlawed. Their role is to perform the wholesale operations of packing and marketing of
fresh oranges on behalf of growers and all the profits/losses accrue to growers (Boland
2008).
Given that many of California orange growers are also fresh orange wholesalers,
the gains they achieve under the No Mitigation policy are partially offset by the losses
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incurred at the wholesale level. Another consideration concerning the No Mitigation
scenario is the existence of risks for individual California orange growers relating to the
distribution of crop losses among them. All orange growers achieve gains under that
scenario at the different pest outbreak assumptions (minimum, average, and maximum),
if the crop losses are proportionately distributed among growers. If the crop losses are
disproportionately distributed among orange growers, an individual grower who suffers
the maximum crop loss rate of 19.4% under the scenario of an aggregate crop loss of
11.25% incurs an annual average loss of $14 thousand. That annual loss is still lower than
that of individual growers under the scenarios involving mitigation, but the probability of
pest infestation is higher.
The scenarios involving mitigation have minimal impacts on orange prices and
require orange growers in infested areas to pay for the mitigation costs. Therefore, such
scenarios are associated with welfare losses/lower welfare gains for California orange
growers and lower welfare losses for the other economic agents and the United States as
a whole. Among the four alternative pest management scenarios, the Eradication
Scenario ranks highest for all economic agents except California orange growers in noninfested areas. Also, compared to the other scenarios involving mitigation, the
Eradication scenario results in the lowest total welfare losses for California orange
growers in infested areas. However, the losses are concentrated among a small number of
growers. Assuming an average orange orchard size of 60 acres in California, 12 orange
growers incur welfare losses of -$460 thousand in the first year of the projection period
after which the pest is totally eradicated. Meanwhile, California orange growers as a
group incur total welfare losses of -$23 million under the Area-Wide Pest Management
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as opposed to total welfare gains of $76 million under the Pesticide Management
Scenario. Although total welfare losses for California orange growers in infested areas
under the Pesticide Treatment Scenario are higher than those under the Area-Wide Pest
Management Scenario, losses for individual growers under the Pesticide Treatment
Scenario are lower.
The above raises the question of whether gainers from the Eradication Scenario
could compensate California orange growers for the welfare losses associated with that
scenario including the welfare gains forgone due to not adopting the No Mitigation
Scenario. Retailers and consumers of fresh oranges in all US regions and California
wholesalers of fresh oranges and orange products incur total welfare losses of
-$2680 million under the no Mitigation Scenario, and -$5 million under the Eradication
scenario. Thus, the Eradication Scenario avoids them total welfare losses of $2675
million. In contrast, California orange growers achieve gains of $1063 million under the
No Mitigation Scenario, and losses of -$0.93 million under the Eradication Scenario.
Thus, accounting for the gains forgone, the Eradication scenario results in welfare losses
of -$1063.93 million for California growers. If fresh orange retailers and consumers in all
regions and California wholesalers of fresh oranges and orange products transfer
$1063.93 million to California orange growers, they could avoid losses of $2675 million.

7.2

Limitations and Recommendations for Further Research

There are several limitations to the analysis in the current study that would benefit
from further research. First, the model employed in the current research assumes that the
allocation of oranges between the fresh and processed markets in California is determined
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by exogenous factors like weather. This assumption is based on the fact that the
delivered-in price of oranges for processing is too low compared to the packinghouse
door price of fresh oranges, since most of the oranges directed to processing are fruits
that do not meet the standard of packinghouses. In addition, after the termination of the
Arizona-California Citrus Marketing Order in 1994, about 80% of California’s
production is allocated to the fresh market. The years when a lower share of California’s
orange production is utilized as fresh are the years of severe weather events or lower
rainfall. This led to the assumption that California orange growers strive to route their
production to the fresh market channel, and the quantity of orange output that is routed
out of the fresh market channel is determined by factors out of the grower’s control.
However, further research about how California orange producers make their decision
about the allocation of their production between the fresh and processed market will
provide more insights to the analysis.
Another limitation to the model developed in the current study is the nonavailability of data about inter-state trade in the United States. The model only accounts
for net trade flows of each region without disaggregation of trade flows by origin and
destination. Disaggregation of trade flows by origin and destination is particularly
important when analyzing the impacts of measures that involve restrictions on movement
of fruits from infested areas to specific regions. The current model treats restrictions on
movement as a prohibitive tariff equivalent of the quantity of trade reduction resulting
from the measure. However, restrictions on movement of fruits are not among the
scenarios considered for the mitigation of False Codling Moth, the pest of focus in the
current research.
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Finally, while oranges represent the main host for False Codling Moth, there are
other crops which can host the pest. The pest spread model assumes that producers of the
other crops adopt the same control policies proposed for oranges. Thus, accounting for
other hosts to the crop in both the pest spread and economic model is a useful extension
of the current research.
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APPENDIX

All the model equations are transformed into logarithmic differential form. The
logarithmic differential form has the advantage of being driven by elasticities which are
easier to estimate or obtain from the literature. In addition, it allows the flexibility of
either using historically observed data or projected data (Paarlberg et. al. 2008). The
following shows the logarithmic transformation of the equations explained in chapter 4.

Consumer Demand
Total logarithmic differentiation of equation (4.1) gives the percentage change in
consumer demand for the aggregate of fresh oranges and orange products as follows:

where Co represents percentage change in consumer demand,
elasticity of demand for oranges,



refers to income

E is percentage change in consumer expenditure,  is

own price elasticity of demand for oranges, and Po RC is the change in average retail price
of oranges,
products,



population.

 is the cross price elasticity of demand for oranges with respect to other
is the change in the consumer fear, and pop is the percentage change in
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Meanwhile, the percentage change in fresh orange consumer demand is
represented as follows:

where

σ c refers to elasticity of substation between fresh oranges and orange

products, and subscripts o, of, and op denote all oranges, fresh oranges, and orange
products respectively.
Orange products demand is represented as:

Wholesale and Retail Level
Total differentiation of factor market clearing conditions in equations (4.14) to
(4.19) gives:

Total differentiation of the zero-profit conditions, application of the envelope
theorem, and normalization of quantity on the unit isoquant, the retail price is represented
as a linear combination of the percentage changes in wages, retail returns to capital and
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management, and wholesale price of oranges at retailer’s door weighted by their revenue
shares:

Similarly, the wholesale price of oranges is represented as a linear combination of
percentage changes in wages, percentage changes in returns to capital and management
of wholesalers, and percentage changes in the packinghouse door price of oranges as
follows:

With the assumption of constant returns to scale, and as shown in Paarlberg et. al.
(2008), Woodland(1982), and Chamber (1988), the change in the ratio of per unit demand
of oranges to per unit demand of capital is expressed as a function of the elasticity of
substitution between oranges and capital, and the change in the ratio of the price of
oranges and returns to capital as follows:

The ratio between the percentage change in per unit demand for labor to the per
unit demand for capital to produce a unit of oranges for retail sale is represented in a
similar way:

The equations at the wholesale level are represented similarly.
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Supply by Orange Growers
Totally differentiating equation (4.30), we obtain:
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